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This study extends two bodies of research, one that analyzes institutional price
response to student financial aid and a second that examines the effect of state merit-
based aid programs on institutions, by examining changes in tuition and fees, room and
board charges, and institutional aid expenditures following the introduction of the Bright
Futures merit-based aid program in Florida. Applying an economic theoretical framework
to postsecondary education pricing, this study explores how institutions respond to the
introduction of a new aid subsidy and how this response varies for different types of
postsecondary institutions. Using descriptive and ordinary least squares regression
analyses that include year fixed-effects and other controls, this study uses institutional
data for the 1993-1994 to 2000-2001 academic years from the Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System and the Florida Bright Futures program to explore postsecondary
price changes in Florida relative to a control group of institutions in selected southeastern
states.
The findings show that the introduction of Bright Futures was associated with an
increase in tuition and fees at public four-year and public two-year institutions in Florida
as well as an increase in room and board rates in public four-year institutions in Florida
but no change in price at private four-year institutions in Florida. Some caution is
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warranted in interpreting these findings to mean that the aid subsidy alone caused the
increase in price because the analyses show no change in price at institutions in Florida
with the highest concentration of Bright Futures scholarship recipients. One explanation
for the change in price in public sector institutions is that Florida had such low tuition
rates relative to the U.S. average that Florida policymakers acted to close the price gap
with surrounding states. The absence of a significant price change at private four-year
institutions in Florida and institutions with high concentrations of Bright Futures
recipients may suggest that these institutions responded to the increased flow of
scholarship recipients by becoming more academically selective rather than by increasing
their price.
The study’s findings have implications for policy and research. Specifically, the
findings highlight the need for states to monitor the effect of state financial aid programs
on prices in each sector in order to determine what portion of the subsidy is captured by
students and what portion is captured by institutions. The study also identifies directions
for future research.
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State governments play a critical role in financing and extending access to
postsecondary education in three primary ways: by making decisions about direct
appropriations to institutions, by influencing or setting tuition prices at public institutions,
and by offering state financial aid programs directly to students (Hauptman, 2001).
During the 1990s the most striking change in the states’ involvement was the initiation
and growth of merit-based student financial aid programs. Traditionally state financial aid
programs directed resources to financially needy students and modeled their eligibility
criteria after federal grant programs such as the Pell Grant. In contrast, these new state
merit-based programs award financial aid to students for good academic performance
rather than financial need. Although the qualification criteria and the scholarship amounts
of merit-based aid programs in different states vary widely, most states award the aid
based on the student’s score on a state standardized test or college entrance examinations,
grade point average (GPA) in specified courses, and, in some cases, taking particular
college preparatory courses.
State merit-based aid has grown considerably in the last two decades in terms of
the number of states with merit-based aid, total dollar amount awarded, and percentage
growth of merit-based aid expenditures compared with need-based aid. In 1993 only
Georgia had a merit-based aid program, but 14 other states had launched similar
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programs by 2005, and more than a dozen other states had listed the development of a
merit-based aid program on their state policy agenda (Heller & Marin, 2004). In 2004-
2005 all 50 states and the District of Columbia collectively spent $1.7 billion on non-
need merit-based aid programs compared with only $350 million dollars 10 years earlier
(National Association of State Student Grant & Aid Programs [NASSGAP], 2005). The
share of state financial aid distributed based on merit grew from 10% of all state aid in
the United States in 1994-1995 to 27% in 2004-2005 (NASSGAP). In the same time
period, total dollars awarded through state merit-based aid programs grew by
approximately 300% in constant dollars, whereas need-based aid grew by just 70%
(NASSGAP).
Growth in state merit-based aid is driven by the tremendous popularity of this
type of aid among policymakers and their constituents as a tool for: (a) encouraging high
school students to perform well academically and to prepare for college, (b) persuading
high achieving high school students to stay in-state for college, (c) promoting college
attainment, (d) expanding college access within the state to stimulate production of
postsecondary degrees and thereby improve the productivity of the state’s economy, and
(e) reducing the cost of postsecondary education in response to voter concerns about
rising college costs (Heller, 2002; Heller & Marin, 2002, 2004; Heller & Rogers, 2003).
Because the price of postsecondary opportunities is increasing, the public
welcomes merit-based aid programs as an additional subsidy that reduces college prices.
In particular, middle- and upper-income residents in states with merit-based aid who may
not qualify for means-tested need-based aid programs strongly support merit-based aid
programs (McCrary & Condrey, 1998). According to the College Board (2006), the
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prices of average tuition and fees have increased almost every year between 1996 and
2006 in both constant and current dollars in private and public four-year colleges. The
College Board (2006) analysis also shows that tuition and fees at public four-year
colleges increased by 35% in constant dollars between 2001 and 2006, 11% at private
four-year colleges, and 23% at public two-year colleges. Thus, in the context of rising
college prices, the popularity of merit-based aid programs is unlikely to diminish because
middle- and upper-income citizens are a large and powerful supportive constituency, and
policies with such broad-based political support tend to endure (Dynarski, 2004).
Ironically, state merit-based aid programs enjoy broad political support, in part,
because they address middle- and upper-class anxiety about college affordability, yet
recent research on state merit-based aid suggests these programs actually contribute to
increases in tuition and fees (Long, 2002, 2003). Long (2002, 2003) hypothesized that the
Georgia merit-based aid program might lead to an increase in student charges because
institutions could capture the new aid revenues, or the program might reduce institutional
financial aid because the new merit-based aid revenues substituted for institutional aid
expenditures. Her analyses showed that both public and private four-year colleges
responded to the introduction of the Georgia merit-based aid program: private institutions
increased tuition rates while simultaneously decreasing institutional aid, and public
institutions raised room and board rates. She concluded that the merit-based aid program
caused these changes because the institutions with the highest concentration of merit-
based award recipients had the greatest price changes even after controlling for external
factors that also affect prices. Long contended that the most troubling aspect of her study
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is that low-income students are more likely than high-income students to face higher net
prices, because they are less likely to qualify for merit-based awards.
Because policymakers and their constituents intend for state merit-based aid
programs to offset the financial burden of postsecondary education on students and their
families, understanding the extent to which this popular form of financial aid is being
captured by institutions, by either increasing tuition and fees or reducing institutional aid,
is critical. The price response of some postsecondary institutions may inhibit the
achievement of state merit-based aid goals because institutions may make choices
between tuition and fees revenues, enrollment numbers, and student quality that are
inconsistent with the state’s policy goals. For example, a state goal to improve college
affordability is not achieved if an institution responds to a state merit-based aid program
by raising tuition, an action that effectively raises the net price for nonrecipients of the
aid. The Florida legislature stated that the primary goal of the Bright Futures program is
to reward high achieving students (Florida Statute 240.40201) but the implicit goal is
improving college affordability. The results of this study provide policymakers with
information to maximize the effectiveness of state merit-based aid programs in meeting
state goals.
Although Long’s (2002, 2003) study examined the effect of the merit-based
program on institutional prices in Georgia, her findings neither represented the
experience in other states nor predicted the effects of new merit-based aid programs in
other states. The generalizability of Long’s findings is limited because states vary in
postsecondary education structure, the demographics of prospective students demanding
education, as well as economic conditions and the quality of K-12 education. Given
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differences in the context of states, additional research is necessary to understand the
state-specific effects of state merit-based aid programs on student and institutional
responses.
In the remainder of this chapter are an overview of the research topic with an
outline of the literature on the relationship between student aid and college prices, a
summary of the existing research on these relatively new state merit-based aid programs,
and an explanation of the purpose of this study. The theoretical and methodological
approaches to the study are described along with a discussion of the importance and
limitations of the study.
Overview of Related Research
An examination of the effect of state merit-based financial aid on institutional net
price is informed by two distinct but related bodies of research: studies on the
relationship between financial aid and institutional price response and studies on the
effects of state merit-based financial aid on students and institutions. The body of
research on price response provides conflicting assessments of the role of financial aid in
the net price of college. Long (2002, 2003) is the only researcher who examined the
effects of state merit-based aid on net price, whereas in other research the effects of
federal aid on net price were considered (Acosta, 2001; Li, 1999; McPherson & Schapiro,
1991, 1993). The research on state merit-based financial aid has primarily focused on the
behavioral responses of students (Cornwell & Mustard, 2005; Dee & Jackson, 1999;
Henry, Rubenstein, & Bugler, 2004) and not on institutional responses. An overview of
each of these two bodies of research is provided.
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Research on Student Aid and Institutional Price Response
Basic microeconomic theory predicts that public subsidies may unintentionally
drive up prices. This price increase occurs when an increase in demand is met by a supply
that requires higher prices as the quantity increases (Long, 2002, 2003; Paulsen, 2001b).
Former Secretary of Education William Bennett (1987) used this framework when he
commented in The New York Times that expanding Pell grants would do little to help
with college costs because postsecondary institutions would raise tuition to capture new
revenues.
Researchers who studied this hypothesis by exploring the relationship between
federal student aid and institutional price found mixed results (Acosta, 2001;
Cunningham, Wellman, Clinedinst, & Merisotis, 2001; Li, 1999; McPherson & Schapiro,
1991, 1993; Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2003; Singell & Stone, 2003). When different samples
and methodologies are used, existing research offers conflicting conclusions about the
connection between federal financial aid subsidies and institutional price response in
different postsecondary sectors. Richard Vedder (2004), in his book, Going Broke by
Degree: Why College Costs Too Much, argued that financial aid programs increase the
demand for education, thereby leading to increases in tuition; however, he provided no
evidentiary support for his argument. One policy analyst with the CATO Institute
(Wolfram, 2005) used a theoretical economic analysis to argue that, if the federal
government stopped funneling money to schools through student aid programs, sticker
prices would decline and the private market would respond by providing loans and
scholarships. Others (Singell & Stone, 2003), found that Pell Grant increases are
7
associated with tuition increases at some private four-year institutions. Acosta found that
both federal loans and grants lead to price increases at private universities, but only
grants lead to increases at public four-year colleges. Others determined that federal aid
leads to tuition increases in the public four-year sector, but not in the private four-year
sector (McPherson & Schapiro, 1991, 1993). In contrast, other researchers asserted that
there is no causal relationship between federal student aid and tuition prices
(Cunningham, et al., 2001).
Researchers noted the challenges associated with measuring the effect of aid on
price. Some asserted that, although a substantial federal aid subsidy, the Pell Grant has
grown so slowly over time it is difficult to measure its effect on institutional behavior
(Long, 2002, 2003). Baum (2005) argued that measuring the connection between the
supply of aid and the price of college is difficult because federal aid is received only by a
fraction of the student body. Furthermore, Pell Grants go to low-income students who
enroll disproportionately in the public two-year sector, and this sector is more likely than
other sectors to simply increase the number of seats in response to an increase in demand
(Baum, 2005). Baum argued that the institutional practice of inflating tuition sticker
prices to provide tuition discounts to less wealthy students also adds to the difficulty of
measuring the effects of real changes in prices.
Some of the uncertainty in earlier research about the relationship between aid and
price comes from methodological problems. For example, some studies that used a
national sample of postsecondary education prices to examine the effect of loans (Acosta,
2001) or grants (McPherson & Schapiro, 1993) ignored state differences in tuition setting
policies. In some states, the state legislature or a coordinating board of state higher
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education sets tuition rates for public institutions, thereby making it difficult for campus
administrators to alter tuition prices in response to aid.
The ambiguity of the findings on institution price response and the
methodological challenge of exploring price response to aid when national data are used
suggest that further analyses are needed to measure the effect of the introduction of a new
aid subsidy within a specific context. Long (2002, 2003) contended that the best way to
address the challenges of measuring the effect of aid on price is to use a controlled
natural experiment in which a large subsidy can be examined before and after the
introduction. The launch of state merit-based aid programs provides an excellent
opportunity for furthering research on institutional price response.
Research on State Merit-Based Aid
Much research on state merit-based aid programs has focused on the behavioral
responses of students to this form of aid. Consequently, policymakers have little
information on how the introduction of these financial aid subsidies has changed or
affected the net prices of institutions. For example, a number of researchers examined
how state-funded merit-based aid affected the college enrollment choices of students
(Binder, Ganderton, & Hutchens, 2002; Cornwell, Mustard, & Sridhar, 2004; Dynarski,
2000, 2002, 2004), their academic performance in high school (Bugler, Henry, &
Rubenstein, 1999; Henry & Rubenstein, 2002; Office of Program Policy Analysis and
Government Accountability, [OPPAGA], 2003), course withdrawal, credit load,
retention, and summer school enrollment (Cornwell, Lee, & Mustard, 2005; Dee &
Jackson, 1999; Henry et al., 2004). Researchers have also examined differences in who
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qualifies for merit aid based on background characteristics such as race and income
(Farrell, 2004a, 2004b; Heller & Rasmussen, 2001, 2002; Heller & Rogers, 2003; Ness &
Noland, 2004; Price, 2001). Dynarski (2005) conducted one of the first studies to explore
the relationship between merit-based aid programs and baccalaureate production.
Researchers disagree on whether merit-based aid programs actually increase
college enrollment, an explicit goal of the merit-based programs of most states. Studies
on enrollment rate response to state merit-based aid show that increases in college
enrollment are associated with merit-based aid programs in the state of Georgia
(Cornwell et al., 2004; Dynarski, 2000, 2002, 2004) but not in the state of New Mexico
(Binder et al., 2002). Research also shows that, in both Georgia and New Mexico, merit-
based aid programs are associated with shifts in enrollment from two-year to four-year
institutions (Binder et al., 2002; Dynarski, 2002, 2004). Researchers disagree on the
effects of state merit-based aid on enrollment increases for White students compared with
Black students (Cornwell et al., 2004; Dynarski, 2002, 2004). Dynarski found that in
Georgia merit-based aid had greater effects on the college enrollment rates of middle-
and upper-income students and White students rather than low-income students and
Black students, because Black students are more likely to stay in-state to study.
Researchers report that groups most likely to be underrepresented in higher
education are the least likely to be awarded state merit-based aid scholarships, and this
relationship increases when the eligibility criteria are more rigorous (Farrell, 2004a;
Heller & Rogers, 2003). For example, research shows clear differences in who qualifies
for and receives merit-based aid, revealing that low-income and minority students are the
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least likely to qualify (Farrell, 2004a; Heller & Rasmussen, 2001, 2002; Heller & Rogers,
2003; OPPAGA, 2003).
The findings are inconclusive as to whether state merit-based aid programs
provide an incentive for students to perform better academically in high school. Some
researchers (Heller & Rogers, 2003) found small improvements in academic performance
for all students but almost no changes in academic performance for Black students
following the introduction of state merit-based aid programs in Michigan. Other
researchers (OPPAGA, 2003) found that after the introduction of merit-based aid in
Florida, academic preparation among students increased for all indicators except test
scores, suggesting that grade inflation may explain some of the increases in academic
performance measured by GPA. Still other researchers (Bugler et al., 1999; Henry &
Rubenstein, 2002) found that grade inflation did not explain the increase in student GPAs
in Georgia following the introduction of the HOPE (Helping Outstanding Pupils
Educationally) merit-based scholarship program because increases in enrollment in
college preparatory curricula and grades are positively correlated with increases in the
scores of college entrance exams. 
With one exception, research generally indicates that academic behaviors in
college are negatively affected by state merit-based aid because college students who
receive state merit-based aid take lighter course loads, withdraw from courses more
frequently, and pay higher yearly costs as they enroll in more summer school courses
(Cornwell & Mustard, 2005; Dee & Jackson, 1999; Henry et al., 2004). Dee and Jackson
found that merit-based aid recipients who enrolled in difficult academic disciplines, such
as science and engineering, were more likely than other merit-based aid recipients to lose
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their aid awards, potentially discouraging students from difficult academic majors.
Within a small sample of Georgia institutions, those who received merit-based aid and
lost the scholarship appeared to be less likely to ever complete a degree than those who
never received merit-based aid (Henry et al., 2004). In contrast, Dynarski (2005) found
merit-based aid to have a positive effect on enrollment, concluding that the number of
baccalaureate degrees increased with the introduction of Georgia HOPE.
A few studies have explored how enrollment responses to the introduction of state
merit-based aid led to demographic changes and selectivity changes in institutions. These
studies show that, in Georgia, the composition of institutions changed after the
introduction of HOPE to greater homogeneity of student ability at more selective
institutions, greater racial disparity across institutions, and a general increase in student
quality at both public and private four-year institutions (Cornwell et al., 2005; Cornwell
& Mustard, 2001, 2006).
Summary
Although existing research examines several important student-level effects of
state merit-based aid programs, little is known about the effects of state merit-based aid
on institutional outcomes. Moreover, little is known about the effects of state merit-based
aid in states other than Georgia. Although researchers note the methodological challenges
associated with examining the effects of federal student aid on institutional price
response, few have examined the effects of state merit-based aid on institutional prices.
Long’s (2002, 2003) study shows that Georgia’s four-year private institutions decreased
institutional aid and four-year public institutions increased room and board charges in
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response to the introduction of state merit-based aid. Additional research is necessary to
understand the effect of state merit-based aid programs on institutional prices in other
states.
Theoretical Framework
Economic theory provides a framework for analyzing three sets of behaviors
relevant to this study: the provision of subsidies by state governments, enrollment
decisions by students, and price-setting by postsecondary institutions. Economic theory
within the public finance framework explains the economic motivations for governments
to subsidize higher education. Human capital theory explains student enrollment
decisions, including the relationship between state merit-based aid and student demand
for education. The microeconomics of not-for-profit organizations, as opposed to the
behavior of for-profit firms, explains how different categories of educational institutions
vary in the ways they maximize their interests in selecting students and setting tuition and
fee rates.
Public sector economists (Cohn & Geske, 2004; Paulsen, 2001b) indicate that
government subsidies to postsecondary education are introduced as corrective measures
for deficiencies in markets that lead to inefficient or inequitable outcomes. These
deficiencies include externalities that cause private underinvestment, inequalities in
opportunities that result from imperfections in capital markets, and differences in
opportunities associated with inequalities in academic preparation and information about
college (Cohn & Geske, 2004). When free markets do not produce efficient resource
allocations to education, or when the benefits of a system are distributed inequitably,
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government subsidies are a lever for improving the efficiency of those markets (Paulsen,
2001b).
Human capital theory connects government financial aid to student application
and enrollment behaviors by modeling an education investment decision as analogous to
a firm’s decision to invest in physical capital (Becker, 1976). According to human capital
theory, a person makes rational choices by calculating the direct costs and the opportunity
costs of forgone earnings against the benefits of increased net earnings and other
nonmonetary benefits over the life cycle and decides whether the net value of education
is greater than that of other options (Becker, 1976). For students eligible for state merit-
based financial aid, the aid lowers the overall financial cost of postsecondary education.
This reduction in costs increases the likelihood that the net benefits will exceed the net
costs, thereby increasing the individual demand for higher education. When aggregated
with all students in the state, state merit-based aid drives up the demand for
postsecondary education at every price level.
Economists (Clotfelter, 1996; Winston, 1999) have suggested that postsecondary
institutions vary in their response to changes in student demand stimulated by
government subsidies because of both their profit orientation and other institutional
objectives. Although most postsecondary education institutions function as not-for-profit
entities, institutions attempt to maximize their long-term financial resources to achieve
their educational goals. Institutions maximize revenues over costs by optimizing the sum
of expected tuition and fees, external giving, and endowment earnings while also
furthering the mission of the institution and its stakeholders’ interests (Winston, 1999).
Institutions may or may not change their prices depending on their capacity to add
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enrollment slots, the behavior of their competitors, and their preferences for quality and
prestige maximization (Clotfelter, 1996; Winston, 1999). In some cases, institutions may
have the opportunity to adjust prices and therefore capture part of the government
subsidy.
This economic theoretical approach to examining the behavior of states, students,
and institutions provides the framework for understanding the pricing behavior of
postsecondary institutions as suppliers of education. This theoretical understanding of
postsecondary institutional price response to state merit-based aid programs combines
explanations for the behaviors of governments, prospective students, and postsecondary
institutions in a single economic supply and demand model for state postsecondary
education. This theoretical framework avoids the weakness of focusing on only one of the
three actors and ignoring their joint determination of postsecondary education pricing.
This theoretical framework provides the context for formulating this study’s economic
model of the price-setting behavior of postsecondary institutions in Florida.
Purpose
This study extends two bodies of research, one that analyzes institutional price
response to student financial aid and a second that examines the effect of state merit-
based aid programs on institutions. Applying an economic theoretical framework to
postsecondary education pricing, this study explores how institutions respond to the
introduction of a new aid subsidy and how price response varies for different types of
postsecondary institutions. Using descriptive and ordinary least squares regression
analyses that include year fixed-effects and other controls, this study uses institutional
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data for the 1993-1994 to 2000-2001 academic years from the Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS) and the Florida Bright Futures program to explore the
following research questions for each of four sectors of postsecondary education (public
four-year, public two-year, private four-year, and for-profit institutions):
1. How do the levels of tuition and fee charges, room and board charges, and grant
aid expenditures at Florida colleges and universities compare with the levels at
institutions in other states?
2. How do annual changes in tuition and fee charges, room and board charges, and
grant aid expenditures at Florida colleges and universities compare with annual
changes at institutions in other states after the introduction of the Bright Futures
merit-based aid program?
3. Relative to a comparison group of institutions in other states, how do tuition and
fee charges, room and board charges, and grant aid expenditures at Florida
colleges and universities react to the introduction of the state merit-based aid
program after controlling for institutional and state economic characteristics?
Research Method
A brief description of the Bright Futures merit-based aid program is followed by
an explanation for the selection of Florida for this study. A summary of data sources,
statistical methods, and selected variables follows.
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Florida Bright Futures Scholarship
The Florida Bright Futures scholarship program was launched by the Florida
Legislature in 1997. It consists of three types of awards: the Florida Academic
Scholarship (FAS), the Florida Medallion Scholarship (FMS), and the Florida Vocational
Gold Seal Scholarship (GSV). Each award has different requirements for courses, GPA,
and test scores. Generally, the criteria require that students achieve a GPA higher than 3.5
and Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores higher than 1270 for the FAS. For the FMS,
the GPA must be higher than 3.0 and SAT scores must be higher than 970. For the GSV
there is a 3.0 overall GPA requirement and a 3.5 GPA requirement in vocational courses.
Approximately one-third of high school graduates qualified for one of the three Bright
Futures awards in 1997 when the program was first introduced (OPPAGA, 2003). Since
1997, most of the growth in student recipients has taken place in the Florida Medallion
Scholarship, which falls in the middle in terms of the level of academic requirements
necessary for qualification.
The Bright Futures program is the largest state-funded financial aid program in
Florida, making up more than three-quarters of all state aid disbursed to Florida residents
(Office of Student Financial Assistance [OSFA], 2005). Disbursements during the first
year, 1997, totaled $69.6 million and rose to $174.9 million by its fifth year (OSFA,
2005). In 2004 expenditures rose to $269.0 million with more than 150,000 Florida
postsecondary students receiving the awards, 50,000 of whom were first-time recipients
(OSFA, 2005). In the final year of the study period the average Bright Futures
scholarship per recipient in 2006 dollars was $2,000 for public four-year institutions,
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$2,143 for private four-year institutions, $1,733 for for-profit institutions and $900 for
public two-year institutions. These awards covered either 75% or 100% of tuition and
fees at public institutions or an average of comparable public institutions for private four-
year and for-profit institutions. The average scholarship amount awarded per student in
the public four-year sector is approximately $2,000 per academic year, $2,200 in the
private four-year sector, $900 in the public two-year sector, and $1,700 in the for-profit
sector. Students who qualify for the more academically rigorous scholarship receive
approximately 30% more funding in each sector.
The Bright Futures program is an appropriate focus for this study because of the
size of the merit-based aid awards in relation to tuition sticker prices, the broad eligibility
criteria of the scholarship, the ability to use a quasi-natural experiment method, and the
lack of current research on institutional price response to the program’s introduction.
First, Florida is one of just a few states with merit-based aid programs where the
scholarship amount covers 75% or more of the full cost of tuition and fees at one of the
state’s public institutions. Other states with this coverage are Georgia, Florida, Louisiana,
New Mexico, and West Virginia. A merit-based aid program that covers a large share of
the cost of tuition is more likely than a program with smaller awards to influence the
thinking and planning of students for college because a human capital model predicts that
the student’s cost-benefit analysis is sensitive to net price (Paulsen, 2001a). Second, the
Bright Futures program offers three different scholarships (with three different ranges of
academic requirements), and approximately 40% of Florida high school graduates meet
the eligibility requirements for at least one of the three programs (Florida Department of
Education, 2005). This high rate of qualification has the potential to make a broad effect
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on the demand for the state’s postsecondary institutions if the number of students
enrolling in college increases as a result. Third, because Florida introduced its program in
1997, a quasi-natural experimental method may be used to examine the effect of the
program relative to the surrounding control group of states, most of which had not
introduced a merit-based program at that time. This method makes it possible to isolate
the effect of the program’s introduction, strengthening the causal link between the
subsidy and changes in institutional prices. Finally, existing research on state merit-based
aid in Florida has examined the effect of the program on student achievement in high
school and college enrollment (OPPAGA, 2003) but has not yet examined the effect of
the program on the prices of postsecondary institutions. A more complete understanding
of the effect of the program on institutional prices and expenditures is needed to inform
the efforts of policymakers to assess the effectiveness of this program in meeting the
state’s goals of rewarding student achievement and improving affordability.
Data and Statistical Method
The primary data source for this study is eight years of enrollment and finance
data (1993-1994 to 2000-2001) from IPEDS. The U.S. Department of Education’s
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) collects institution-level data for IPEDS
from all postsecondary institutions in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and parts of
Puerto Rico. IPEDS defines a postsecondary institution as any organization open to the
public that has as its primary mission the provision of postsecondary education, which is
defined as “formal instructional programs with a curriculum designed primarily for
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students who are beyond the compulsory age for high school...[including] academic,
vocational, and continuing professional education programs” (NCES, 2004, p. 1).
The IPEDS database includes information about more than 6,000 institutions that
participate in Title IV federal student financial aid programs, such as Pell Grants or
Stafford Loans. The dataset contains several variables relevant to this study, such as
college enrollment counts, student financial aid expenditures, tuition rates, and fee
charges. Because institutions are required by law to participate in the survey in order for
their students to receive Title IV federal financial aid (P. L. 102-325), IPEDS has high
response rates. Although not without limitations, the dataset is the most reliable dataset
available for studying institutions across multiple states.
IPEDS data are supplemented by data from the Florida Bright Futures program.
The Office of Student Financial Assistance within the Florida Department of Education
gathers data on all scholarships dispersed to Florida residents through the Bright Futures
program. This study uses information about the number of Bright Futures recipients at
each institution (initial and renewal) and the dollar amount received for each recipient at
each institution (initial and renewal) for selected years after the program’s introduction
(1997-98 to 2000-01).
To address the first and second research questions, descriptive analyses are used
to measure in constant dollars how average prices and expenditures changed in the
sample period. To address the third research question, this study uses a differences-
within-differences method, and the coefficients are estimated by using ordinary least
squares regression analysis that includes year fixed-effects and controls for state and
economic characteristics. The differences-within-differences approach was used in earlier
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studies that examined student response to merit-based aid in Georgia and New Mexico
(Binder et al., 2002; Cornwell & Mustard, 2001; Dynarski, 2000). According to Meyer
(1995), differences-within-differences is a useful method for analyzing a well designed
natural experiment in which “there is a transparent exogenous source of variation in the
explanatory variables that determine the treatment assignment…[such as those] induced
by policy changes, government randomization, or other events [that] may allow a
researcher to obtain exogenous variation in the main explanatory variables” (p. 151). The
introduction of merit-based aid in Florida provides this kind of policy change treatment.
Similar to Long (2002, 2003), this study uses surrounding states from the southeastern
region that have not introduced a merit-based aid program during the eight years of the
study period as a comparative control group to account for changes in postsecondary
education that affect all institutions. The analysis further compares Florida to a control
group including all of the United States that did not introduce a merit-based aid program
before or during the study period. Tuition and fees are analyzed at institutions in four
sectors: public four-year, private four-year, public two-year and for-profit. Room and
board charges are measured in four-year sectors only, which more commonly offer room
and board. Grant aid expenditures are only measured at four-year private institutions, the
sector that most commonly offers institutional grants. Grant aid expenditures in public
four-year institutions are not analyzed as a result of small sample sizes.
As in other price response analyses (Li, 1999; Long, 2002, 2003; McPherson &
Schapiro, 1991, 1993; Singell & Stone, 2003), the outcome variables for this study are
three separate measures of price: tuition and fees, room and board, and institutional grant
aid expenditures per full-time equivalent (FTE) student. The primary independent
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variable for this study is the introduction of the Florida Bright Futures program. Measures
of several institutional characteristics are included in the analyses: institutional
selectivity, endowment size per FTE, Carnegie classification, and appropriations per
FTE. To test whether the effect on prices is greatest at institutions with the most
recipients, a measure of scholarship recipient concentration at each institution is
calculated. Previous research (Acosta, 2001; Long, 2002, 2003; McPherson & Schapiro,
1993; Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2003) found that several aspects of state characteristics predict
differences in institutional prices. Based on this precedent, this study uses data from the
U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey to control for state-level determinants
of price, including unemployment rate, per capita income, educational attainment, and
postsecondary enrollment capacity.
Limitations and Significance
This study has several limitations. First, some southeastern states (e.g., Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina) introduced merit-based programs
before and during the study period and therefore cannot be included in the control group.
Therefore the control group includes only seven southeastern states (Alabama, Delaware,
Maryland, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia), and the results are
not as robust as they would have been with a larger control group sample (Meyer, 1995).
Second, although providing the best available information on college prices over time,
IPEDS suffers from quality control issues. Data quality issues are particularly
problematic for the years before 2000 because of inconsistencies in how institutions
interpreted the definitions of several elements of the surveys (Jackson, Jang, Sukasih, &
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Peeckson, 2005). Third, institutions that do not have at least four of the eight years of
IPEDS data are eliminated from the analyses, which may reduce the external validity of
the results. Finally, the results of this study may not be generalizable to institutions in
states other than Florida because of differences in state characteristics, including
characteristics of state merit-based aid programs.
Despite these limitations, this study extends and improves the empirical testing of
institutional price response to state government subsidies by using a quasi-natural
experimental method to study the introduction of a program within a single state context.
Similarly, this study extends the assessment of the effect of state merit-based aid
programs to institutions by focusing on Florida, a previously unstudied state. The
generalizability of previous findings from research that focus on the state of Georgia is
limited given differences in state context. For example, compared with Georgia, Florida
is home to proportionally larger two-year and for-profit sectors and a proportionally
smaller four-year public sector as well as a state merit-based aid program with broader
eligibility criteria.
The results of this study offer important findings for policymakers about the
effects of state merit-based aid on institutional prices. The adverse effects of institutional
price response on state merit-based aid policy goals for accessibility, affordability, and
degree production concern state policymakers, because these effects counter the stated
purposes of these state programs (Heller, 2002; Heller & Marin, 2002, 2004; Heller &
Rogers, 2003). This study provides information of special value to policymakers in
Florida because the study assesses the effects of the Bright Futures program on prices





This literature review describes research related to state merit-based aid programs
and institutional price response to other types of student financial aid. Three purposes of
this literature review are to describe the application of economic theory to the study of
postsecondary price determination, critically examine the empirical research on
institutional price response to student financial aid, and analyze existing research on state
merit-based aid programs and summarize what is known about the effect of these
programs on students and institutions.
Theoretical Framework
Three sets of actors interact in the market for higher education within the
economic framework of this study: students as consumers who demand education,
postsecondary institutions that supply education, and governments that provide subsidies,
such as state financial aid, that stimulate changes in student demand and institutional
supply for education. The introduction of an aid program in a given state increases some
students’ ability to pay for college at every price level, thereby placing upward pressure
on student demand for postsecondary education. The outward shift in demand occurs as
the number of people able and willing to buy postsecondary education at each price
increases, and this puts outward pressure on both the quantity and price of education in
the states. The actual quantity and price levels in the state are also determined by the
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response of institutions to these increases in demand as reflected in the shape of the
supply function.
Economic theory explains three sets of behaviors that inform research on the
relationship between state merit-based aid and institutional price response: public subsidy
and the behavior of governments, human capital theory and student enrollment decisions,
and microeconomics and the pricing behavior of postsecondary institutions. The public
finance framework explains the economic motivations for governments to subsidize
particular goods and services, including higher education. Human capital theory explains
student enrollment decisions, including the relationship between state merit-based aid and
student demand for education. The microeconomics of not-for-profit organizations, as
opposed to the behavior of for-profit firms, explains how different categories of
educational institutions vary in the ways they maximize their interests in selecting
students and setting tuition and fee rates. Each of these three applications of economic
theory informs the economic model for this study.
Because some postsecondary institutions may adjust the number of admitted
students and the prices charged as a result of changes in student demand for education,
institutional response must be factored into assessments of the effect of government
subsidies on enrollment and pricing outcomes. One intended goal of state subsidies to
higher education is to stimulate demand, particularly for those who have low income and
are most likely to underinvest because of financial constraints. Greater equity in
enrollment rates among students from different income backgrounds is the explicit goal
of many federal and state financial aid programs (McPherson & Shapiro, 1998).
However, institutional responses to financial aid can mute the intended effects of that aid
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by raising prices or by changing the net prices for different populations of students. In the
next three sections the application of economic theory to the behaviors of governments,
students, and institutions in the postsecondary education market is described.
Economic Analysis of Public Subsidy
Theorists (Cohn & Geske, 2004; Paulsen, 2001b) have argued for government
subsidies to postsecondary education as corrective measures for deficiencies in markets
that lead to inefficient or inequitable outcomes. When markets do not produce efficient
resource allocations to education, or when the benefits of a system are distributed
inequitably, government subsidies are a lever for improving the efficiency of those
markets (Paulsen, 2001b). Four deficiencies that government subsidies are designed to
address are the following: externalities that cause private underinvestment, the quasi-
public good characteristics of higher education, inequalities in opportunities that result
from imperfections in capital markets, and differences in opportunities associated with
inequalities in academic preparation and information about college (Cohn & Geske;
Paulsen).
First, economists (Cohn & Geske, 2004) have proposed that externalities related
to the consumption of postsecondary education justify government subsidies. Because the
benefits to society associated with education are greater than the earning premiums that
are realized by individuals, one reason governments subsidize postsecondary education is
to increase levels of participation (Cohn & Geske, 2004). Absent such subsidies,
individuals underinvest in education compared with the socially optimal level. In other
words, individuals do not consider the positive benefits that society realizes through
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educational attainment when making their own education investment decisions. Society
derives substantial, well-documented benefits from education that extend beyond the
personal benefits to individual students. The benefits include higher tax revenue, better
public health, increased civic activity, and economic development (Bowen, 1977, 1996).
Higher levels of education are associated with lower unemployment, decreased crime
activity, and less demand for government social programs (The College Board, 2004).
Educational attainment is also associated with healthier living habits, higher voting
participation, and more civic activities such as volunteering and donating blood (The
College Board), all of which benefit society in reduced costs for social services and
greater contributions from citizens. The RAND Corporation (1999) estimated that the
federal government annually saves between $800 and $2,700 on social programs for each
individual college graduate compared with each high school graduate. Research shows
that, at both a national and a state level, higher education attainment is associated with
increased productivity (Carnevale & Desrochers, 2003) and greater tax revenues (The
College Board, 2005). In their meta-analysis about the role of financial aid, college prices
and student enrollment response, Leslie and Brinkman (1988) estimated that investments
in postsecondary education account for approximately one-fifth of all economic growth
nationally. Postsecondary education contributes to the development of human capital and
helps make the United States competitive as a nation in the global marketplace, a
marketplace that increasingly requires greater skill and knowledge (Carnevale &
Desrochers). Therefore, government subsidies to education are justified because, in their
absence, individual prospective students underestimate the benefits of education and
acquire less than the socially optimal level.
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Second, government subsidies for higher education are also justified because of
the quasi-public good nature of postsecondary education. Paulsen (2001b) described a
pure public good as one in which no one is excluded from its benefits, and one person’s
consumption does not preclude another from consuming it. Examples of public goods
include national defense and mosquito control. Cohn and Geske (2004) contended that
citizens in a given state benefit from overall increased productivity when the government
invests in higher education. Because all citizens benefit from this activity and no one can
be excluded from sharing in the benefit, governments are justified in mandating that all
citizens share the cost of producing the benefit by raising taxes to fund postsecondary
education. In this way, the government subsidy “promote[s] a more socially efficient
allocation of resources to higher education in a state” (Paulsen, 2001b, p. 102).
Third, economists justify government subsidies for higher education because
imperfections in the capital markets fail to provide adequate financing for students who
want to invest in their education (Behrman, Crawford, & Stacey, 1997; Cohn & Geske,
2004; Paulsen, 2001b). For example, absent government intervention, individuals may
have difficulty obtaining financing for educational investment, because they are unable to
borrow against the collateral of their future, not-yet-earned degree. Without government
guarantees, lenders might be unwilling to make loans because the risk of not being repaid
is too high (Cohn & Geske, 2004). These market failures lead to special challenges for
students from low-income backgrounds because, unlike their high-income peers, they
cannot use family wealth as collateral for loans in private markets (Kane, 1999b). In
response to these market imperfections, governments may seek to improve student access
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to affordable postsecondary education through funding need-based aid programs,
guaranteed student loans, and direct subsidies to colleges and university.
Finally, governments justify their investment in higher education as a response to
other market imperfections that limit opportunities for individuals from low-income
families to enter postsecondary education and consequently further perpetuate inequities
in society (Kane, 1999a; Leslie & Brinkman, 1988). Even with adequate financing,
potential students from low-income families face barriers in their decisions to invest in
higher education that make government intervention necessary. Compared with their
higher-income peers, low-income students have less academic preparation and poorer
information about postsecondary education and its costs (Kane, 1999a). Furthermore,
assuming that greater equality is a societal goal, investment in education is a more
efficient method than direct transfer payments by government entities to increase the
income of individuals at the low end of the income distribution (Becker, 1976; Cohn &
Geske, 2004; Paulsen, 2001b). In other words, inequities in the capacity to invest in
higher education are better remediated through education itself than through income
transfers.
In summary, public finance theory explains how deficiencies in markets that lead
to inefficient or inequitable outcomes, for the public or for individuals, motivate
governments to intervene in postsecondary education. Even in the absence of inequities
associated with income, governments are justified in subsidizing postsecondary education
to correct social inefficiencies caused by externalities that result in private
underinvestment and by the quasi-public good characteristics of postsecondary education.
Governments are also motivated to intervene in postsecondary education to address
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income-related imperfections in capital markets and inequalities in opportunities
associated with differences in academic preparation and access to information.
Governments may intervene in markets by increasing the supply of postsecondary
education or increasing the demand for postsecondary education or both. One common
response is for state governments to make direct appropriations to public sector
postsecondary institutions (and in some cases the private sector) to increase the supply of
education in the state. States also increase demand for postsecondary education by
providing financial aid directly to students. In contrast to need-based financial aid, merit-
based aid may be inconsistent with traditional rationales for government interventions in
the market. If state merit-based aid creates incentives that improve student academic
preparation for college and thus encourage more students to enter college, the merit-
based subsidy may be effective in addressing underinvestment in postsecondary
education. But, if state merit-based aid is disproportionately awarded to students from
groups that are not historically underrepresented in higher education, this form of aid is a
disadvantage to those the state would otherwise want to subsidize to equalize
opportunities and outcomes. In other words, from a public finance perspective, state
merit-based aid implies a trade-off between efficiencies for the public as a whole against
equitable outcomes across individuals. In the next section the theoretical mechanisms by
which government subsidies to students translate into changes in student behaviors and,
therefore, changes in student demand are explained.
30
Economic Analysis of College Enrollment Decisions
Financial aid to students is one type of government subsidy that affects the
demand for postsecondary education by changing the pricing of the individuals’ decision
about education investment. Human capital theory models an education investment
decision as analogous to a firm’s decision to invest in physical capital (Becker, 1976).
The short-term costs of acquiring education are an allocation of resources away from
consumer goods and toward the production of producer goods that will generate future
benefits (Douglass, 1977). The producer good, human capital, consists of “the acquired
energy, motivations, skills, and knowledge possessed by human beings, which can be
harnessed over a period of time to the task of producing goods and services” (Douglass, 
1977, p. 362). The person makes rational choices based on an analysis of the perceived
costs and benefits of investing in education confined by the individual’s preferences and
tastes (Becker, 1964, 1976). The person calculates the direct costs and the opportunity
costs of forgone earnings, compares the costs against the benefits of increased net
earnings and other nonmonetary benefits over the lifecycle, and decides whether the net
value of education is greater than that of other options. The person makes a choice that
maximizes his or her welfare and increases investment in education until the declining
marginal return on the last dollar of investment equals the rising marginal costs of
financing that dollar (Becker, 1976). Public subsidies in the form of financial aid to
students reduce the marginal costs for postsecondary education and increase the level of
education at which marginal return and marginal costs are equal.
When applied to college enrollment, the human capital decision-making model
assumes that a prospective student calculates the net costs and benefits of postsecondary
31
education compared with alternative choices such as immediate employment, military
service, or other options. Paulsen (2001a) identified these expected costs as direct costs,
indirect costs, and the forgone earnings for an individual who does not work while
enrolled and the expected benefit as anticipated earnings over the number of years he or
she will work. In addition to greater expected income, the student may consider other
benefits including greater quality of life, as well as cultural and nonmonetary gains
(Becker, 1992). Financial aid enters into this equation as a reduction in the total direct
costs of tuition, fees, and books, as well as the costs of living and the forgone earnings
while enrolled in postsecondary education (St. John, 2004).
State merit-based aid programs are one type of aid that reduce costs for students
and, therefore, have implications for the individuals’ investment calculations. For
students eligible for state merit-based aid, the scholarship lowers the total financial cost
of postsecondary education. This reduction in costs increases the likelihood that the net
benefits will exceed the net costs, thereby increasing the individual demand for higher
education. When aggregated across all students in the state, state merit-based aid drives
up the demand for postsecondary education at every price level. The scale of the shift in
demand depends on the response of those students at the margins who previously were
not demanding education at a given price level as well as the magnitude of the price
change.
Because of the size of the state merit-based aid scholarships in relation to price
and because of the wide availability of these subsidies in certain states, these programs
are likely to create observable changes in student demand for postsecondary education.
Students who previously would have considered the benefits of postsecondary education
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not worth the costs may reverse their assessment because of available aid. Several state
merit-based aid programs offer a scholarship large enough to cover the full tuition and fee
costs of attending a four-year or two-year public institution in their state along with
stipends for books (Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, New Mexico, and West Virginia).
Human capital theory suggests that these subsidies can have a dramatic effect on the
demand for higher education within those states, particularly for those students for whom
costs are a primary barrier to college attendance and who can meet the merit-based aid
eligibility requirements. These programs also are likely to create observable shifts in
relative student demand for different sectors of postsecondary education based on the
portability of the subsidy, because students at the margin shift from out-of-state to in-
state, from two-year to four-year sectors, and from private to public sectors (or vice versa
depending on state context).
Although merit-based aid programs may reduce some or all direct costs for
students and stimulate demand, economists (Becker, 1976; Paulsen, 2001a) have argued
that variations in student demand for higher education in response to these cost
reductions are partially a result of differences in family, cultural, and educational
backgrounds of students that influence their real or perceived estimates of costs and
benefits of postsecondary education. Becker suggested that the rate of return to education
in the labor market varies by race and gender, and consequently postsecondary education
demand varies across these groups. Student investment decisions may also vary because
of differences in the quality of the K-12 schools that they attend. Paulsen indicated that
the quality of K-12 schools is associated with academic achievement, educational
attainment, and earnings. Although merit-based aid reduces costs for all eligible students,
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variations in student characteristics, such as race, gender, income, and high school
academic experiences, affects the way these changes enter the calculation of costs and
benefits.
In summary, human capital theory explains how state merit-based aid as a form of
public subsidy to students increases the demand for postsecondary education. Students at
the margin seek enrollment because of the increase in benefits relative to the costs for
postsecondary education compared with alternative choices. Variations in student
characteristics affect calculation of costs and benefits, leading to different levels of
demand for human capital for different subpopulations. In the next section, how different
types of institutions vary in their enrollment and pricing behaviors in response to changes
in student demand is explained.
Economic Analysis of Institutional Price Setting
The response of postsecondary institutions to changes in student demand
stimulated by government subsidies is contingent on institutional profit orientation and
other objectives. Most postsecondary education institutions function as not-for-profit
entities. Therefore, these institutions do not maximize revenues over costs for the purpose
of distributing profits to owners or stockholders but rather attempt to maximize their
long-term financial resources to achieve their educational goals. Not-for-profit
institutions optimize the sum of expected tuition and fees, external giving, and
endowment earnings while also furthering the mission of the institution and the
stakeholders’ interests (Winston, 1999). Unlike public and private not-for-profit
institutions, the profit-maximizing strategies of for-profit institutions do not include the
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use of external donative giving or direct appropriations to subsidize and sell their product
at a price below the cost of its production. Both nonprofit and proprietary postsecondary
institutions make enrollment and pricing decisions that best match their financial and
mission interests.
For some institutions, the ability to change prices in response to changes in
student demand is limited by state legislatures or state governing boards for higher
education and by competition from other institutions (Winston, 1999). If the structure of
postsecondary education supply includes a combination of existing institutions and
potential new institutions that are able and willing to increase total enrollment seats
unconstrained at a given price level, the supply function is perfectly flat and the increase
in demand caused by increased financial aid is directed into increased enrollments at a
constant price. Supply is constrained when additional seats are more costly than existing
seats, barriers exist that prevent the development of new institutions, the number of
competitors in a market segment is small, and institutions have a preference for quality
and prestige maximization. When supply is constrained, some institutions have the
opportunity to adjust prices and therefore capture part of the government subsidy
(Clotfelter, 1996; Winston, 1999). The actual price response of institutions to financial
aid is a matter of empirical research, and researchers (Acosta, 2001; Cunningham et al.,
2001; Li, 1999; McPherson & Schapiro, 1991, 1993; Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2003; Singell
& Stone, 2003) found varying price responses based on aid structure, institutional
categories, and other state context factors. This empirical work is summarized in later
sections of this chapter.
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For those institutions that are able to adjust price in response to changes in
demand, the actual price response is further constrained by institutional goals and
objectives. Theorists argue that not-for-profit institutions seek to maximize their
discretionary budget, defined as the surplus of total revenues above the total cost of
producing the institution’s educational services (Blais & Dion, 1991; McPherson &
Schapiro, 1993). These total revenues come from “commercial” income which
encompasses fees collected for education services, and “donative” income from
government appropriations, endowment income, and other charitable giving by
individuals and organizations (Hansmann, 1986). Because of these two revenue streams,
nonprofit postsecondary institutions, unlike for-profit businesses, are able to sell their
product at prices below the cost of production. This perpetual ability to subsidize all of its
customers violates the long-term relationship between price, supply, and revenues that
govern for-profit businesses, including for-profit postsecondary institutions, which
require commercial income to exceed costs of production over the long term (Winston,
1999). Within the pursuit of institutional objectives, not-for-profit postsecondary
institutions can set prices for reasons other than commercial profit maximization.
Therefore, the relationship between price and the supply of postsecondary
education by a state’s institutions is not fully analogous to the relationship between price
and supply in commercial markets because of the not-for-profit nature of a sizable
majority of postsecondary institutions (Winston, 1999). Both the commercial profit-
maximizing firm and the not-for-profit institution share the constraint that total costs
must be below total revenues for the long-term life of the organization. But, although the
for-profit entity must maintain a level of fees charged for goods and services that exceeds
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the total costs of producing those goods and services, the not-for-profit entity may use
donated revenues from other sources to supplement the fees it collects for goods and
services to cover total production costs. Nonprofit postsecondary institutions can and do
subsidize their customers, charging them tuition and fee rates that are less than the actual
cost of providing education (Winston, 1999).
Another dynamic that affects the pricing behavior of postsecondary education is
the dual role that students play as both customers and suppliers (Rothschild & White,
1995). Education employs a customer-input technology in which fellow students are an
important input into the quality of the educational attainment of their peers. In other
words, “Peer quality is, technically, an input to a college’s production, one that cannot be
bought from anyone other than its own customers” (Winston, 1999, p. 18). This feature
implies that two transactions are combined in the net price students pay: “The student-as-
customer pays a price for education while the same student-as-supplier-of-input is paid a
wage rate by the school…leaving a net tuition payment as their difference” (Winston,
1999, p. 18). In addition to paying for the human capital that they acquire through their
educational experiences as tuition and fees, some students are selected according to an
institution’s objectives to receive compensation for their inputs into the education
production function in the form of discounted tuition and fees, scholarships, and
nonmonetary consideration, such as admittance to honors programs. Therefore,
interpretation of an institution’s pricing response to government aid must consider
changes in the sticker price, net price, and quality of admitted students.
Three rationales explain why institutional charges are not fully determined by
profit maximization. First, not-for-profit postsecondary institutions have donative
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resources that are available to subsidize students. Second, institutions are able to realize
benefits from students through their contributions as inputs to the education production
function for their peers and as inputs into the prestige and reputation creating activities of
colleges and universities. Third, students vary in their contribution to fulfilling other
institutional preferences or mission objectives. Therefore, prices charged by institutions
are driven by the relative value of the student to the institution as an input into the
education production and as an input into the achievement of institutional mission
objectives, over and above the tuition and fees charged to the student.
Summary
The theoretical framework for understanding postsecondary institutional price
response to state merit-based aid programs combines explanations for the behaviors of
governments, prospective students, and postsecondary institutions in a single economic
supply and demand model for state postsecondary education. Governments attempt to
correct market inefficiencies and inequities by providing subsidies to students or
postsecondary institutions or both. When those subsidies are provided to students as
financial aid, their effects on student demand are influenced by other student
demographic characteristics, including gender, race, income level and the quality of high
school academic experiences. Actual student enrollment outcomes are further determined
by changes in prices made by postsecondary institutions in response to increases in
student demand generated by subsidies. Variations in not-for-profit status, mission,
objectives, financial resources, and student quality lead to variations in the price
responses that postsecondary institutions make to changes in student demand.
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In the following section, empirical studies on the relationship between
postsecondary prices and financial aid are reviewed. The review traces the growth of this
literature from a focus primarily on Pell Grants to other forms of financial aid subsidy. A
summary of the conflicting findings about the effect of financial aid on institutional price
and a catalogue of some of the limitations that restrict the ability of most studies to
accurately measure price response conclude the section.
Relationship between Financial Aid and Institutional Price
Research on institutional price response to student financial aid is relevant to
concerns expressed by policymakers and citizens about the rising price of colleges. Since
the early 1990s, following the introduction of the notion that financial aid subsidies lead
to price increases (Bennett, 1987), researchers have given attention to this topic. In this
section the institutional price response to three different types of subsidies, federal Pell
Grants, federal loans, and state merit-based aid, are described. How researchers have
analyzed institutional price response to several different types of student financial aid is
summarized, the strengths and weaknesses of existing studies are analyzed, and aspects
of previous work that this dissertation builds upon are identified.
Initial Findings for Federal Pell Grants
Research on the institutional price response to federal grant aid revenues shows
that change in price varies considerably across institutional sectors (Li, 1999; McPherson
& Schapiro, 1991, 1993). Some of this difference may be explained by different sample
periods, controls, and methods used in the studies. In the private four-year sector, Li
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concluded that Pell Grant aid is associated with increases in prices, whereas others
(McPherson & Schapiro, 1991, 1993) found no effect. For the public four-year sector,
some have concluded that Pell Grant aid is associated with increases in prices (Li, 1999;
McPherson & Schapiro, 1991, 1993).
Early empirical studies by McPherson and Shapiro (1991, 1993) found that the
relationship between student financial aid and institutional price response varies by
institutional type. Their study looked broadly at subsidies to higher education to measure
the response of colleges to changes in government subsidies associated with changes in
the per student levels of scholarship aid, gross tuition and fees, and instructional
expenditures. Using a national sample of price data from the Higher Education General
Information Survey of 1978-1979 and 1985-1986, they examined changes in prices
relative to financial aid in a sample of 1,934 private four-year colleges, 371 public four-
year colleges, and 667 two-year public colleges. The study showed that a $1.00 increase
in federal Pell Grant aid is associated with a $0.50 increase in tuition and fees in the
public four-year sector, but is unrelated to tuition and fees in the public two-year or
private four-year sectors. A $1.00 increase in Pell Grant aid is associated with a $0.20
increase in institutional scholarship expenditures in the private four-year sector, but is
unrelated to institutional aid in the public two-year and four-year sectors. They found no
relationship between federal Pell Grant aid and instructional expenditures in any sector.
In addition to the effect on price, the study found a positive relationship between federal
Pell Grant aid and institutional aid, indicating that there is no substitution effect with
institutional aid.
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Li (1999) argued the early work on price response by McPherson and Schapiro
was flawed in its theoretical modeling of the relationship between institutional aid and
federal aid. She argued that, because the Pell formula considers cost-of-attendance as a
component of the formula used to determine the financial need of students, higher tuition
by definition creates greater need and larger grants, thereby breaking the causal direction
of the model. Li made an important contribution to the empirical work on price response
because her study was the first to use both student-level and school-level data. The
student-level data came from the Master Files of the Pell Grant Information System for
recipients between 1984 and 1994, whereas her institution-level data come from the
Computer-Aided Science Policy Analysis and Research Database System (CASPAR)
from the National Science Foundation. The sample is limited to students attending the
2,000 institutions in the CASPAR data set.
Li (1999) found that increases in federal financial aid lead to price increases in
private and public four-year colleges. She estimated that a $1.00 increase in Pell revenues
is associated with a $0.36 increase in list tuition revenues per student and a $0.76
increase in net tuition revenues at public four-year colleges. For private four-year
institutions, a $1.00 increase in Pell revenues is associated with a list tuition increase of
$1.30 and no change for net price. However, she noted as a limitation to her study that the
absence of federal loan data biased these numbers, because private-college students are
more likely to borrow. She found little to no change in institutional aid associated with
Pell increases in either the private four-year or the public four-year sectors.
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Findings for Federal Pell Grants Controlling for Federal Loans
Early studies (Li, 1999; McPherson & Schapiro, 1991, 1993) shared the common
difficulty of isolating the effect of Pell Grants on institutional price because growth in the
Pell program was slow and consistent until the introduction of changes to the need
analysis formula resulting from the 1992 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act
(HEA). Later research (Acosta, 2001) improved on the methods of Li and McPherson and
Schapiro (1993) with the introduction of the 1992 policy change as a natural experiment
to test the effect of Pell expenditures on prices. Beginning with the 1993-1994 academic
year, the rule changes excluded the home equity of student’s family from the Pell Grant
needs analysis. Using an approach similar to McPherson and Shapiro’s (1991), Acosta
chose a sample of data from IPEDS for 1991-1992 to 1995-1996, and tested for
institutional price responses.
Acosta’s (2001) study is also an important contribution, because she added loans
to the model to isolate the effects of Pell Grants while controlling for the increasing
availability of loans; earlier studies did not account for loans. Her study found that
increases in both federal loans and federal Pell Grants are associated with increases in
tuition at private four-year institutions. In the private four-year sector, a $1.00 increase in
federal Pell Grant aid is associated with a $1.48 increase in institutional aid and a $3.24
increase in tuition. An increase in federal loans of $1.00 is associated with an increase in
institutional aid of $0.58 and $1.30 in tuition prices. In contrast, for public four-year
institutions a $1.00 increase in federal Pell Grant aid is associated with a decrease in
institutional grant aid of $0.57 and a small increase in tuition of $0.26. The study found
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no significant relationship between federal loan aid and public sector institutional aid or
tuition rates.
In response to a request from Congress for an explanation for the rapid growth of
college prices, Cunningham et al. (2001) used data from IPEDS institutions from between
1988-1989 and 1997-98 and found no relationship between financial aid and tuition for
any type of institution. Using trend analyses of changes in tuition prices, revenues,
expenditures, and all forms of student financial aid, they found that, tuition increased
faster than the rate of inflation in all postsecondary sectors during the time period. The
researchers concluded that state appropriations to institutions are the most important
influence on tuition changes, particularly in the public four-year sector. They found no
association between aid and tuition, regardless of whether aid is measured as federal
grants, federal loans, or state grants. However, they did find that institutional aid is
positively associated with tuition increases for public and private comprehensive
universities.
Findings for Federal and State Grant Aid at Selective Institutions
Although some researchers (Acosta, 2001; Li, 1999; McPherson & Schapiro,
1991, 1993) studied price response across the national population of institutions, other
researchers (Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2003; Singell & Stone, 2003) who examined
institutional price response focused on only a subset of postsecondary institutions and
found little evidence of a connection between price and aid. Rizzo and Ehrenberg
examined the determinants of tuition and enrollment at public flagship universities. Using
a sample of 91 public four-year flagship Research I and Research II universities, data
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from IPEDS (1979-1998), and a two-stage least squares regression analysis, they found
that federal and state grant programs are not related to increases in either in-state or out-
of-state tuition rates.
Singell and Stone (2003) focused their study of price response on highly selective
four-year public and private institutions and found that, among these institutions, only the
top-ranked private universities increase net tuition in response to increases in federal Pell
Grants. Using panel data from CASPAR describing 71 universities between 1983 and
1986, they examined a sample of institutions in the two highest ranked categories as
defined by U.S. News and World Report rankings. They found no evidence of a
relationship between federal Pell Grants and net tuition in the public universities or
lower-ranked private colleges. But, for the top private four-year colleges, the tuition to
Pell ratio is roughly 4-to-1. They characterized this pricing behavior among top-ranked
private universities as their charging full price to wealthy students of high academic
standing to subsidize equally qualified needier students. Furthermore, they demonstrated
that, in the aggregate, students experiencing the largest price increases in response to Pell
Grants attend institutions with the fewest Pell recipients. Without student-level data,
however, the distribution of these price changes among students is not observable. The
exclusion of student loans from their regression analysis may have also biased their
estimation of the effects of Pell Grants on price increases at expensive elite institutions,
causing them to overestimate the effect.
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Summary of Findings on Federal and State Grant Aid
Researchers found that institutional price response to federal and state grant aid
revenues varies considerably across institutional sectors (Acosta, 2001; Cunningham et
al., 2001; Li, 1999; McPherson & Schapiro, 1991, 1993; Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2003;
Singell & Stone, 2003). However, because of different sample periods, controls, and
methods, studies offered inconsistent conclusions about price response effects for
institutions in the private four-year and public four-year sectors. Variations across states
in who is authorized to set tuition rates may also contribute to the inconsistent findings
across sectors. For the private four-year sector, some (Acosta, 2001; Li, 1999) concluded
that federal Pell Grant aid is associated with increases in prices, although others
(McPherson & Schapiro, 1991, 1993; Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2003) found no effect.
Similarly, for the public four-year sector, some concluded that federal Pell Grant aid is
associated with increases in prices (Acosta, 2001; Li, 1999; McPherson & Schapiro,
1991, 1993), although others (Cunningham et al., 2001; Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2003) found
no relationship.
At least five conclusions may be drawn about the empirical approaches in earlier
research. First, IPEDS is the primary source of data. Second, federal aid programs are the
main focus. Third, data are drawn from national populations, and in the analyses there is
an attempt to control for state and institutional differences. Fourth, samples are limited to
four-year institutions with no attention to two-year institutions or for-profit institutions.
Fifth, inconsistencies in findings for price response across different sectors may be
attributed to differences in how researchers treat loans and direct appropriations in their
models. Some researchers omitted loans as a source of revenue in their price response
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models but included direct appropriations (Li, 1999; McPherson & Schapiro, 1991, 1993;
Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2003). Other research omitted direct appropriations (Acosta, 2001),
whereas another study established a significant relationship between price and direct
appropriations (Cunningham et al., 2001). Other common limitations of studies that
focused on Pell Grants were that a small percentage of students qualify for federal Pell
Grants in relation to total enrollments, the size of the average amount of Pell Grants is
small in relation to total tuition and fees, and year-to-year shifts in the amount of the Pell
are minimal. All of these limitations make empirical measurement of the effects of
federal grant aid difficult.
State Merit-Based Aid
Within the price response literature only one researcher (Long, 2002, 2003)
examined the effect of state merit-based aid programs on institutional prices, and she
concluded that four-year institutions raise tuition and fees in response to state merit-based
aid. Long used the introduction of state merit-based aid in Georgia as a natural
experiment to study the effect of the HOPE program on institutional prices and found that
both public and private four-year colleges respond to HOPE by increasing either tuition
or fee charges. Long further concluded that HOPE caused these changes because
institutions with the highest concentration of HOPE recipients had the greatest changes in
prices.
Long (2002, 2003) reached these conclusions by using a fixed-effects approach,
several controls for state characteristics and college attributes, and data from IPEDS and
the Georgia Higher Education Commission. She examined effects of the introduction of
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HOPE on changes in four outcomes: appropriations, tuition and fee charges, institutional
grant funding among private institutions, and instructional expenditures. Long argued that
all the outcomes were possible, because, depending on institutional choices, HOPE could
lead to increases in student charges as institutions seek to capture a portion of the new
HOPE revenues, or HOPE could lead to reductions in other forms of financial aid as
institutions use HOPE funds to substitute for institutional aid expenditures. Or, in
response to HOPE, institutions could reduce investments for cost of instruction, because
institutions have less incentive to invest in quality when the HOPE program gives
institutions an automatic competitive price advantage over out-of-state institutions.
In addition to finding that both public and private four-year colleges responded to
the HOPE program by increasing either tuition or fee charges, Long (2002, 2003) found
that institutions in the private four-year sector responded to HOPE by decreasing
institutional aid and that institutions in the public four-year sector responded by
increasing room and board fees. For institutions in all sectors, instructional expenditures
did not decline and direct appropriations actually increased, possibly because HOPE
funds came from the state lottery and not the state budget.
Because she studied the effect of a state program on institutional price within one
state, Long’s study overcame the methodological problems of earlier studies that ignored
state-by-state differences in tuition-setting policies and used a national sample of
postsecondary education institutions to examine the effect of loans (Acosta, 2001) or
grants (McPherson & Schapiro, 1993). In some states, the legislature or higher education
coordinating board sets tuition rates for public institutions, thereby making it hard for
campus administrators to alter tuition prices in response to aid (Baum, 2005; Long, 2002,
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2003). Long’s study is also a superb contribution to the price response literature because
the use of a natural experimental method allowed her to draw conclusions about the
causal connection between government grant aid and institutional price response.
Because of the contradictory findings of national studies that attempted to assess
the effect of government grant aid on institutional prices and because of the ways that
state context affects the relationship between government grant aid and institutional
prices, additional state-specific studies are desirable extensions of existing research.
Although Long’s (2002, 2003) findings for the program in Georgia shed light on the
relationship between state aid and institutional price response, the findings do not
necessarily represent the experience in other states and do not predict the effects of new
programs in other states, especially in states whose postsecondary education structure and
student demographics significantly differ from Georgia’s. Florida, the subject of this
study, has almost twice the number of postsecondary institutions and postsecondary
enrollments compared with Georgia, faces a different set of out-of-state competitors, has
a substantially higher share of private institutions, and has a different racial, ethnic, and
socioeconomic demographic distribution.
In the next section empirical studies on the effects of state merit-based aid on
student and institutional responses other than pricing are summarized. Although the focus
of this study is on institutional responses to state merit-based aid and specifically price
response, much of the existing research on merit-based aid programs focuses on the
behavioral responses of students to these new forms of aid. A review of this body of
literature relates this study on state merit-based aid in Florida to the existing empirical
work on state merit-based aid and positions this study’s research questions within what is
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currently known and not known about the effect of these programs on students and
institutions. A summary of the findings and a discussion of areas for further research
follows.
Research on State Merit-Based Aid
Because states began introducing large-scale merit-based aid programs only in
1993, empirical research on these programs is relatively new compared with research on
other financial aid programs. Because states attempt to achieve a diversity of goals
through these programs, this body of empirical research examines the effects of state
merit-based aid on a range of student outcomes: eligibility rates, college enrollment
choices, academic performance in high school, and such academic outcomes in college as
course withdrawal, credit load, retention, and summer school enrollment. This review of
research on state merit-based aid considers all the different outcomes researchers have
studied to understand what is known about the effect of these programs and to determine
where further research is needed. Many existing studies look at variations in outcomes by
student demographic characteristics, most commonly race, gender, income, and
socioeconomic status. Also included are the few studies that examine how institutions’
demographics and student academic quality change in response to state merit-based aid.
A review of the literature on state merit-based aid reveals broad similarities in
methodologies, data sources, and samples. Many studies rely heavily on descriptive
analyses and examine students attending institutions in a single state or institution. Most
researchers use a combination of data sources, including Census or Current Population
Survey data, federal and state Department of Education data, survey data such as IPEDS,
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and state-provided financial aid data. The majority of studies focus on students in
Georgia, because Georgia was the first state to institute a broad-based, merit-based aid
program. Because of the isolated introduction of Georgia HOPE, researchers such as
Long (2002, 2003) were able to use quasi-natural experimental techniques and
surrounding states as a control group. Other researchers (Binder et al., 2002; Heller &
Rasmussen, 2001; Ness & Tucker, 2005) analyzed the effects on student outcomes of
merit-based programs in Florida, Michigan, Tennessee, and New Mexico, and some
(Farrell, 2004b; Heller & Rasmussen, 2001) examined the effects of two or more state
programs.
In both of their two comprehensive reports on state merit-based aid, Heller and
Marin (2002, 2004) concluded that the goal of increasing access to college is not being
met through state merit-based aid. Heller and Marin’s (2002) compilation included
analyses from a 2001 research symposium organized by The Civil Rights Project at
Harvard University in response to the tremendous growth and popularity of merit-based
aid programs. Heller and Marin’s (2002) report included an overview of state merit-based
aid programs and analyses of who qualifies for and receives the aid in Florida, Michigan,
Georgia, and Tennessee, emphasizing inequities in who benefits from these subsidies as
well as an analysis of institutional responses to merit-based aid in Georgia. Heller and
Marin (2004) updated their initial report with a second compilation of research on state
merit-based aid, adding a detailed examination of programs in Massachusetts, Indiana,
Alaska, Florida, and Kentucky, and furthering the inquiry into the distributional equity of
these programs. In both of these compilations the researchers concluded that, in general,
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the studies in the reports confirm that use of traditional measures of merit, such as grades,
standardized test scores, and curricular test scores:
…results in scholarships that are awarded disproportionately to students who
were likely to attend college even without the public assistance…in contrast to
need-based aid programs, which have been demonstrated to have an important
role in promoting college access and attainment for underrepresented students.
(Heller & Marin, 2004, p. 20)
In short, Heller and Marin concluded that merit-based aid programs do little to help close
the gaps in college participation within a state.
Variations in Qualifying for and Receiving State Merit-Based Aid
Most research shows that high-income students and White students
disproportionately qualify for state merit-based aid awards (Farrell, 2004a, 2004b; Heller
& Rasmussen, 2001, 2002; Heller & Rogers, 2003; Ness & Noland, 2004). Heller and
Rasmussen (2001, 2002) compared variations in who qualifies for and receives merit-
based aid in Florida and Michigan to explore how student socioeconomic background is
related both to eligibility for merit-based aid and probability of receiving merit-based aid.
They found that, compared with Black and Hispanic students, White students are
overrepresented among both those who meet the scholarship eligibility criteria and those
who receive the scholarship. Subsequent research by Heller and Rogers on students in
Michigan found variations in qualification across income for all three of the qualification
conditions: taking the state of Michigan’s core academic area qualifying exams, scoring a
Level I or II on the qualifying exams, and scoring in the top quartile on the ACT or SAT.
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Similarly, Heller and Rasmussen (2001, 2002) found that high-poverty secondary schools
in both Michigan and Florida have fewer merit-based aid scholarship recipients than low-
poverty secondary schools and that schools with higher college-participation rates before
program implementation have greater proportions of the awards than schools with lower
pre-implementation college participation rates. The research showed that, compared with
Florida, Michigan has a disproportionately high number of eligible students in its high-
income secondary schools, in part, because Michigan’s state merit-based aid program has
more rigorous academic eligibility requirements than Florida’s. Heller and Rogers
concluded that groups most underrepresented in higher education are the least likely to be
awarded merit scholarships, and this pattern increases when the eligibility criteria are
more academically rigorous.
Other researchers found inequities in eligibility for Florida’s merit-based aid
award (OPPAGA, 2003). Florida high school students qualify for two different merit-
based academic awards by completing 15 credits of college preparatory courses and
scoring at specified levels on their GPA and ACT or SAT. Different requirements
determine eligibility for a third award for students on vocational paths. Similar to the
Michigan studies (Heller & Rasmussen, 2001, 2002; Heller & Rogers, 2003), OPPAGA
researchers found racial disparities in who qualifies for the scholarships in Florida.
Specifically, White and Asian students are overrepresented among the academic
scholarship recipients and underrepresented among the vocational scholarships.
Using data from 12 states with merit-based aid programs in 2002, Farrell (2004a)
concluded that most states had not achieved the goals of their programs, such as
increasing college participation, improving high school achievement, and keeping
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students in-state. She used data from Census, IPEDS, and Common Core of Data,
supplemented by state specific data where available. Farrell found that, when comparing
the rates of merit-based aid awards for county-level populations, White students are more
likely to receive merit-based aid than Black students, and students from suburban or low-
poverty districts are more likely to receive merit-based aid than their peers in urban high-
poverty districts. She concluded that race and income are highly related to qualification
for merit-based aid with White and wealthy students the most likely to qualify for merit-
based aid in every state in her study.
Ness and Noland (2004) studied the sensitivity of different student populations to
scholarship qualification rules by applying the academic criteria for the Tennessee
Education Lottery Scholarship (TELS) to the state populations of Florida, West Virginia,
and Louisiana. Ness and Noland found that some underrepresented students are more
likely to qualify under less academically rigorous criteria. TELS allows students to
qualify by meeting either GPA requirements or minimum scores on college entrance
examinations. With these eligibility criteria, 65% of Tennessee high school graduates
qualify for the aid. Using student ACT college entrance score data over 2001-2003 and
descriptive analyses, they found that, if the comparison states were to use the TELS
optional GPA or test score criteria, the proportion of qualifying low-income Black
students in these states doubles. The research illustrated the importance of differentiating
between merit-based aid programs with different qualification rules and interpreting
outcomes within their state contexts and suggested the limitations of generalizing
findings about a particular state merit-based aid program to other states.
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Overall, research on the distribution of state merit-based aid indicated that low-
income students and Black and Hispanic students are underrepresented among those who
qualify for and receive these awards (Farrell, 2004a; Heller & Rasmussen, 2001, 2002;
OPPAGA, 2003). Researchers found that groups most likely to be underrepresented in
higher education are the least likely to be awarded merit scholarships, and this pattern
increases when the eligibility criteria are more academically rigorous (Farrell, 2004a;
Heller & Rogers, 2003). When eligibility criteria are more flexible, more low-income
minority students qualify for the aid (Ness & Noland, 2004).
College Enrollment Choices in Response to State Merit-Based Aid
Researchers have reached different conclusions about the extent to which merit-
based aid increases college enrollment (Binder et al., 2002; Cornwell et al., 2004;
Dynarski, 2000, 2002, 2004), one of the explicit goals of most state programs. With data
on southeastern students from IPEDS, Census, and the Southern Regional Educational
Board between 1988 and 1997, Cornwell et al. (2004) used descriptive and regression
analyses to show that Georgia HOPE increases enrollment of freshmen at four-year
Georgia colleges by 6%. Cornwell and colleagues attributed most of this change to an
increase in the number of freshmen who stay in-state rather than attend college out-of-
state. For freshmen who recently graduated from high school and attended four-year
colleges, two-thirds of the program’s effect is explained by a decrease in the likelihood of
leaving the state. They also concluded that the increase in Georgia enrollments is greatest
among Black students as a result of a surge in enrollment of Black HOPE recipients in
Georgia’s historically Black four-year colleges.
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Similar to Cornwell and colleagues (2004), Dynarski (2000) determined that
HOPE increases college attendance rates among Georgia’s 18-19 year olds by 7-9%
relative to the attendance rates in the rest of the Southeast. She concluded that the rate of
attendance increases 4% for every $1,000 in merit-based aid. Contrary to Cornwell et al.
(2004), Dynarski found that merit-based aid has the greatest effect on the college
enrollment rates of middle- and upper-income and White rather than low-income and
Black students.
Later work by Dynarski (2002, 2004) demonstrated that HOPE is primarily
influencing a shift in the quality of institutions selected by students rather than an
increase in general access to college. As Cornwell et al. (2004) found, Dynarski (2002,
2004) found that merit-based aid programs are associated with a higher probability that
high school students stay in-state to attend college. Dynarski (2002, 2004) also showed
that the effect of merit-based aid on college enrollment differs by race. She found that,
for all students, HOPE increases the probability of attending a four-year public or four-
year private institution rather than a two-year institution, but that HOPE has a much
greater effect on four-year college attendance by White students than on four-year college
attendance by Black or Hispanic students.
In contrast to the work of Dynarski (2000) and Cornwell et al. (2004) for Georgia,
Binder, Ganderton and Hutchens (2002) discovered no change in the rate of in-state
college enrollment after the introduction of New Mexico’s merit-based aid program.
However, they did find changes in the composition of the student body at the University
of New Mexico and that Native Americans increased their share of enrollment after the
introduction of the merit-based program. Specifically, Binder et al. (2002) found that the
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proportion of students at the University of New Mexico from low-income families
declined after the introduction of the scholarship program but that the proportion of
students with lower academic ability increased. Although they found no change in the
overall rate of New Mexico students going to college associated with the introduction of
the merit-based aid program, Binder et al. found a shift in enrollment from two-year
institutions to four-year institutions for New Mexico students compared with enrollment
patterns in Colorado and Arizona.
The generalizability of findings about the effects on enrollment of particular state
merit-based aid programs is likely to be limited given differences in the specifications of
each state’s merit-based aid program. New Mexico’s scholarship program differs from
Georgia’s in that a student qualifies for the New Mexico award based on academic
performance during the first year of college rather than during high school. Any student
who enrolls in a full course load and achieves a first semester 2.5 GPA receives free
tuition at a two- or four-year state-supported institution in New Mexico for eight
semesters.
In each of the Georgia studies (Cornwell et al., 2004; Dynarski, 2000, 2002, 2004)
changes in enrollment before and after the introduction of Georgia HOPE were compared
with changes in enrollment in the same period in states across the Southeast. This
approach was limited by the use of aggregate data from a national source, such as Census
and IPEDS. These sources lack the data necessary to control for other changes in the
student populations such as academic preparation. Binder et al. (2002) used a similar
before and after approach, comparing changes in New Mexico with changes in other
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states in the Southwest. In spite of the limitations, these researchers used the best
available data to examine the effect of merit-based aid on enrollment.
Although most researchers examined aggregate enrollment response and its
variation by student demographics and institutional type, Ness and Tucker (2005)
considered how students’ thinking about college changes in response to the availability of
the merit-based scholarship in Tennessee. Using survey data, Ness and Tucker found that
students who are traditionally underrepresented in college self-report that the availability
of merit-based aid strongly influences their decision to consider college enrollment. Their
descriptive analysis suggested that Black students are more likely than White students to
report considering enrolling in college because of the availability of merit-based aid in
their state. Similarly, students with family incomes of less than $36,000 (the need-based
qualification cap in Tennessee) are more likely than students from higher income families
to view merit-based aid as critical to their consideration of college enrollment. They also
found that students with parents of lower education levels more frequently report that the
scholarship is very important to their college decision-making. Even when students who
described themselves as “not planning to go to college” were excluded from the sample,
the study indicated that Black students and other minorities are more likely than White
students to report the positive influence of merit-based aid on their enrollment intentions.
Two aspects of Ness and Tucker’s (2005) study design limit the usefulness of the
findings. First, the income variable is based only on the self-reports of students. Second,
the outcome variable is a simple dichotomous yes/no response on a questionnaire
indicating whether or not the scholarship influences the student’s decision about whether
to attend rather than actual enrollment behavior. Regardless of these limitations, this
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study is the first, to my knowledge, to suggest a connection between the awareness of
state merit-based aid among high school students and their decision-making about college
enrollment.
In summary, studies showed that increases in college enrollment are associated
with merit-based aid programs in Georgia (Cornwell et al., 2004; Dynarski, 2000, 2002,
2004) but not in New Mexico (Binder et al., 2002). Research also showed that in both
Georgia and New Mexico merit-based aid programs are associated with shifts in
enrollment from two- to four-year institutions (Binder et al., 2002; Dynarski, 2002,
2004). Researchers found conflicting indicators of the effects of state merit-based aid on
enrollment increases for White students compared with Black students (Cornwell et al.,
2004; Dynarski, 2002, 2004). Dynarski found that merit-based aid has more effect on the
college enrollment rates of middle- and upper-income students and White students than
low-income students and Black students because of the increased likelihood of students
staying in-state to study. Although Ness and Tucker (2005) did not study enrollment,
their study of the intentions of students to enroll showed that Black students, low-income
students, and students from families with low education levels are more likely than other
students to self-report that merit-based aid positively influences their thinking about
going to college.
Academic Preparation and Performance in High School
The small number of studies on the effects of state merit-based aid on academic
achievement and preparation for college do not agree on whether the programs function
as an incentive for student performance in high school (Bugler et al., 1999; Heller &
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Rogers, 2003; Henry & Rubenstein, 2002). Heller and Rogers found little change in the
academic preparedness of students before and after implementation of the merit-based aid
program in Michigan for the class of 2000. Using bivariate analyses of data trends of high
school student cohorts in 2000, 2001, and 2002 in Michigan, researchers found
inconsistent changes between cohorts in their academic achievement levels. They
examined three outcomes: the portion of each cohort taking all four Michigan 11th grade
achievement tests, the percentage of students who pass at least two of the achievement
tests, and the share of students who score in the top quartiles on the SAT or ACT.
Although there are racial disparities in the rates of achievement (as described above), the
analyses showed an increase in overall academic achievement as measured by state
achievement tests between the 2000 and 2001 cohort, and a decrease between the 2001
and 2002 cohorts.
Heller and Rogers (2003) observed no change in the ACT scores (the test taken by
the majority of Michigan students) after the implementation of merit-based aid and only
small improvements in the mean SAT scores. The researchers concluded that the initial
gains in the rates of qualification may primarily be a result of publicity surrounding the
availability of the merit award in its first year. Because state achievements tests are
administered to students in the 11th grade, the 2000 cohort of high school graduates had
no opportunity to improve their performance. However, the publicity surrounding the
program may have provided students in the second cohort, who did improve their scores,
time to better prepare for the standardized state exam required for qualification.
Furthermore, Heller and Rogers found that most of the gains in test scores occurred
among White students rather than Black, Native American, and Hispanic students.
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Other researchers found that a growing share of students in Florida improved their
academic performance to qualify for the Bright Futures merit-based aid award
(OPPAGA, 2003). The descriptive analysis in the OPPAGA evaluation showed that the
percentage of high school graduates who took all the courses required by the Bright
Futures academic scholarships increased from 54% in 1997 to 65% in 2001, four years
after the program launch. Over the same period, the average GPA for students also
improved. Researchers found that the share of students meeting the academic standards
of the scholarship rose from 26% to 30% over the same time period. Although the
researchers found racial disparities in who reaches the academic standards of the awards
in Florida, their analysis indicated that the academic preparation level of various at-risk
populations improved. The share of graduates taking more academically rigorous course
work increased over the study period for Black, Hispanic, and students with limited
English proficiency students, as well as students receiving free and reduced-price
lunches. In contrast to improvements in classroom performance, OPPAGA found that the
scores of college entrance exams declined in Florida over the study period.
Research on state merit-based aid in Georgia showed that the HOPE program
improves academic achievement and encourages taking college preparatory course work
in high school (Henry & Rubenstein, 2002). Using student-level data on all Georgia high
school graduates from the Georgia Student Finance Commission and the Board of
Regents between 1988 and 1998, Henry and Rubenstein found that the portion of high
school graduates who meet the academic requirements for HOPE increased from 47% in
1993 to 60% in 1998, five years after the launch of HOPE. On average, SAT scores and
high school GPAs increased over the same period for seniors in college preparatory
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tracks in Georgia high schools. Furthermore, in response to the program, a higher share
of students graduated from Georgia high schools with college preparatory diplomas
rather than standard high school diplomas, and the number of Advanced Placement (AP)
exams taken per 100 students doubled during the 10-year study period.
Bugler et al. (1999) argued that grade inflation does not explain the improved
academic performance among students in Georgia after the introduction of HOPE. Bugler
et al. used ordinary least squares regression to explore the extent to which improved
academic performance is explained by grade inflation rather than actual increases in
student performance. At the national level, they found a trend of grade inflation with a
growing portion of the U.S. student population receiving higher grades at the same time
that average SAT scores were falling. But, for first-year HOPE recipients, the correlation
between SAT scores and high school grades in core courses grew stronger after the
introduction of HOPE. Looking just at students who took a college preparatory
curriculum and who were closest to the GPA cutoff for HOPE (e.g., those whom Bugler
and colleagues hypothesized are the most likely to have grades inflated), they found that
SAT scores increased between 1993 and 1999 for all races, genders, and preparation
levels. They concluded that grade inflation does not explain the increases in GPA in
Georgia, because students are still taking a college preparatory curriculum and are
performing better academically after HOPE.
Henry and Rubenstein (2002) argued that, because the incentive effect provided
by the scholarship program motivates students to higher academic achievement, the
program “improves the quality of K-12 education in Georgia and reduce[s] racial
performance disparities by motivating students and their families to commit greater effort
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to schooling” (p. 93). They hypothesized that if students “apply more time and effort to
schoolwork relative to leisure to secure higher grades, the quality of education is
enhanced” (p. 96). They hypothesized that the incentive effect should be more important
for low-income students, because these students have the most to gain. Henry and
Rubenstein found that, after 1997, the first year that high school graduates would have
known about HOPE for all four years of secondary school, SAT scores and GPA rose for
all groups. They also found that, whereas SAT scores increased for all groups, Black
students in Georgia performed better on the SAT than the national average for Black
students after the introduction of HOPE. Henry and Rubenstein speculated that Black
student performance responded more strongly to HOPE than White student performance
because the publicity about the program increased awareness of financial aid
opportunities among Black students from lower-income backgrounds to a greater degree
than their White counterparts. Because this study did not control for the income or
socioeconomic status of students, the researchers did not test this potential explanation
for the relationship.
In summary, research is inconclusive as to whether state merit-based aid programs
provide an incentive for students to perform better academically in high school. Some
researchers (Heller & Rogers, 2003) found little change in academic performance for
students and almost no change in academic performance for Black students in Michigan.
Other researchers (OPPAGA, 2003) found that academic preparation among students in
Florida increased for all indicators except test scores. Still other researchers (Bugler et al.,
1999; Henry & Rubenstein, 2002) found that grade inflation does not explain the increase
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in student GPAs in Georgia because both enrollment in college preparatory curricula and
grades are positively correlated with increases in college entrance exam scores.
Academic Behaviors in College
Several researchers found that state merit-based aid programs negatively affect
college behavioral outcomes (Cornwell et al., 2005; Dee & Jackson, 1999; Henry et al.,
2004), with one exception (Dynarski, 2005). Because most state merit-based aid
programs have a college GPA requirement to maintain the scholarship, these studies
showed that merit-based aid affects course withdrawal, credit load, retention, summer
school enrollment, and choice of major.
Cornwell et al. (2005) found that students who received the merit scholarship in
Georgia were more likely than nonrecipients to take lighter course loads, withdraw from
courses, and incur extra costs to enroll in summer school courses to maintain the GPA
required for scholarship renewal. Using descriptive and regression analyses of data from
the financial aid and registrar offices for University of Georgia undergraduates between
1989 and 1997, Cornwell et al. found that HOPE reduced full course-load enrollments for
all students by 4.2 percentage points, and increased course withdrawal by the same
amount. Among freshmen, in the eight-year period included in the study, HOPE reduced
the probability of full-load course taking by 16 percentage points. The study indicated
that, after the introduction of HOPE, Georgia students with the lowest GPAs were 5.8
percentage points less likely to take a full load and 11.2 percentage points more likely to
withdraw from courses. The analysis showed that summer-school credits were 63
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percentage points and 44 percentage points higher in the two summers following the first
matriculation of HOPE scholars.
Another unintended consequence of the college GPA requirement is that
recipients of state merit-based aid are inclined to enroll in less challenging academic
majors. Dee and Jackson (1999) investigated the characteristics of students in the 1996
cohort of HOPE recipients at Georgia Tech who lost their scholarships because of failure
to maintain the minimum 3.0 GPA. Their descriptive analyses showed that 57% of
recipients lost the scholarship after the first year. They found that students in engineering,
science, and computing were more likely to lose their scholarship than students in other
disciplines, that men lost it more often than women, and that Black students lost it more
often than White students. The demands of keeping the scholarship appeared to be
greatest for students studying in the engineering and science fields, where, even after
controlling for academic ability, researchers found that, students in these fields were
prone to lose their scholarship (Dee & Jackson, 1999). Researchers found that, after
controlling for ability by using SAT and high school GPA as proxies, differences in who
maintains their scholarship by race and gender are minimal. However, researchers found
that, after controlling for the choice of academic major, substantial differences in
scholarship loss indicate that the grade requirement in HOPE may disproportionately
harm students in more difficult academic disciplines.
Other researchers found that the effect of Georgia HOPE on college persistence is
greater for those who lose the scholarship during the first year of college than for those
who either never receive a HOPE award or who receive and retain their award (Henry et
al., 2004). Using data from the Georgia Finance Commission, Henry et al. analyzed a
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sample of Georgia students in 1995-1996 who had a GPA one point over the HOPE high
school grade requirement. This sample was selected to compare differences in college
persistence between HOPE recipients just above the HOPE eligibility criteria and similar
nonrecipients. The results of their logistic regression analysis indicated that students who
receive merit awards and fail to keep them after their first semester are less likely to ever
receive a degree within four years than those who never receive the scholarship. Henry et
al. concluded that the value of HOPE as a mechanism for improving persistence
diminishes as a result of scholarship loss, and in some cases students who receive HOPE
and lose it appear to be worse off than those who never received it at all.
In contrast to other researchers (Cornwell & Mustard, 2005; Dee & Jackson,
1999; Henry et al., 2004), Dynarski (2005) found positive academic outcomes, such as
higher levels of degree completion for Georgia HOPE recipients than a small subsample
of Georgia nonrecipients (Henry et al., 2004). Dynarski’s study explored the relationship
between merit-based aid programs and degree completion before and after the
introduction of Georgia HOPE, using a sample from the 2000 decennial Census
microdata of 22-34 year olds born in the United States. She found the probability that a
student will persist to a baccalaureate degree increased by 3 percentage points in Georgia
after the introduction of merit-based aid scholarships. Furthermore, she showed that the
increase in degree completion is most pronounced for women: White women increased
completion by 3.2 percentage points; Hispanic women increased by 7 percentage points;
and non-White women increased by 6 percentage points. Her study also included a cost-
benefit analysis of the merit-based programs, and, based on this analysis, she argued that
tuition reduction through HOPE may be an efficient method for increasing college
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completion. In short, Dynarski’s findings suggest that HOPE has a positive effect on
degree achievement in the state of Georgia.
In summary, research indicates that academic behaviors in college are negatively
affected by state merit-based aid because students take lighter course loads, withdraw
from courses more frequently, and incur costs to enroll in more summer school courses
(Cornwell & Mustard, 2005; Dee & Jackson, 1999; Henry et al., 2004). Students enrolled
in difficult academic disciplines, such as science and engineering, are most likely to lose
their merit-based aid awards, potentially discouraging students from taking difficult
academic majors (Dee & Jackson, 1999). Research suggests conflicting evidence about
the effect of merit-based aid on degree completion. Those who receive merit-based aid in
Georgia and subsequently lose the scholarship appear to be less likely to ever complete a
degree than those who never received merit-based aid (Henry et al., 2004). Yet, other
research indicates that the introduction of Georgia HOPE increases baccalaureate
completions for the population as a whole (Dynarski, 2005). Most analyses on academic
behaviors focused on the effects of Georgia HOPE. This area of student behavioral
response to merit-based aid needs to be expanded to other states because the effects or the
aid program may differ, depending on eligibility requirements for the program and
scholarship maintenance rules.
Institutional Responses to State Merit-Based Aid
Few studies have examined the effect of state merit-based aid on aspects of
institutions other than net price. The research shows that the introduction of merit-based
programs corresponds with changes in the selectivity of institutions in terms of applicant
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admission and yield rates and the academic quality of students enrolling in institutions
(Cornwell et al., 2005; Cornwell & Mustard, 2006; Singell, Waddel, & Curs, 2004).
Some research (Cornwell et al., 2005) suggested that the academic quality of
students improves when merit-based aid is introduced. Using descriptive and regression
analyses on data from the financial aid and registrar offices for University of Georgia
undergraduates between 1989 and 1997, Cornwell et al. found that, on average, the
quality of in-state and out-of-state students increases after the introduction of HOPE
when quality is measured by SAT scores, AP credits, and high school GPA. More recent
analyses by Cornwell and Mustard (2006) indicated that the academic quality of students
and the selectivity of institutions increased in Georgia and surrounding states after the
introduction of HOPE. Their analysis showed that, at the most competitive four-year
institutions, students with higher academic qualifications enroll at greater rates following
the introduction of HOPE, making the student bodies more academically homogenous at
the top Georgia colleges relative to institutions in other southern states. They also found
that, at the most competitive institutions, application rates increase while acceptance rates
decline, thereby increasing selectivity at these institutions. Student ability becomes more
homogenous at the highest-quality institutions and more heterogeneous at the lowest
quality institutions as those with lower academic quality trickle down to the less selective
institutions, thereby exacerbating stratification by ability in colleges. Cornwell et al.
(2006) showed that acceptance rates in Georgia decreased for all institutions in Georgia
after HOPE was introduced and decreased most severely at universities that were most
space constrained and most selective.
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In other states where HOPE-like programs are present, regression analyses
showed increases similar to Georgia’s in the average academic quality of students
enrolled in four-year colleges and universities (Cornwell & Mustard, 2006). Arkansas,
Kentucky, and South Carolina all had increases in average institutional SAT scores after
the introduction of merit-based aid programs. Also, the share of students from the top
10% of their high school class enrolled in in-state institutions increased in Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, and Kentucky.
Another change in institutional demographics after the introduction of HOPE is
an increase in the number of Pell recipients in Georgia institutions relative to other
southern states (Singell et al., 2004). Singell et al. found that this growth is concentrated
in less selective four-year and two-year institutions. When IPEDS data, federal Pell data,
and economic data from Census were used, their regression analyses indicated a decline
in the size of the average Pell award by 7.3% overall, suggesting that HOPE draws less
needy students into the total population of Pell awardees. In the two-year sector they
found an 18.4% decrease in the average Pell award in Georgia. But, although average
Pell awards decreased in the two-year sector, overall Pell expenditures to these
institutions rose as a result of increased identification of Pell eligible students and
increased enrollment. Based on this finding, Singell et al. concluded that Georgia is “able
to leverage its [merit] scholarship dollars with greater federal support” (p. 25). However,
the important caveat they mentioned is that the observed increase in low-income Pell
recipients enrolled is concentrated mostly in less-selective institutions.
Overall, state merit-based aid in Georgia is associated with increases in student
quality at Georgia institutions as well as increased stratification of students by ability
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(Cornwell et al., 2005; Cornwell & Mustard, 2001, 2006). Some researchers contend that
the enrollment of low-income students increases in response to merit aid, based on
evidence of an increased number of Pell recipients in Georgia institutions after the
introduction of HOPE. However, it is unclear that equal access to college opportunities
for low-income student improves from the existence of merit-based aid, because the
growth is concentrated in less-selective institutions (Singell et al., 2004).
Summary
Most research on state merit-based aid has focused on the effect of these
programs on the behavior of students, with more limited attention to the effect these
programs have on such institutional attributes as demographic composition, student
quality, and price. The empirical studies on the effects of state merit-based aid on student
outcomes found the following:
1. Students most likely to be underrepresented in postsecondary education, e.g.,
those from low-income backgrounds and those who are Black and Hispanic, are
underrepresented among those who qualify for and receive these awards (Farrell,
2004a; Heller & Rasmussen, 2001, 2002; Heller & Rogers, 2003; OPPAGA,
2003).
2. Increases in college enrollment are associated with the introduction of merit-based
aid in Georgia (Cornwell et al., 2004; Dynarski, 2000, 2002, 2004) but not in New
Mexico (Binder et al., 2002).
3. Merit-based aid has no significant effect on academic achievement in high school
or test scores in Michigan (Heller & Rogers, 2003) but is associated with
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improved achievement in high school in Florida (OPPAGA, 2003) and improved
achievement and test scores in Georgia (Bugler et al., 1999; Henry & Rubenstein,
2002).
4. Merit-based aid has a negative effect on students’ academic choices in college,
such as course load and choice of major (Cornwell & Mustard, 2005; Dee &
Jackson, 1999; Henry et al., 2004), although one study suggests that it improves
baccalaureate degree completion (Dynarski, 2005).
5. After the introduction of Georgia HOPE, the composition of institutions changed
to greater homogeneity of student ability at more selective institutions, greater
racial disparity across institutions, and a general increase in student quality
(Cornwell et al., 2005; Cornwell & Mustard, 2001, 2006).
The inconsistent findings across multiple states suggest that effects on enrollment
and high school achievement outcomes associated with state merit-based aid depend on
the state context and the specification of the merit-based aid program. Therefore,
conclusions about the effects of state merit-based aid programs drawn from a study of
one state may not apply to other states. Focusing on a single state recognizes the role of
state context and allows for an examination of the state-specific effects of state aid
programs on student and institutional responses (Perna, 2006; Perna, Steele, Woda, &
Hibbert, 2005). Researchers also find significant variations in effects in state merit-based
aid policies that are similarly structured because of differences across states in economic
conditions, K-12 educational quality, the supply of postsecondary education, and the
demographics of that particular state (Farrell, 2004a; Perna & Titus, 2004).
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This literature review also highlights the scarcity of inquiry into the behavior of
postsecondary institutions in response to the introduction of state merit-based aid
programs. Although Long (2002, 2003) examined effects on institutional price, other
institutionally focused research examined changes in the demographic and achievement
levels of student populations without consideration of institutional pricing behavior
(Cornwell & Mustard, 2005; Cornwell & Mustard, 2006; Singell et al., 2004). However,
economic theories predict that subsidies such as merit-based aid interact with decision on
student human capital, institutional enrollment, and pricing to simultaneously determine
institutional price and the composition of the student body. Therefore, further research is
needed that considers the role of institutions in the outcomes of state merit-based aid
programs.
Summary
This literature review shows that the relationship between student financial aid
and institutional price varies, depending on state context, the type of financial aid, and the
eligibility details of the aid (Acosta, 2001; Li, 1999; Long, 2003; McPherson & Schapiro,
1993). Also, this literature review demonstrates that earlier research on state merit-based
aid programs paid little attention to the behavior of postsecondary institutions, but
focused primarily on student response. One exception is Long’s (2002, 2003) research
that used natural experimental techniques by exploiting the introduction of merit-based
aid in Georgia. In this dissertation the research on institutional price response is furthered
by application of an economic theoretical framework to the introduction of merit-based
aid in the state of Florida.
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In establishing merit-based aid programs, state policymakers may intend to reduce
net price, encourage higher rates of total in-state enrollments, and/or improve the
academic quality of students in their state institutions. Florida’s Bright Futures program
explicitly aims to reward academic achievement by lowering the price of postsecondary
opportunities in the state. This dissertation predicts that the price response of some
postsecondary institutions inhibits the effectiveness of state merit-based aid programs in
achieving state policy goals, because institutions make choices regarding tuition and fee
revenues, enrollment numbers, and student quality that are inconsistent with their state’s
policy goals. As a result of differences in institutional missions and resources,
institutional responses to state merit-based aid programs are predicted by theory to differ
across postsecondary education sectors defined by control (public, private, and for-
profit), location (in-state or out-of-state), and level (two-year and four-year) (McPherson
& Schapiro, 1991; Winston, 1999). This study of merit-based aid in the state of Florida
extends current research about the active role that institutions play in the outcomes of
state merit-based aid programs.
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
CHAPTER 3
Introduction
This study extends two bodies of research, one that analyzes institutional price
response to student financial aid and a second that examines the effect of state merit-
based aid programs on institutions, by examining changes in tuition and fees, room and
board charges and institutional aid expenditures following the introduction of the Bright
Futures merit-based aid program in Florida. Applying an economic theoretical framework
to postsecondary education pricing, this study explores how institutions respond to the
introduction of a new aid subsidy and how this response varies for different types of
postsecondary institutions. Using descriptive and ordinary least squares regression
analyses that include year fixed-effects and other controls, this study uses institution-level
data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) and the Florida
Bright Futures program to explore the following research questions for each of four
sectors of postsecondary education (public four-year, public two-year, private four-year,
and for-profit institutions):
1. How do the levels of tuition and fee charges, room and board charges, and grant
aid expenditures at Florida colleges and universities compare with the levels at
institutions in other states?
2. How do the annual changes in tuition and fee charges, room and board charges,
and grant aid expenditures at Florida colleges and universities compare with
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changes at institutions in other states after the introduction the Bright Futures
merit-based aid program?
3. Relative to a comparison group of institutions in surrounding states, how do
tuition and fee charges, room and board charges, and grant aid expenditures at
Florida colleges and universities react to the introduction of the state merit-based
aid program after controlling for institutional and state economic characteristics?
This chapter begins with a description of Florida, its state merit-based aid
program, and its appropriateness for this analysis. Then the IPEDS dataset and other
supplemental data sources are presented. Following these descriptions, components of the
economic model are outlined and the variables included in the model are defined. The
statistical techniques used to address the research questions are also described, followed
by a description of the limitations of this study.
Florida and the Bright Futures Merit-Based Aid Program
In this section background information on Florida and the Bright Futures program
is provided. The appropriateness of Florida for this study is described, followed by
contextual information on the state’s tuition-setting approach and financial aid policies
during the study period. Eligibility criteria and expenditures for the Bright Futures
program are described.
Selection of Florida and State Context
Florida is an appropriate focus for this study because it introduced a merit-based
aid program earlier than other southeastern states. One requirement for a natural
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experimental study is a discrete shift in policy or introduction of a new policy that can be
studied relative to a control group (Meyer, 1995). Florida and surrounding southeastern
states with no merit-based aid programs provide the opportunity for a natural experiment.
Also, because Bright Futures offers students the possibility of 75% to 100% of their
tuition and fees being covered by the scholarship, it is more likely to influence a price-
sensitive students’ decision to attend college than a program that covers lower shares of
the price (Ness & Tucker, 2005; Paulsen, 2001a).
Florida is the fourth most populous state with 17 million residents, and it has a
large and diverse array of postsecondary institutions made up of 160 degree-granting
institutions and approximately 760,000 students (National Center for Education Statistics
[NCES], 2006). Despite its large number of institutions, Florida typically ranks below the
national average in terms of baccalaureate attainment among those 25 years old and older
compared with the rest of the United States (NCES, 2005). Florida is well known for
having some of the lowest-priced public postsecondary institutions relative to the rest of
the United States. However, in 2006 the National Center for Public Policy in Higher
Education gives Florida an F in providing affordable higher education, largely because
the state invests only 14% of its student financial aid in need-based programs.
The state political context relative to higher education slowly changed during the
period covered in this study. Historically, the state’s public institutions were organized
within a relatively autonomous state university system that began as a Board of Regents
arm of the state government (Finney, 1997). The Board was able to coordinate policies
and set tuition rates. By the 1970s, the Board of Regents became a government unit
reporting to the elected Commissioner of Education. Legislative authority over
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institutions grew during the 1970s and into the 1980s, culminating in a state law in 1991
authorizing a tuition indexing policy, capping how much the Board of Regents could
raise tuition and fees (Florida Statute 240.214 [5]). Although authority over price-setting
did not significantly change before 2000, in 1998, Florida introduced a K-20 governance
structure through a constitutional amendment (Florida Statute 240.297[8]). As a result of
this shift, the Board of Regents was abolished and a Board of Trustees was established
for each public four-year institution. Most of these substantive changes were not in effect
until after the time period analyzed in this study. During the study period in public
institutions tuition and fees were set by the Board of Regents in the January that preceded
the academic year (Florida Statute 240.297[8]) whereas room and board charges and
institutional grants were determined by private and for-profit institutions autonomously
on their own schedules.
Description, Eligibility Criteria, and Expenditures of Bright Futures
The Bright Futures program is the largest financial aid program in Florida (Office
of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability [OPPAGA], 2003). It was
launched by the Florida Legislature in 1997 to:
Establish a lottery-funded scholarship program to reward any Florida high school
graduate who merits recognition of high academic achievement and who enrolls
in an eligible Florida public or private postsecondary education institution within
three years of graduation from high school. (Florida Statute 240.40201)
Because Bright Futures legislation explicitly mentions the goal of rewarding academic
achievement, it implicitly establishes a goal of making college opportunities more
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affordable. The Bright Futures Scholarship Program consists of three types of awards: the
Florida Academic Scholarship (FAS), the Florida Medallion Scholarship (FMS), and the
Florida Gold Seal Vocational Scholarship (GSV). For public sector recipients these
awards cover 75% to 100% of tuition and fees and for private sector recipients these
awards cover 75% to 100% of the average tuition and fees at comparable public
institutions.
To be eligible for these awards a student must be a U.S. citizen or eligible
noncitizen, be a recipient of a standard Florida high school diploma or its equivalent
within three years of receiving the first award disbursement, not be guilty of a felony, not
be in default on any federal Title IV loan or state loan, submit a Florida financial aid
application, and attend a Florida-eligible institution for at least six credit hours. Table 3.1
lists the eligibility requirements for the three different awards. Each award requires that
students meet a minimum grade point average (GPA) in core courses, a minimum test
score on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) or American College Test (ACT), and for
the FAS award, a minimum of 75 community service hours.
The Florida Department of Education administers Bright Futures, and the
Education Enhancement Trust Fund allocates the funding for the scholarships. In the
event that the funds appropriated to Bright Futures are not adequate to provide the
maximum allowable award to each eligible applicant, awards in all three components of
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3.5 weighted GPA using the credits listed
below, combined with the test scores and
community service hours listed below
3.0 weighted GPA using the credits listed
below, combined with the test scores
listed below
3.0 weighted GPA using the 15.5 credits
listed below for a 4-year diploma and a
3.5 unweighted GPA in a minimum of 3
vocational credits in one vocational









Courses must include 15 credits of
college preparatory academic courses:
4 English (3 with substantial writing)
3 Mathematics (Algebra I and above)
3 Natural Science (2 with lab)
3 Social Science
2 Foreign Language (one language)
May use up to 3 additional credits from
courses in the academic areas listed
above and/or AP, IB, or AICE fine arts
courses to raise the GPA
Courses must include 15 credits of
college preparatory academic courses:
4 English (with substantial writing)
3 Mathematics (Algebra I & above)
3 Natural Science (2 with lab)
3 Social Science
2 Foreign Language (one language)
May use up to 3 additional credits from
courses in the academic areas listed
above and/or AP, IB, or AICE fine arts
courses to raise the GPA
4-year Diploma
Credits must include 15.5 core credits
required for high school graduation:
4 English
3 Mathematics (including Algebra I)
3 Natural Science
3 Social Science (American and
World History, Government, and
Economics)
1 Practical Arts OR 1 Performing




Plus a minimum of 3 Vocational Job-
Preparatory or Technology Education
Program credits
Source: Florida Bright Futures Scholarship Program Initial Eligibility Brochure, www.firn.edu/doe/brfutures/pdf/bf_brochure.pdf
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Table 3.1 (Continued)
Eligibility Requirements for Initial Bright Futures Awards for 2006 High School Applicants





Florida Gold Seal Vocational Scholars
Award (GSV)
Community Service 75 hours, as approved by the district or
private school
Not required Not required
Test Scores Best composite score of 1270 SAT
Reasoning Test (based on the combined
Critical Reading and Math sections only)
or 28 ACT (excluding the writing
section)
The new writing sections for both the
SAT and ACT are used in the composite.
SAT Subject Tests are not used for Bright
Future’s eligibility.
(ACT scores are rounded up for scores
with .5 and higher; SAT scores do not
require rounding.)
Best composite score of 970 SAT
Reasoning Test (based on the combined
Critical Reading and Math sections only)
or 20 ACT (excluding the writing
section)
The new writing sections for both the
SAT and ACT are used in the composite.
SAT Subject Tests are not used for Bright
Future’s eligibility.
(ACT scores are rounded up for scores
with .5 and higher; SAT scores do not
require rounding.)
Students must earn the minimum score
on each section of the CPT or SAT or
ACT.
CPT: Reading=83; Sentence Skills=83;
Algebra=72
or SAT Reasoning Test: Critical
Reading=440; Math=440
or ACT: English=17; Reading=18;
Math=19
Source: Florida Bright Futures Scholarship Program Initial Eligibility Brochure, www.firn.edu/doe/brfutures/pdf/bf_brochure.pdf
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Table 3.1 (Continued)
Eligibility Requirements for Initial Bright Futures Awards for 2006 High School Applicants









• National Merit or Achievement
Scholars and Finalists
• National Hispanic Scholars
• IB Diploma Recipients
• Students who have completed the IB
Curriculum with best composite score of
1270 SAT or 28 ACT
• AICE Diploma Recipients
• Students who have completed the AICE
Curriculum with best composite score of
1270 SAT or 28 ACT
• Students who have attended a home
education program with best composite
score of 1270 SAT or 28 ACT
• GED with best composite score of 1270
SAT or 28 ACT and a 3.5 weighted GPA
in the above 15 required credits
• Early Admissions with best composite
score of 1270 SAT or 28 ACT and a 3.5
weighted GPA in curriculum courses
completed
• 3-year standard college preparatory
program with best composite score of
1270 SAT or 28 ACT and a 3.5 weighted
GPA in the above 15 required credits
• National Merit or Achievement
Scholars and Finalists and National
Hispanic Scholars who have not
completed 75 hours of community
service
• Students who have completed the IB
Curriculum with best composite score of
970 SAT or 20 ACT
• Students who have completed the AICE
Curriculum with best composite score of
970 SAT or 20 ACT
• Students who have attended a home
education program and have a best
composite score of 1070 SAT or 23 ACT
• GED with best composite score of 970
SAT or 20 ACT and a 3.0 weighted GPA
in the above 15 required credits
• Early Admissions with best composite
score of 970 SAT or 20 ACT and a 3.0
weighted GPA in curriculum courses
completed
• 3-year standard college preparatory
program with best composite score of
970 SAT or 20 ACT and a 3.0 weighted
GPA in the above 15 required credits
Obtain a 3.5 unweighted GPA in a
minimum of 3 vocational credits in one
vocational program and minimum test
scores listed above.
• 3-year Career Preparatory Diploma with
3.0 weighted GPA using the 13 core
credits required for graduation listed
below:
4 English (3 with substantial writing)
3 Mathematics (including Algebra I)
3 Natural Science (2 with lab)
3 Social Science
• 3-year College Preparatory Diploma
with 3.0 weighted GPA using the 15 core
credits required for graduation listed
below:
4 English (3 with substantial writing)
3 Mathematics (Algebra I and above)
3 Natural Science (2 with lab)
3 Social Science
2 Foreign Language (in the same
language)
• GED with 3.0 weighted GPA using the
core credits required for your selected
high school graduation option (standard,
career, or college)
Source: Florida Bright Futures Scholarship Program Initial Eligibility Brochure, www.firn.edu/doe/brfutures/pdf/bf_brochure.pdf
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The total disbursements during the first academic year following the introduction
of Bright Futures (1997-1998) totaled $69.6 million and rose to $174.9 million by 2001-
2002, the fifth year of the program (OPPAGA, 2003). How the disbursement amounts
vary for the three programs and the share of tuition and fees covered by the scholarship
for students attending eligible institutions are shown in Table 3.2. The FAS recipients,
those who meet the highest academic standards, receive a scholarship equal to 100% of
tuition and fees in public institutions as well as $300 per semester for other college
expenses. At private institutions, FAS recipients receive a scholarship equal to 100% of
the price
Table 3.2










100% of tuition and fees
(including lab fees up to $300
per semester) plus $300 per
semester for college related
expenses (excluding summer
term) prorated by term and
hours
100% of the average tuition
and fees covered at a
comparable Florida public
institution including the $300
per semester provided for
college-related expenses





























Source: Florida Bright Futures Scholarship Program Initial Eligibility Brochure,
www.firn.edu/doe/brfutures/pdf/bf_brochure.pdf
covered at a comparable public institution. The FMS recipients, who meet slightly less
rigorous academic requirements, receive a scholarship equal to 75% of tuition and fees at
public institutions. At private institutions, FMS recipients receive a scholarship equal to
75% of tuition and fees at a comparable public institution. The GSV recipients, who meet
the least rigorous academic requirements, receive an amount equal to 75% of tuition and
fees at public institutions and a comparable dollar amount at private institutions.
Students attending college part-time also qualify for the program but receive
lower awards. A student enrolled in six to eight semester credit hours may receive as
much as one-half of the maximum award, a student enrolled in 9 to 11 credit hours may
receive as much as three-fourths of the maximum award, and a student enrolled in 12 or
more credit hours may receive the full award. The Bright Futures program allows
students to transfer within the state with their award, and students may apply for
additional awards for summer terms within the annual maximum of 45 credit hours per
student.
The 1997 legislation established the institutions that students may attend to
qualify for the award (Florida State Law 240.40204). Eligible institutions are—(a) a
Florida public university, community college, or technical center; (b) an independent
Florida college or university that is accredited by a member of the Commission on
Recognition of Postsecondary Accreditation and that has operated in the state for at least
three years; (c) an independent Florida postsecondary education institution that is
licensed by the State Board of Independent Colleges and Universities, is in sound
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financial condition, and has operated in the state for at least three years without having its
approval, accreditation, or license placed on probation; (d) a Florida independent
postsecondary education institution that offers a nursing diploma approved by the Board
of Nursing; or (e) a Florida institutions of independent postsecondary education that is
licensed by the State Board of Independent Postsecondary Vocational, Technical, Trade,
or Business Schools meeting the minimum program completion and placement rate
required by a U.S. Department of Education recognized accrediting agency and has
operated in Florida for five years in good standing.
Approximately 27% of all Florida high school graduates qualified for one of the
three Bright Futures awards in 1997 when the program was introduced, and this
percentage steadily increased to almost 40% in 2003 (Florida Department of Education,
2005). Table 3.3 shows participation in the program from its initial year to the 2004-2005
academic year. During the 1997-1998 academic year, 23,710 students received a Bright
Futures scholarship for the first time, and an additional 18,609 students were
grandfathered into the program from an existing state scholarship program.1 According to
OPPAGA (2003), approximately 71% of all the scholarship recipients attended public
four-year institutions in 2000, 10% attended private four-year institutions, 19% attended
public two-year institutions, and fewer than 1% attended for-profit institutions. Table 3.3
also shows differences in the distribution of recipients and dollars disbursed across the
1 Before the launch of the Bright Futures program in 1997, two state scholarship programs were offered in
Florida: the Florida Undergraduate Scholars Fund (FUSF) and the Vocational Gold Seal Endorsement
Scholarship (VGSES). Compared with Bright Futures, these programs have far less generous scholarships,
but similar merit-based criteria, including minimum GPA, test score, and course requirements. FUSF,
capped at $2,500 annually, and VGSES, capped at $2,000 annually, were funded through state
appropriations, whereas Bright Futures was tied to a percentage of public four-year and public two-year
prices. After 1997, FUSF and VGSES students were moved into the new Bright Futures program, funded
through the state lottery and set as a percentage of tuition and fees (Florida Department of Education,
1996).
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three programs. For example, in 2004-2005 there were 27,472 FAS recipients,
representing just 21% of total recipients, but 33% of total disbursed dollars went to
Table 3.3
Bright Futures Scholarship, Number of Initial, Renewal and Total Recipients and Dollars




(FAS) (FMS) (GSV) Combined
_______________________________________________________________________
Initial Recipients
1997-98 7,011 9,861 6,838 23,710
1998-99 7,453 15,576 2,314 25,343
1999-00 7,926 18,201 2,402 28,529
2000-01 6,031 24,184 2,040 32,255
2001-02 6,345 25,495 1,210 33,050
2002-03 7,064 28,447 1,323 36,834
2003-04 7,705 30,812 1,404 39,921
2004-05 8,560 32,967 1,467 42,994
Renewal Recipients
1997-98 11,608 3,174 3,827 18,609
1998-99 14,132 9,569 7,021 30,722
1999-00 16,348 22,221 3,907 42,476
2000-01 18,443 34,296 2,062 54,801
2001-02 18,390 45,078 1,776 65,244
2002-03 18,055 53,676 1,303 73,034
2003-04 18,091 61,430 1,195 80,716
2004-05 18,912 67,543 1,148 87,603
Total Recipients
1997-98 18,619 13,035 10,665 42,319
1998-99 21,585 25,145 9,335 56,065
1999-00 24,274 40,422 6,309 71,005
2000-01 24,474 58,480 4,102 87,056
2001-02 24,735 70,573 2,986 98,294
2002-03 25,119 82,123 2,626 109,868
2003-04 25,796 92,242 2,599 120,637
2004-05 27,472 100,510 2,615 130,597
________________________________________________________________________




Bright Futures Scholarship, Number of Initial, Renewal and Total Recipients and Dollars




(FAS) (FMS) (GSV) Combined
________________________________________________________________________
Dollars Dispersed
1997-98 $43,892,936 $15,242,245 $10,431,788 $69,566,969
1998-99 $52,130,071 $31,153,146 $10,049,353 $93,332,570
1999-00 $65,605,340 $58,656,888 $7,588,704 $131,850,932
2000-01 $69,142,925 $90,574,018 $5,052,404 $164,769,347
2001-02 $67,628,272 $103,792,891 $3,493,754 $174,914,917
2002-03 $71,584,097 $127,378,680 $3,242,029 $202,204,806
2003-04 $78,499,060 $153,278,582 $3,411,112 $235,188,754
2004-05 $89,018,077 $176,316,888 $3,609,404 $268,944,369
________________________________________________________________________
Source: Office of Student Financial Assistance, Annual Report to the Commissioner,
2004-05
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FAS ($89 million). In contrast, FMS represented 77% of total recipients but only 66% of
total dollars ($176 million). In other words, expenditures per student are higher for FAS
than FMS because of the differences in awards and the prices of institutions attended.
FAS pays out an amount equal to 100% of tuition and fees at public institutions and a
comparable dollar amount for private institutions plus stipends, and students who receive
FAS predominantly attend four-year institutions that have higher tuition and fees than
public two-year colleges. In contrast, FMS recipients receive scholarships equal to 75%
of the costs of tuition and fees, and a larger share of the FMS recipients attend public
two-year institutions. Table 3.4 also shows that the number of recipients and the amount
of spending on both the FAS and the FMS programs steadily increased between 1997-
1998 and 2004-2005 but declined in the GSV category.
Data
In this study Bright Futures Scholarship data from the Florida Department of Education
and enrollment and finance data from the Integrated Postsecondary Student Education
Data System (IPEDS) are used. These sources are supplemented with data that describe
state characteristics from the Current Population Survey and the Digest of Education
Statistics. In this section the two primary data sources, the sample of institutions from




Bright Futures Awards by Institutional Sector, Average Institutional Disbursements, and
State Disbursements in Constant (2006) Dollars
________________________________________________________________________
Institutional Average State Total
________________________________________________________




FMS 927 $1,181,170 8,343 $10,630,529
GSV 448 $578,562 4,033 $5,207,061
FAS/ATS/TOPS 1,637 $3,861,645 14,733 $34,754,805
Total 3,012 $5,621,377 27,109 $50,592,395
Private Four-Year
FMS 49 $71,315 1,384 $1,996,833
GSV 20 $28,986 561 $811,597
FAS/ATS/TOPS 100 $260,734 2,507 $6,518,359
Total 148 $310,893 4,452 $9,326,789
For-Profit
FMS 3 $2,936 26 $23,487
GSV 9 $8,986 96 $98,849
FAS/ATS/TOPS 2 $3,683 7 $11,049
Total 11 $11,115 129 $133,385
Public Two-Year
FMS 114 $80,041 3,526 $2,481,282
GSV 146 $100,623 6,001 $4,125,551
FAS/ATS/TOPS 56 $88,747 1,561 $2,484,909
Total 270 $221,750 11,088 $9,091,742
________________________________________________________________________
Note: Academic Top Scholarships (ATS) and its predecessor TOPS are two supplemental
grants only available to FAS recipients. The number of awardees are unduplicated counts
of recipients.
Source: Bright Futures Scholarship Office, Florida Department of Education.
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Table 3.4 (Continued)
Bright Futures Awards by Institutional Sector, Average Institutional Disbursements, and
State Disbursements in Constant (2006) Dollars
________________________________________________________________________
Institutional Average State Total
________________________________________________________




FMS 1,791 $2,382,871 16,120 $21,445,843
GSV 468 $617,344 4,212 $5,556,099
FAS/ATS/TOPS 1,949 $4,696,902 17,542 $42,272,116
Total 4,208 $7,697,118 37,874 $69,274,058
Private Four-Year
FMS 82 $125,312 2,619 $4,009,999
GSV 17 $25,924 554 $829,567
FAS/ATS/TOPS 101 $269,716 2,716 $7,282,320
Total 178 $367,330 5,889 $12,121,886
For-Profit
FMS 7 $7,603 66 $76,028
GSV 6 $6,471 72 $77,655
FAS/ATS/TOPS 3 $5,518 17 $27,591
Total 12 $13,944 155 $181,274
Public Two-Year
FMS 181 $144,873 6,714 $5,360,301
GSV 119 $87,696 4,628 $3,420,152
FAS/ATS/TOPS 51 $80,081 1,472 $2,322,351
Total 329 $284,687 12,814 $11,102,804
________________________________________________________________________
Note: Academic Top Scholarships (ATS) and its predecessor TOPS are two supplemental
grants only available to FAS recipients. The number of awardees are unduplicated counts
of recipients.
Source: Bright Futures Scholarship Office, Florida Department of Education.
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Table 3.4 (Continued)
Bright Futures Awards by Institutional Sector, Average Institutional Disbursements, and
State Disbursements in Constant (2006) Dollars
________________________________________________________________________
Institutional Average State Total
________________________________________________________




FMS 3,009 $4,739,717 27,078 $42,657,449
GSV 305 $467,582 2,749 $4,208,240
FAS/ATS/TOPS 2,230 $6,068,285 20,071 $54,614,562
Total 5,544 $11,275,583 49,898 $101,480,251
Private Four-Year
FMS 127 $207,149 4,077 $6,628,762
GSV 10 $15,204 276 $425,717
FAS/ATS/TOPS 103 $284,409 2,873 $7,963,442
Total 226 $469,310 7,226 $15,017,921
For-Profit
FMS 8 $12,204 85 $134,244
GSV 5 $7,263 50 $72,629
FAS/ATS/TOPS 3 $6,138 15 $36,827
Total 11 $17,407 150 $243,700
Public Two-Year
FMS 269 $229,717 9,947 $8,499,528
GSV 89 $70,770 3,371 $2,689,244
FAS/ATS/TOPS 53 $88,145 1,528 $2,556,216
Total 371 $343,625 14,846 $13,744,988
________________________________________________________________________
Note: Academic Top Scholarships (ATS) and its predecessor TOPS are two supplemental
grants only available to FAS recipients. The number of awardees are unduplicated counts
of recipients.
Source: Bright Futures Scholarship Office, Florida Department of Education.
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Table 3.4 (Continued)
Bright Futures Awards by Institutional Sector, Average Institutional Disbursements, and
State Disbursements in Constant (2006) Dollars
________________________________________________________________________
Institutional Average State Total
________________________________________________________




FMS 4,555 $7,403,207 40,999 $66,628,860
GSV 161 $258,384 1,449 $2,325,458
FAS/ATS/TOPS 2,322 $6,423,057 20,902 $57,807,509
Total 7,039 $14,084,647 63,350 $126,761,827
Private Four-Year
FMS 180 $317,875 5,756 $10,172,008
GSV 7 $12,235 193 $330,340
FAS/ATS/TOPS 98 $287,815 2,845 $8,346,634
Total 275 $589,031 8,794 $18,848,982
For-Profit
FMS 11 $18,977 154 $265,680
GSV 3 $3,824 39 $53,534
FAS/ATS/TOPS 3 $7,915 14 $39,577
Total 12 $19,933 207 $358,791
Public Two-Year
FMS 353 $296,032 12,364 $10,361,111
GSV 64 $55,189 2,499 $2,152,386
FAS/ATS/TOPS 59 $81,661 1,757 $2,449,825
Total 396 $356,270 16,620 $14,963,322
________________________________________________________________________
Note: Academic Top Scholarships (ATS) and its predecessor TOPS are two supplemental
grants only available to FAS recipients. The number of awardees are unduplicated counts
of recipients.
Source: Bright Futures Scholarship Office, Florida Department of Education.
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Florida Bright Futures Data
One source of data for this study is the Florida Bright Futures program. The
Office of Student Financial Assistance within the Florida Department of Education
gathers data on all scholarships dispersed to Florida residents through the Bright Futures
program. In this study I use information about the number of Bright Futures recipients at
each institution (initial and renewal) and the dollar amount received for each recipient at
each institution (initial and renewal) for selected years after the program’s introduction
(1997-1998 to 2000-2001). The student-level data are aggregated to create institution-
level data about the disbursements and number of recipients for Bright Futures. To gain
access to the Florida data, I submitted a request to the Bright Futures program director
that included a description of the study. I received institution-level data for all four years
with the number of recipients and the dollar amount for every eligible Florida institution.
Table 3.4 shows the breakdown of recipients and dollars by sector for Florida
institutions included in the sample from 1997-1998 to 2000-2001. The largest number of
awardees and the amount of money spent for Bright Futures were concentrated in the
public four-year sector in all years, followed by the public two-year sector and the private
four-year sector. For-profit institutions had a maximum of 12 awardees on average in a
given year. The largest Bright Futures program in 1997 was FAS (with the more
academically rigorous criteria), but in 1998 through 2000, FMS (with average academic
requirements) grew to be the largest program across all sectors combined.
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Integrated Postsecondary Student Education Data System
A second source of data for this study is IPEDS. The U.S. Department of
Education’s NCES originally launched IPEDS in 1986 to replace the Higher Education
General Information Survey as a means of collecting data from all postsecondary
institutions. In 1992, this data collection effort was limited to institutions that participated
in federal Title IV financial aid programs. IPEDS is conducted by NCES to fulfill its
legislative mandate to collect and disseminate information about U.S. postsecondary
education. Participation in the survey is mandatory for all institutions that participate in
any federal financial aid assistance program authorized by Title IV of the Higher
Education Act of 1965, as amended (20 U.S.C. 1094[a][17]). IPEDS data collection
focuses on nine areas: institutional characteristics, completions, employees, salaries, fall
staff, enrollment, student financial aid, finance, and graduation rates. Fall staff data are
collected biannually, and the other categories are collected annually in the fall, winter,
and spring. The IPEDS data for this study are publicly available on the NCES Data
Cutting Tool website for 1993-1998 and 2000. For financial surveys in 1996 and 1997,
and for all the surveys in 1999, data are available with a password provided by NCES.
NCES collects institution-level data for IPEDS from all Title IV postsecondary
institutions in all 50 states and the District of Columbia as well as parts of Puerto Rico.
IPEDS institutions include: (a) all institutions whose primary purpose is the provision of
postsecondary education; (b) all branches of colleges, universities, and other institutions
as long as the branch offers a full program of study; (c) free-standing medical schools as
well as schools of nursing, schools of radiology, and others within hospitals; and (d)
schools offering occupational and vocational training to prepare students for work
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(Jackson et al., 2005). IPEDS does not include (a) schools not open to the general public
(e.g., training sites at prisons, military installations, corporations); (b) hospitals offering
only internships or residency programs or hospitals that offer only training as part of a
medical school program at an institution of higher education; (c) organizational entities
providing only noncredit continuing education; (d) schools whose only purpose is to
prepare students to take a particular test, such as the Certified Public Accountant
examination or bar exams; and (e) branch campuses of U.S. institutions in foreign
countries (Jackson et al., 2005).
Although today IPEDS is completely web-based, before 2000 all institutions
received the survey form by mail in July preceding the academic year for which the
survey was based. Institutions received one of four versions of the survey depending on
their control, program offerings, and eligibility for federal financial aid. Eligible
institutions included those identified by the U.S. Department of Education and those
identified by institutional self-identification. Beginning in 1996-1997 the list of eligible
institutions was validated by matching the IPEDS universe with the Office of
Postsecondary Education’s Postsecondary Education Participation System file, a file that
is used to determine whether an institution is eligible to participate in Title IV federal
financial aid programs (NCES, 1997a). Institutions are to complete and return
questionnaires before September 1, and NCES conducts extensive follow-up for survey
nonrespondents through April of the following academic year. Critical missing data,
including tuition, fees, room and board, and enrollment, are collected from the
institutions through an abbreviated telephone survey interview (NCES, 1997a).
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In 2000, NCES staff redesigned IPEDS to improve its technology and data
collection procedures, and to adapt to changes in postsecondary education. Also, in 2000
the IPEDS survey became completely web-based. These changes respond, at least in part,
to a number of quality issues with data collected before 2000. Some of these data quality
issues include inconsistency in data definitions used in IPEDS compared with other
federal and nonfederal surveys (which led to different data definition interpretations
among institutional respondents), inaccurate institutional reporting with limited
opportunities for institutional revisions to previous data responses, and inadequate
processes for checking the reliability and validity of survey responses (Jackson et al.,
2005).
Between 1993 through 2000, three surveys were collected that are relevant to this
study: Institutional Characteristics (IC), Fall Enrollment, and Institutional Finance. The
IC survey is central to IPEDS data collection because it forms the sampling frame from
which all other NCES surveys of postsecondary institutions are conducted. Data elements
in the annual IC survey include information such as institution address, tuition and
required fees, room and board charges, control or affiliation, type of calendar system,
levels of awards offered, types of programs, and accreditation.
The Fall Enrollment survey is administered to the same group of institutions
included in the IC survey. The survey collects data on students enrolled in courses
creditable toward a degree or other formal award and in courses that are part of a
vocational or occupational program, including those enrolled in off-campus centers and
high school students taking regular college courses for credit. The Fall Enrollment survey
excludes students who are enrolled exclusively in courses not creditable toward a formal
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award, a postsecondary vocational program, and remedial courses, as well as students
exclusively auditing classes, studying abroad if their enrollment at the institution is only
an administrative record and the fee is only nominal, attending any branch campus
located in a foreign country, and earning continuing education units only.
There are two primary versions and one consolidated version of the Fall
Enrollment survey. Institutions receive one of the three versions based on institution type.
The most extensive primary version is sent to all four-year institutions. The other, less-
detailed primary version is sent to two-year postsecondary institutions that grant only an
associate's degree. Additional enrollment data are collected with a third consolidated
version of the survey that is sent to two-year institutions that grant awards or certificates
of at least two- but less-than-four academic years (nondegree granting) and less-than-
two-year institutions that offer awards or certificates of less-than-two-year duration. The
enrollment data collected by the surveys are integrated into the Fall Enrollment database.
The extensive primary version collects from four-year institutions the number of students
by attendance status (full-time or part-time), student level (undergraduate, first
professional, graduate), race/ethnicity and sex, degree-seeking status, major field of study
(even numbered years only), year of study, age (odd numbered years only), and residence
of first-time students (even numbered years only). The less detailed primary version for
two-year institutions omits student level (undergraduate, first professional, graduate) and
major field of study. The consolidated version further collects data from all other
institutions on the number of students by attendance status, race/ethnicity and sex, and
year of study. Survey forms for the Fall Enrollment survey are sent to institutions in the
July before the fall academic semester and are due in mid-November. Extensive follow
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up for nonresponse occurs between November and April. All data submitted are
extensively edited and reviewed. NCES survey staff checks all enrollment data to
determine internal and interyear consistency (NCES, 1997b).
The Institutional Finance survey is distributed to the same group of institutions
included in the IC survey. Data elements include current fund revenues by source (e.g.,
tuition and fees, government aid, and private gifts), current fund expenditures by function
(e.g., instruction, research, plant maintenance, and operation), physical plant assets and
indebtedness, and endowment investments. From 1993 to 1995, finance data were
collected in a single survey for all institutions. Beginning in 1996 with the introduction of
standards of federal accounting reporting, the finance survey varied slightly based on
institutional control. For public institutions, data are collected on current funds revenues
by source, current funds expenditures by function, scholarship and fellowship
expenditures, indebtedness on physical plants, details of endowment assets, hospital
revenues, and physical plant assets. Additionally, certain data are collected for the U.S.
Bureau of the Census, including fiscal year interest earnings and cash and security, fiscal
year tax receipts and capital outlay expenditures, and fiscal year revenue, expenditure,
and indebtedness. For private not-for-profit institutions, data are collected on statement of
financial position, changes in net assets, student grants, revenues and investment return,
and expenses by functional classification. For private for-profit institutions, data are
collected on balance sheet information, changes in equity, student grants, revenues and
investment return, and expenses by function (NCES, 2000).
Student financial aid information is based on the full academic year and collected
in two parts: number of aid recipients and financial aid dollar amounts. Data on the
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number of aid recipients are collected by characteristics such as whether the student is in-
district, in-state, or out-of-state; a first-time college student; or an undergraduate seeking
a full-time degree/certificate. For each type of aid, the survey collects the average amount
of aid received by those students for the entire academic year. The survey includes data
on federal grants (grants/educational assistance funds), state and local grants
(grants/scholarships/waivers), institutional grants (scholarships/fellowships), and loans to
students (NCES, 2000).
The three IPEDS surveys described in this section contain several variables
relevant to this study, such as college enrollment, student financial aid expenditures,
tuition and fee charges, and room and board rates. Because institutions are required by
law to participate in the survey for their students to receive Title IV federal financial aid
(P. L. 102-325), IPEDS has a high response rate. Table 3.5 shows the annual response
rates for the IPEDS institutions selected for this study. In several years, the selected
institutions had a 100% response to all the surveys. The lowest response rate to the IC
survey occurred in the for-profit sector (97.3%) in 1998 and 1999. The lowest response
rate to the Fall Enrollment survey occurred in the private four-year sector in 2000
(73.5%). The lowest response rate in the finance survey occurred in the public two-year
sector in 1996 (88.4%). Although not without limitations, the generally high response
rates to the main IC survey makes IPEDS the most commonly used and most reliable
dataset available for studying U.S. institutions across multiple years and states.
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Table 3.5








Public Four-Year (n = 474)
1993 100.0% 99.8% 99.8%
1994 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
1995 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
1996 100.0% 100.0% 98.9%
1997 100.0% 100.0% 99.2%
1998 99.4% 100.0% 100.0%
1999 99.6% 99.4% 98.9%
2000 100.0% 87.3% 100.0%
Private Four-Year (n = 893)
1993 99.9% 99.7% 98.0%
1994 100.0% 100.0% 98.1%
1995 100.0% 100.0% 98.2%
1996 100.0% 99.7% 89.6%
1997 100.0% 99.2% 90.0%
1998 99.0% 100.0% 98.8%
1999 99.2% 98.5% 96.1%
2000 100.0% 73.5% 99.9%









Public TwoYear (n = 837)
1993 100.0% 99.8% 90.4%
1994 100.0% 100.0% 92.1%
1995 100.0% 100.0% 92.2%
1996 100.0% 99.8% 88.4%
1997 100.0% 99.8% 90.3%
1998 99.3% 100.0% 99.5%
1999 99.2% 99.4% 97.3%
2000 100.0% 99.4% 100.0%
________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Finance survey was not used for analyses of institutions in the for-profit sector.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993-2000
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Sample
The sample selected for this study includes postsecondary institutions from 1993-
1994 through 2000-2001. The eight-year period provides four years of observation of
Florida institutions before the implementation of the Florida Bright Futures program and
four years after implementation. Two control groups are used for comparison with
Florida. The primary control group consists of 397 institutions in eight years from seven
southeastern states: Alabama (n = 43), Delaware (n = 12), Maryland (n = 63), North
Carolina (n = 104), Tennessee (n = 65), Virginia (n = 81), and West Virginia (n = 29).
These states exclude the five southeastern states that introduced merit-based aid programs
during the study period: Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina.
Institutions in the entire United States that did not introduce state merit-based aid
programs during the study period are used as the second control group (n = 2,654) to test
for the robustness of regression results. The institutions selected for analysis represent
four sectors of postsecondary education including public four-year, private four-year,
public two-year, and for-profit institutions. However, for-profit institutions are discussed
only in the descriptive analyses, because data from the Bright Futures program indicate
that scholarship recipients made up less than one percent of students at these institutions.
To select the sample of IPEDS institutions for this study, I applied several criteria
from the IC Survey from 1993 through 2000 (e.g., eight years of data, 39,832 institution
observations). Table 3.6 shows the number of institutions for each year and sector for the
two phases of selection used to create the sample institution list. First, I selected
institutions that were Title IV eligible, open to the general public (e.g., not a military
institution), serving undergraduates (e.g., not exclusively a graduate or professional
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Table 3.6
Number of Institutions by Sector and Year, After Applying Criteria Used to Select Sample of IPEDS
Institutions
______________________________________________________________________________________
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
______________________________________________________________________________________
PHASE Ia
Public Four-Year 573 573 575 576 581 585 584 586 4,633
Private Four-Year 1,188 1,192 1,197 1,204 1,212 1,216 1,205 1,228 9,642
For-Profit 1,530 1,520 1,513 1,320 1,320 1,304 1,290 1,327 11,124
Public Two-Year 1,227 1,235 1,239 1,442 1,425 1,434 1,433 1,421 10,856
Other 461 459 455 437 441 440 420 417 3,530
Unassigned - - - - - - 47 - 47
Total 4,979 4,979 4,979 4,979 4,979 4,979 4,979 4,979 39,832
PHASE IIb
Public Four-Year 474 474 474 474 474 474 474 474 3,792
Private Four-Year 893 893 893 893 893 893 893 893 7,144
For-Profit 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005 1,005 8,040
Public Two-Year 837 837 837 837 837 837 837 837 6,696
Total 3,209 3,209 3,209 3,209 3,209 3,209 3,209 3,209 25,672
______________________________________________________________________________________
aSample Criteria for Phase I: Title IV eligible, open to the public, serving undergraduates, and not a
subsidiary.
bAdditional Sample Criteria for Phase II: Remained within the same sector all years, classification for state
and region remained the same for all years, not a Florida competitor, and not in a state that introduced a
merit-based aid program before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993-2000
institution), and not a subsidiary to another institution in their survey response (e.g., not
classified as a “child” institution in any part of the IPEDS survey). Second, I selected
only institutions that were consistently assigned by NCES to the same sector and state
and that were active (e.g., did not cease operations) for each of the eight years.
Institutions were excluded if they were a Florida competitor (defined as having 5% or
more Florida residents in the first-year class) and if they were in a state that introduced a
merit-based aid program before or during the study period. The final IPEDS study sample
has 3,209 institutions and 25,672 observations in eight years. The final analytical sample
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for the study is further limited by missing data for the dependent variable. The extent to
which missing data results in a biased sample is discussed below.
Table 3.7 shows the number of institutions in the IPEDS sample by sector, region,
and state. The largest share of institutions are for-profit institutions (31.3%), followed by
private four-year institutions (27.8%), public two-year institutions (26.1%), and public
four-year institutions (14.8%). In terms of geographic region, the largest share of
institutions is concentrated in the Mid-Atlantic (21.2%) followed by the Southeast with
18.2% of the total sample of institutions. The regional comparison group of states
selected for this study are all in the Southeast and Mid-Atlantic regions. Florida has the
seventh highest number of postsecondary institutions with 4.9% of the sample institutions
(Florida, n = 158). Only Ohio, Illinois, Texas, Pennsylvania, New York, and California
have more institutions. In Appendix A the Florida institutions included in the selected
IPEDS sample are listed.
Table 3.8 shows the Carnegie classifications of the four-year institutions in the
sample. The majority of the four-year public institutions are Master’s Universities and
Colleges I, making up 41.8% of the sample of public four-year institutions, followed by
Baccalaureate Colleges II (16.2%) and Research Universities I (10.5%). The majority of
private four-year institutions are Baccalaureate Colleges II, making up 29.5% of the
private four-year institutions, followed by Master’s Universities and Colleges I (17.4%)
and Baccalaureate Colleges I (14.0%).
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Table 3.7
Number and Distribution of Institutions in the Sample by Sector, Region, and State
______________________________________________________________________________________




Public Four-Year 474 3,792 14.8%
Private Four-Year 893 7,144 27.8%
For-Profit 1,005 8,040 31.3%
Public Two-Year 837 6,696 26.1%
Total 3,209 25,672 100.0%
Region
New England 250 2,000 7.8%
Mid-Atlantic 681 5,448 21.2%
Great Lakes 468 3,744 14.6%
Plains 271 2,168 8.4%
Southeast 584 4,672 18.2%
Southwest 368 2,944 11.5%
Rocky Mountains 124 992 3.9%
Far West 463 3,704 14.4%
Total 3,209 25,672 100.0%
______________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Sample excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced a merit-
based aid program before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993-2000
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Table 3.7 (Continued)
Number and Distribution of Institutions in the Sample by Sector, Region, and State
______________________________________________________________________________________




Alabama 43 344 1.3%
Arkansas 55 440 1.7%
Arizona 64 512 2.0%
California 325 2,600 10.1%
Colorado 65 520 2.0%
Connecticut 52 416 1.6%
District of Columbia 12 96 0.4%
Delaware 12 96 0.4%
Florida 158 1,264 4.9%
Hawaii 16 128 0.5%
Iowa 51 408 1.6%
Idaho 10 80 0.3%
Illinois 165 1,320 5.1%
Indiana 90 720 2.8%
Kansas 63 504 2.0%
Massachusetts 108 864 3.4%
Maryland 63 504 2.0%
Maine 31 248 1.0%
Minnesota 86 688 2.7%
Montana 21 168 0.7%
North Carolina 104 832 3.2%
North Dakota 19 152 0.6%
Nebraska 32 256 1.0%
New Hampshire 26 208 0.8%
New Jersey 90 720 2.8%
New York 252 2,016 7.9%
Ohio 159 1,272 5.0%
Oklahoma 68 544 2.1%
Oregon 46 368 1.4%
Pennsylvania 252 2,016 7.9%
Rhode Island 16 128 0.5%
South Carolina 49 392 1.5%
South Dakota 20 160 0.6%
Tennessee 65 520 2.0%
Texas 236 1,888 7.4%
Utah 19 152 0.6%
Virginia 81 648 2.5%
Vermont 17 136 0.5%
Washington 76 608 2.4%
Wisconsin 54 432 1.7%
West Virginia 29 232 0.9%
Wyoming 9 72 0.3%
Total 3,209 25,672 100.0%
______________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Sample excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced a merit-
based aid program before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993-2000
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Table 3.8.
Number and Distribution of Institutions in the Sample by Carnegie Classification
______________________________________________________________________________________
Public Four-Year Private Four-Year
____________________________________
N Percentage N Percentage
______________________________________________________________________________________
Research universities I 50 10.5% 24 2.7%
Research universities II 23 4.9% 9 1.0%
Doctoral universities I 21 4.4% 18 2.0%
Doctoral universities II 30 6.3% 20 2.2%
Masters (comprehensive) universities and colleges I 198 41.8% 155 17.4%
Masters (comprehensive) universities and colleges II 17 3.6% 50 5.6%
Baccalaureate (liberal arts) colleges I 10 2.1% 125 14.0%
Baccalaureate colleges II 77 16.2% 263 29.5%
Associate of arts colleges 18 3.8% 12 1.3%
Theological seminaries, Bible colleges and other institution 0 0.0% 100 11.2%
Medical schools and medical centers 17 3.6% 6 0.7%
Other separate health profession schools 0 0.0% 18 2.0%
Schools of engineering and technology 4 0.8% 8 0.9%
Schools of business and management 0 0.0% 28 3.1%
Schools of art, music, and design 2 0.4% 32 3.6%
Teachers colleges 0 0.0% 2 0.2%
Other specialized institutions 5 1.1% 6 0.7%
Tribal colleges 2 0.4% 1 0.1%
Total 474 100.0% 893 100.0%
______________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Carnegie classifications are only used for analyses of the four-year sectors, because the majority of
public two-year and for-profit institutions are unclassified.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993-2000
Imputation of Variables
The extent to which IPEDS consistently represents the entire population of U.S.
institutions over time makes the data useful for building a well-constructed panel of
institutions. NCES annually reviews IPEDS survey data to address the problem of
missing or inconsistent data with imputations. NCES uses at least three methods to
impute missing data in the finance components of the survey. In cases in which data are
available from the previous year, data are carried forward to the current survey year and
adjusted for inflation. For some variables deemed proportional to enrollment such as total
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tuition and fees or total student grants, information is carried forward to the current
survey year by an enrollment ratio to adjust for year-to-year change. In cases in which
data are unavailable from the previous year, a sample of three comparable institutions is
used to estimate data for variables such as total current funds revenue, scholarships, and
fellowships expenditures and total current fund expenditures. Additionally, missing data
are sometimes imputed by ranking a group of institutions and assigning a calculated
median value to an institution (NCES, 2000). The careful procedures used by NCES in
imputing missing or inconsistent data makes IPEDS a useful dataset for a study that is
based on a panel of data of eight years. Without these imputation activities, missing data
would make it necessary to drop many institutions from the analytic sample, thereby
reducing the validity of the results.
Although NCES uses a review process to impute missing or inconsistent data,
there are still some inconsistencies year-to-year in IPEDS data. For the 1996 and 1997
finance surveys, and all the surveys from 1999, NCES did not impute missing data. To
reduce the effect of missing data on this study’s analytical sample, I imputed values for
enrollment and appropriations variables in this study. I imputed only data for institutions
that have at least seven years of available data for tuition and fees and enrollment (to
calculate full-time equivalent [FTE]). No imputation methods were used for the
dependent variables. However, I imputed data for the following variables in Table 3.9:
full-time enrollment, part-time enrollment, and state and local appropriations. I imputed
the enrollment variables to calculate FTE enrollment and grant aid per FTE. I imputed
appropriations to have a consistent independent variable that controls for direct state and
local subsidies to institutions. Missing values were imputed only if at least four of the
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eight years of data were available for the appropriations variable and five years of data
were available for the enrollment variable.
To impute a given variable, I first identified the mean of the nearest available year
before and after the missing year. In some cases, when two nearest-year values were
unavailable because the missing value occurred at the end or at the beginning of the
sample period, a second imputation step used a simple linear trend to establish the
imputed value. Table 3.9 shows
Table 3.9
Percentage of Cases Imputed by Sector for Enrollment and State Appropriations
______________________________________________________________________________________
Public Private Public
Variables Four-Year Four-Year For-Profit Two-Year
______________________________________________________________________________________
Full-time enrollment
No full-time enrollment 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0%
Cases imputed three years 0.0% 0.1% 1.4% 0.0%
Cases imputed two years 0.0% 0.7% 2.4% 0.6%
Cases imputed one year 0.5% 7.8% 11.1% 1.2%
Cases with no imputation 99.5% 91.4% 84.5% 98.3%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Part-time enrollment
No part-time enrollment 0.4% 5.7% 44.6% 1.6%
Cases imputed three years 0.2% 0.5% 4.6% 0.0%
Cases imputed two years 0.0% 1.3% 6.0% 0.9%
Cases imputed one year 1.1% 5.5% 12.9% 2.2%
Cases with no imputation 98.4% 87.0% 31.9% 95.3%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Appropriations (state appropriations and local appropriations for public two-year)
No state appropriations 1.8% 87.6% 3.7%
Cases imputed four years 0.0% 0.0% 9.3%
Cases imputed three years 0.0% 1.7% 4.7%
Cases imputed two years 0.2% 3.0% 20.1%
Cases imputed one year 4.0% 2.0% 9.2%
Cases with no imputation 94.0% 5.6% 53.0%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
______________________________________________________________________________________
Note: Sample excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced a merit-
based aid program before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993-2000
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that the majority of imputations occurred for full-time enrollment in the for-profit sector
in which only 85.1% of the cases required no imputation (compared with 99.5% in the
public four-year sector, 91.4% in the private four-year sector, and 98.3% in the public
two-year sector). The majority of imputations occurred for part-time enrollment again in
the for-profit sector in which only 76.5% of the cases required no imputation (compared
with 98.8% in the public four-year sector, 92.7% in the private four-year sector, and
96.9% in the public two-year sector). For state and local appropriations, occurrences of
missing data were most prevalent in the public two-year sector (56.7% required no
imputation), compared with 95.8% in the public four-year sector and 93.2% in the private
four-year sector that required no imputation. State and local appropriations were not
included in analyses of the for-profit sector.
Statistical Model and Methodology
This study evaluates the effect of the state merit-based aid program in Florida on
institutional tuition and fees, room and board charges and institutional aid expenditures.
This study extends two lines of research: one that analyzes institutional price response to
aid subsidies and a second that examines the effect of state merit-based aid programs on
student and institutional outcomes. Utilizing an economic model of student and
postsecondary institutional behavior, and data for the 1993-1994 to 2000-2001 academic
years from IPEDS and the Florida Bright Futures program, this study evaluates a set of
research questions about institutional response by sector.
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Two comparison groups are used in the analyses: southeastern states that did not
introduce a merit-based aid program before or during the study period and all of the states
that did not introduce a merit-based aid program before or during the study period.
Tuition and fees are analyzed for institutions in four sectors: public four-year, private
four-year, public two-year, and for-profit. Room and board and charges are measured
only in the four-year sectors that more commonly offer room and board. Grant aid
expenditures are measured only at four-year private institutions, the sector that more
commonly offers institutional grants. Grant aid expenditures in public four-year
institutions could not be analyzed because of the small sample sizes.
Research Question One
How do the levels of tuition and fee charges, room and board charges, and grant aid
expenditures at Florida colleges and universities compare with the levels at institutions
in other states?
To address the first research question, I used descriptive analyses to measure the
level of tuition and fee charges, room and board charges, and grant aid expenditures in
2006 constant dollars over the sample period for each sector of postsecondary education
in Florida relative to the Southeast and U.S. comparison groups. The variables analyzed
are list tuition and fee charges, list room and board charges, and institutional grant aid per
FTE. Institutional grant aid per FTE is calculated for each year in the sample period by
dividing total institutional grant aid by the total number of undergraduate and graduate
FTEs. The analysis examines enrollment-weighted data to avoid exaggerating the charges
and expenditures of a large number of institutions with small enrollment numbers. T-tests
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are used to identify statistically significant differences in the variable means between
Florida institutions and the two comparison groups of institutions.
Research Question Two
How do the annual changes in tuition and fee charges, room and board charges, and
grant aid expenditures at Florida colleges and universities compare with changes at
institutions in other states after the introduction of the Bright Futures merit-based aid
program?
To address the second research question I used descriptive analyses to measure
the year-over-year percentage change in tuition and fee charges, room and board charges,
and grant aid expenditures in 2006 constant dollars over the sample period for each sector
of postsecondary education in Florida relative to the Southeast and U.S. comparison
groups. T-tests are used to identify statistically significant differences in the percentage
changes between Florida institutions and each of the two comparison groups of
institutions.
Research Question Three
Relative to a comparison group of institutions in surrounding states, how do tuition and
fee charges, room and board charges, and grant aid expenditures at Florida colleges and
universities react to the introduction of the state merit-based aid program after
controlling for institutional and state economic characteristics?
To address the third research question, I took advantage of the opportunity for a
quasi-natural experiment provided by the introduction of the Bright Futures program in
Florida by using a differences-within-differences method. Similar to earlier research
(Long, 2002, 2003), I used surrounding states from the southeastern region that have not
introduced a merit-based aid program during the eight years as a comparative control
group to account for changes in postsecondary education that have an effect on all
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institutions. To test for robustness of the regression results in the Southeast, I also use a
second control group that consists of all states in the United States that had not
introduced a merit-based aid program during the eight years. This differences-within-
differences method was also used in earlier studies that examined student response to
merit-based aid in Georgia and New Mexico (Binder et al., 2002; Cornwell & Mustard,
2001; Dynarski, 2000). This method is appropriate when a policy change applies to one
population and not another, which naturally creates a randomly selected control group
(Meyer, 1995). This method assumes that omitted variables that affect institutional
charges and aid do not differ between the treatment and control groups before and after
the change.
Following Meyer’s (1995) instruction that this design is best when the study
group is most similar to the control group, I used colleges in surrounding southeastern
states but excluded institutions in states that introduced merit-based aid programs before
or during the study period. To test whether results vary based on the comparison group,
the data are run with both institutions in the southeastern region and institutions in the
entire United States as comparison groups.
In Long’s (2002, 2003) analyses, she eliminated from the control group
institutions that were direct competitors for Georgia students. Similar to Long, in this
study competitors are defined as out-of-state institutions with more than 5% of Florida
students in their freshman class. Similarly, for this study, these institutions are excluded,
because, given their reliance on Florida students, they might be motivated to react to
Bright Futures as an out-of-state competitor for the same students by lowering their
prices to attract them. This competitor effect violates the assumption of independence
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required for the control group. For this study, direct competitors with Florida are
excluded from the control groups.
The differences-within-differences method assumes that all variation between the
study group and the control group is attributable to the policy intervention. Therefore, to
control for expected differences in prices across states and institutions, a set of controls is
used to measure both postsecondary education supply and demand. As shown in equation
(1), this function can be interpreted as the equilibrium price in which supply and demand
meet for a specific institution. This function includes sets of independent variables for
state characteristics, institutional characteristics, and year fixed-effect variables to control
for time trends that are assumed to define the institutional price, and is applied to the
whole analytic sample (Florida and control group institutions):
Priceij = B0 * X( state unemployment, state per capita income, state educational
attainment level, state postsecondary capacity, institutional sector, endowment size per
FTE, state appropriations per FTE, year)ij + error term ij.
(1)
Similar to Long (2002, 2003), the price function is extended to measure three aspects of
Bright Futures: (a) the effect of Bright Futures after the introduction; (b) the effect of
Bright Futures in institutions with high concentrations of scholarship recipients; and (c)
the effect of Bright Futures in each year separately, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000, to
determine whether the difference increases as the numbers of recipients grow each year.
To measure the effect of Bright Futures on price (tuition and fees, room and
board, and grant aid per FTE) the regression model is separately applied to each measure
of price. The model includes variables that capture the availability of the Bright Futures
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program by adding dummy variables for the state of Florida, for After, which indicates
that the year is after the program introduction, and an interaction term:
Priceij = B0 * Xij + b1 (Florida j * Afteri) + b2 * (Florida j) + b3 * (After i) + error term ij,
(2)
where i indicates the year and j indicates each institution. The parameter b1 measures
whether Florida institutional prices respond differently from other institutional prices
after the introduction of the Bright Futures program. The variables Florida and After are
dichotomous variables in which Florida = 1 for all Florida institutions, After = 1 for the
year the program was introduced (e.g., 1997) and all subsequent years, and 0 is for years
before the introduction. No Florida institutions in the IPEDS sample were ineligible for
Bright Futures during the study period, therefore, Florida = 1 for all Florida institutions.
To measure the effect of Bright Futures in institutions with high concentrations of
scholarship recipients, the Florida institutions are divided based on the share of the
student body receiving Bright Futures. If the change in Florida college prices is caused by
the introduction of the Bright Futures program, the increase in price should be greater at
institutions with the highest number of enrolled awardees. To test whether the change in
price is greater at the institutions with the highest number of Bright Futures recipients,
the following equation is used:
Priceij = B0 * Xij + b1 (HighFutures * After) + b2 * (HighFutures) + b3 * (LowFutures *
After) + b4 * (LowFutures) + b5 * (After) + error term,
(3)
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where HighFutures is a dichotomous variable defined as 1 for those Florida institutions
in the top half of the distribution of schools ranked by the proportion of students
receiving the award within each sector and LowFutures is a dichotomous variable defined
as 1 for those Florida institutions in the bottom half of the same distribution within each
sector. Schools in the control group are marked 0 for both variables and correspond to the
omitted category for this variable.
To measure the effect of Bright Futures in each year after the introduction of
Bright Futures, the following equation is used:
Priceij = B0 * Xij + b1 (Florida j) + b2 * (Florida j* 1997i) + b2 * (Florida j* 1998i) + b2 *
(Florida j* 1999i) + b2 * (Florida j* 2000i) + error term ij.
(4)
The four sectors examined are public four-year, public two-year, private four-year, and
for-profit. Each sector is examined separately, and only analyses of four-year institutions
are extended to include controls for institutional selectivity and wealth. To address the
research questions, the coefficients are estimated using by ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression analysis which is an appropriate method to estimate the relative effects of
multiple independent factors on a continuous variable outcome.
Variables
The dependent and independent variables for this analysis are described in this
section. The three measures of price response are delineated first, followed by primary
independent variables and control variables for institutional and state characteristics. The
regression analyses are run separately on each measure of price response (tuition and
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fees, room and board rates, and institutional grants per FTE). To control for inflation, the
three measures of price response are converted into 2006 dollars (to put the variable in
current terms) by using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The academic base year 2006-
2007 is based on the CPI for August 2006. The calendar year is based on the CPI for
January 2006. Table 3.10 shows the factors used to convert each year to 2006 constant
dollars. The CPI is based on measured changes in consumer prices calculated by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, which defines various goods and services that consumers
purchase based on the average monthly prices of items in the following groups: food and
beverages, housing, apparel, transportation, medical care, recreation, education and
communication, and other goods and services.
Table 3.10
Consumer Price Index with Factors Used to Convert Current to Constant (2006) Dollars
_______________________________________________________________________
Academic Year Conversion Calendar Year Conversion
(August – July) (January – December)
___________________________________ _______________________________
Academic Factor to Calendar Factor to
Year CPI-U Convert Year CPI-U Convert
________________________________________________________________________
93-94 144.8 1.41 1993 144.5 1.40
94-95 149.0 1.37 1994 148.2 1.36
95-96 152.9 1.33 1995 152.4 1.32
96-97 157.3 1.30 1996 156.9 1.29
97-98 160.8 1.27 1997 160.5 1.26
98-99 163.4 1.25 1998 163.0 1.24
99-00 167.1 1.22 1999 166.6 1.21
00-01 172.8 1.18 2000 172.2 1.17
01-02 177.5 1.15 2001 177.1 1.14
02-03 180.7 1.13 2002 179.9 1.12
03-04 184.6 1.11 2003 184.0 1.10
04-05 189.5 1.08 2004 188.9 1.07
05-06 196.4 1.04 2005 195.3 1.03
06-07 203.9 1.00 2006 201.6 1.00
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________________________________________________________________________
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt
Dependent Variable: Price Response
The outcomes for this study are three separate measures: tuition and fee charges,
room and board charges, and institutional grant aid expenditures. For ease of
interpretation all dollar variables are converted into a natural logarithm, a commonly used
method by economists in the interpretation of percentage change in dollar values (Long,
2002, 2003). Tuition and fee charges are defined as the list price for a full academic year
or the equivalent of two semesters and/or 30 credit hours for a full-time student at an
institution. Because the majority of for-profit institutions charge tuition by program rather
than by semester, tuition for this sector is defined as the list price for the largest program
offered. The limitation of this method is the variation in which the program is largest
across the study years. However, using the semester tuition and fee charge in the for-
profit analysis would result in eliminating 90% of for-profit institutions from the analytic
sample.
Room and board charges are defined as the price for a full academic year of on-
campus residence and related on-campus living expenses, such as a meal plan at an
institution. Room and board is charged predominantly by four-year institutions where a
portion of the student body lives on campus. Therefore, room and board charges are
examined only in four-year institutions. For this variable to be measured, an institution
had to indicate that it offered both room and board at the institution for at least seven of
the eight study years. In some cases, institutions reported the combined charge for room
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and board, and in other cases they reported them separately. If reported separately, these
values were added together.
Institutional grant aid expenditures are converted from institutional totals into
grant amounts per total (e.g., undergraduate and graduate) FTE. Similar to room and
board charges, this outcome variable is measured only for four-year institutions because
the majority of public two-year and for-profit institutions do not offer institutional grants.
Also, to preserve the quality of the analysis, only four-year institutions are examined
because the extent to which grant aid data are missing or simply not offered is not made
clear in three of the eight years of IPEDS. The lack of clarity on missing data in IPEDS is
a result of the finance survey not being released with imputations for 1996, 1997, and
1999. Furthermore, financial aid variables are completely missing in 1997 for institutions
in the for-profit sector.
The FTE of undergraduate and graduate enrollment for an institution is derived by
adding together the full-time enrollment of an institution and an estimated equivalent of
part-time enrollment by using a method parallel to that used by NCES in the IPEDS
database. FTE of undergraduates is used to weight average prices in the descriptive
analyses. FTE of both undergraduates and graduates is used for estimating institutional
grants per FTE because IPEDS reports grant expenditures for all students together. The
full-time equivalent of part-time enrollment is estimated by multiplying the part-time
enrollment by factors that vary by control and level of institution and level of student.
The following factors are recommended by NCES: public four-year = .403543, not-for-
profit and for-profit, private four-year = .392857, public two-year and less-than-two year
= .335737, and all other sectors = .397058 (IPEDS, 2000, on-line Data Analysis System).
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Primary Independent Variables Related to Bright Futures
The primary independent variable for this study is the introduction of the Florida
Bright Futures program. After indicates whether the year of the observation is before or
after implementation of the Florida Bright Futures program. The variable is defined as 1
for every year after program implementation. Because the program was implemented in
the 1996-1997 academic year and institutions may not have had enough time to change
prices in response, the indicator is marked 1 for the next year, 1997-1998, and continues
for every year thereafter.
To test whether the effect of Bright Futures on price is greater at the institutions
with relatively more recipients than for other institutions, the variable HighFutures and
LowFutures is constructed as a dichotomous variable indicating a high concentration of
scholarship recipients at a particular institution. The variable is defined as 1 for those
institutions in the top half of the distribution of Florida institutions in each sector ranked
by the percentage of enrolled students with the scholarship. The HighFutures and
LowFutures variables are calculated separately for each sector to determine which
institutions are in the bottom and top half of each sector rather than across institutions. To
determine if the use of the top and bottom half were the most appropriate definition, the
regression results are also analyzed with the definition of high concentration as the 75th
percentile and the low concentration as the 25th percentiles. The direction and
significance of the results are identical using both definitions.
Other variables related to the Bright Futures program are used to calculate
summary statistics to describe the Bright Futures program. Bright Futures Recipients
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measures the number of Bright Futures recipients, including both new and renewal
recipients, for each institution in each academic year. This information comes the Florida
Bright Futures program office, and it is used to create the HighFutures and LowFutures
variables. Information on the amounts of Bright Futures scholarships is used for summary
descriptions of the scholarship program. The amounts are adjusted for inflation by using
the CPI.
Other Institutional Variables
Four sectors of postsecondary institutions are examined: public four-year, private
four-year, public two-year, and for-profit. The sectors are based on an IPEDS variable
that is derived from information on the control (public and private) and level (two-year
and four-year sectors) of each IPEDS institution. This study also includes the following
measures of institutional characteristics: selectivity measured by Barron’s Profile of
American Colleges and Universities, the institutional mission as measured by Carnegie
Classification, and institutional wealth as measured by Endowment Size per FTE. These
measures control for characteristics that vary within the four-year sectors that may also
predict changes in price.
Because of differences in institutional incentives related to pricing, student
academic quality and institutional prestige (Clotfelter, 1996; Winston, 1999), institutional
selectivity is expected to be associated with differences in price response in four-year
institutions. In this study, institutional selectivity is measured with the Barron’s Profile
categories: less competitive, competitive, very competitive, highly competitive, and most
competitive. Institutions that are unclassified by Barron’s or noncompetitive are used as
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the reference category. To obtain these data, the most recent Barron’s Profile of
American Colleges and Universities, 2007 categories were added to the data set.
Although institutions may have changed profile categories between the study period and
2007, the categories are appropriate because they indicate the results of an institutional
orientation toward prestige and selectivity that theory suggests influence price decisions
during the study period.
In addition to selectivity, earlier research demonstrated that endowment size, a
proxy for institutional wealth (Clotfelter, 1996), is positively correlated with price
response (McPherson & Schapiro, 1993). For this study, Endowment Size per FTE is
calculated by using data from the IPEDS finance survey. The variable is defined as the
dollar amount of the ending market value of the endowment at the fiscal year end divided
by the FTE of total undergraduate and graduate enrollment. Because of changes in the
finance survey and in the variables used to gather information on endowments beginning
in 1997, this variable is calculated based on the mean endowment in the 1993-1994 to
1996-1997 academic years divided by the undergraduate and graduate FTE in the same
years.
Earlier research used Carnegie classifications to control for differences in
institutional mission that contribute to differences in price response (Long, 2003;
McPherson & Schapiro, 1993). For this study, 10 Carnegie classifications are used:
Carnegie Research I, Carnegie Research II, Carnegie Doctoral I, Carnegie Doctoral II,
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive I, Carnegie Masters Comprehensive II, Carnegie
Baccalaureate Liberal Arts, Carnegie Baccalaureate II, Carnegie Associates Colleges, and
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Carnegie Professional or Special Emphasis Institutions. Unclassified institutions are used
as the reference category. These classifications are obtained from the IPEDS, IC Survey.
The final set of institutional variables needed for the study is state and local
appropriations. Research shows that decreases in appropriations are correlated with
increases in tuition and fees (McPherson & Schapiro, 1993). For this study
Appropriations per FTE is included as a control variable in the analysis of public four-
year institutions and public two-year institutions. In the public four-year sector
Appropriations per FTE is based only on state appropriations. In the public two-year
sector Appropriations per FTE is based on both state and local appropriations, because
local sources provide a significant share of revenues for this sector. For-profit institutions
and private four-year institutions receive limited amounts of both state and local
appropriations relative to public-sector institutions. Total state (and local) appropriations
are divided by the FTE enrollment for the institution and year. This variable is adjusted
for inflation by using the CPI.
State Variables
Researchers found that several other aspects of state characteristics predict
differences in institutional prices, including state unemployment, state per capita income,
state educational attainment, and postsecondary enrollment capacity (Acosta, 2001; Long,
2002, 2003; McPherson & Schapiro, 1993; Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2003). Measures of these
state characteristics are drawn from publicly available data from the U.S. Census Bureau
Current Population Survey and the Digest of Education Statistics.
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Higher state unemployment rates translate into greater demand for postsecondary
education because lack of employment opportunities drives down the opportunity costs of
attending college for potential students (Long, 2002, 2003; McPherson & Schapiro,
1993). Unemployment rates also indicate general state economic conditions that may
affect price through the effect of the state’s economic well being on the institutions’
ability to provide postsecondary education (Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2003). For this study
State Unemployment is defined as the average annual unemployment rate for adults age
25 and older in the given year.
Higher state incomes translate into greater supply for postsecondary education
because greater state income means that more potential resources are available for
postsecondary institutions through direct appropriations and other donative channels
(McPherson & Schapiro, 1993; Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2003). Higher state incomes may
also indicate general state economic conditions that may affect price through increases in
student demand for education. For this study, State per Capita Income is defined as the
total personal income divided by total mid-year population in the state. Data are adjusted
for inflation with the CPI and converted to a natural logarithm for each year of the study.
States with higher educational attainment, measured by the percentage of state
residents age 25 and older with a bachelor’s degree, are by definition states with a higher
demand for postsecondary education. Therefore, inclusion of State Educational
Attainment is used in this study to control for differences in demand across states.
Earlier research (Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2003) and theory support the notion that the
capacity of postsecondary education in a state has a positive relationship with prices.
When a state has reached seat capacity and can no longer expand the supply of
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postsecondary opportunities, prices escalate. Therefore, in this study Postsecondary
Capacity is calculated in a manner similar to others (Rizzo & Ehrenberg), with a ratio of
the potential pool of students within a state to the actual enrollment. To calculate this
variable, the number of enrolled students (based on the Digest of Education Statistics) is
divided by the number of recent high school graduates (based on the Current Population
Survey) for each year of the study.
Limitations
There are several methodological and data quality limitations in this study. First,
because the study relies on a differences-within-differences methodology, it is assumed
that there are no interactions between time and the relevant price response variables other
than the Florida state merit-based aid and other explicit controls. To the extent that other
unidentified and uncontrolled for factors are driving the relative change in prices between
Florida schools and other institutions, the study may falsely attribute the effect of those
other factors to the introduction of the Bright Futures program. For example, if a change
in economic conditions during the study period affect students and institutions differently
across states and this change occurs at the same times as Bright Futures, a portion of this
effect may be erroneously included in the estimate of the effect of the merit-based aid
introduction (Meyer, 1995).
Second, the control group of institutions in the southeastern region used in this
study is small because states are excluded if they introduced a merit-based aid program
before or during the study period. Having a larger control group that includes all of the
southeastern states would be ideal because it would increase the statistical precision of
122
the analysis by allowing for a greater number of observations. However, institutions in
five of the states in that group are eliminated from the study because they introduced
similar state merit-based aid programs either before or during the study period. These
exclusions decrease the population size and thus the precision of the estimates.
Third, the quasi-natural experimental methodology assumes a discrete start to the
intervention that separates the study group and the control group. Florida Bright Futures,
however, is an expansion of a previous state grant program. The expansion of Bright
Futures increased the number of scholarship recipients by 93.0% and the total award
dollars by 53.6% in its first year of introduction, indicating that the expansion itself was a
major event that may be studied. However, the results of this study still need to be
interpreted as the effects related to the increase in the new program and not the effects of
an entirely new program.
A final limitation of the study is the quality of the available data. In 1996, 1997,
and 1999, NCES was unable to complete the final release of the IPEDS survey.
Therefore, missing data were not imputed by the NCES staff for all finance variables in
1996 and 1997. Furthermore, when NCES made the transition to an on-line survey in
2000 most of the survey staff resources were focused on the transition; therefore no final
adjudicated data were ever released for the 1999 IPEDS survey sections. Table 3.11
illustrates that the data were not randomly missing. I created a cross-tabulation of the
sample of institutions with the analytic sample after institutions with missing data were
excluded. I used a chi-square test to the statistical significance of the differences between
groups. Public four-year institutions were more likely to have missing data (7.8%) in one
of the 8 years of the study period and, therefore, were less likely than other institutions to
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be selected for the final analytic sample. Also, missing data disproportionately occurred
in the Far West geographic regions (19.4%), largely concentrated in the state of
California (26.8% missing). Idaho and Indiana followed California with large percentages
of missing data (40% and 15.6%, respectively).
Despite these limitations, this study is worth conducting because it extends and
improves the empirical testing of institutional price response to state government
subsidies and extends findings about the effects of state merit-based aid to another state,
Florida. Also, the results of this study offer important findings for policymakers about the
effects of state merit-based aid programs on institutional prices.
Table 3.11
Percentage of Institutions Excluded Because of Missing Data for Tuition and Fees or Enrollment
by Sector, Geographic Region and State
________________________________________________________________________

















Note: Three asterisks (***) indicate significance at the p < .001 level using a chi-square test.
Sample excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced a
merit-based aid program before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993-2000
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Table 3.11 (Continued)
Percentage of Institutions Excluded Because of Missing Data for Tuitions and Fees or Enrollment by















































Note: Three asterisks (***) indicate significance at the p < .001 level using a chi-square test. Sample
excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced a merit-based aid
program before or during the study period.





Descriptive and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses that include year
fixed-effects and other controls are used in this study. Institution-level data for the 1993-
1994 to 2000-2001 academic years from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data
System (IPEDS) and from the Florida Bright Futures program are used to explore the
effect of the introduction of a merit-based financial aid program on postsecondary prices
in Florida relative to two comparison groups of states. For each research question, the
analyses describe each sector of postsecondary education separately: public four-year,
public two-year, private four-year, and for-profit. Research questions one and two consist
of descriptive analyses. Research question three uses OLS regression and a differences-
within-differences approach with controls for state and institutional characteristics to
measure three aspects of price in Florida relative to the comparison groups: price before
and after the introduction of Bright Futures, price for institutions with high and low
concentrations of Bright Futures recipients, and price for each year of study after the
introduction of Bright Futures to identify in which year price varies most. Research
findings for each of the three research questions are presented.
Research Question One: Price Level in Florida Compared with Control Group States
For the first research question tuition and fees charged in institutions in Florida
and institutions in other states are analyzed for four sectors: public four-year, public two-
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year, private four-year, and for-profit. Room and board charges are compared for four-
year institutions only, and institutional grant aid expenditures per FTE are compared for
private four-year institutions only. These analyses explore how these charges and
expenditures for institutions in Florida compare with those for institutions in the
Southeast control group for the study period, 1993-2000. These analyses are repeated
with institutions nationwide as the control group. For each analysis, states that have
introduced a merit-based aid program before or during the study period are excluded.
Competitor institutions, defined as institutions with more than 5% of first-year full-time
enrollees from Florida for any year, are also excluded from all analyses. Independent-
sample t-tests are used to measure the difference in the means between Florida
institutions and the two comparison groups. The results are presented for each of the
dependent variables: tuition and fees, room and board, and institutional grants. In Tables
4.1 to 4.3 the results are summarized.
Tuition and Fees
Average tuition and fee charges were lower in Florida institutions than in the rest
of the United States for all sectors and years, with the exception of four years in the for-
profit sector (1995, 1997, 1998 and 1999). Table 4.1 shows the average tuition and fees
for public four-year institutions in Florida compared with the Southeast control group and
the U.S. control group. In the public four-year sector, average tuition and fees were lower
127
Table 4.1
Average Tuition and Fees for Institutions in 2006 Dollars in Florida Compared with
Institutions in Southeast and U.S. Control Groups by Sector and by Year: 1993 to 2000
________________________________________________________________________
Southeast U.S. Florida Florida
Control Control minus % minus %
Florida Group Group Southeast Difference U.S. Difference
________________________________________________________________________
Public Four-Year
1993 $2,512 $3,385 $3,719 -$873 * -25.8% -$1,207 * -32.5%
1994 $2,440 $3,462 $3,800 -$1,022 * -29.5% -$1,360 * -35.8%
1995 $2,356 $3,564 $3,987 -$1,208 * -33.9% -$1,631 * -40.9%
1996 $2,319 $3,679 $4,091 -$1,359 * -36.9% -$1,772 * -43.3%
1997 $2,423 $3,739 $4,188 -$1,315 * -35.2% -$1,764 * -42.1%
1998 $2,526 $3,874 $4,303 -$1,348 * -34.8% -$1,777 * -41.3%
1999 $2,739 $3,813 $4,370 -$1,074 * -28.2% -$1,631 * -37.3%
2000 $2,794 $3,866 $4,425 -$1,072 * -27.7% -$1,631 * -36.9%
N 9 75 425
Private Four-Year
1993 $14,036 $12,851 $16,305 $1,184 * 9.2% -$2,270 * -13.9%
1994 $14,329 $13,422 $16,756 $907 * 6.8% -$2,427 * -14.5%
1995 $14,736 $13,808 $17,287 $927 * 6.7% -$2,551 * -14.8%
1996 $15,229 $14,208 $17,723 $1,021 * 7.2% -$2,494 * -14.1%
1997 $15,562 $14,685 $18,202 $877 * 6.0% -$2,640 * -14.5%
1998 $15,972 $15,212 $18,788 $760 * 5.0% -$2,817 * -15.0%
1999 $16,478 $15,709 $19,338 $769 * 4.9% -$2,861 * -14.8%
2000 $17,266 $15,991 $19,467 $1,276 * 8.0% -$2,201 * -11.3%
N 36 79 804
________________________________________________________________________
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates significance at the p < .05 level.
Data are weighted by FTE of undergraduates. Control groups exclude institutions from
states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period, and
institutions that were Florida competitors with more than 5% of first-year, full-time
undergraduate enrollment from Florida in any year (n=113 competitors in U.S. control
group). Means are compared using independent-samples t-tests procedures.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS: 1993-2000
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Table 4.1 (Continued)
Average Tuition and Fees in 2006 Dollars for Institutions in Florida Compared with
Institutions in Southeast and U.S. Control Groups by Sector and by Year: 1993 to 2000
_______________________________________________________________________
Southeast U.S. Florida Florida
Control Control minus % minus %
Florida Group Group Southeast Difference U.S. Difference
_______________________________________________________________________
Public Two-Year
1993 $1,482 $1,761 $2,170 -$279 * -15.8% -$688 * -31.7%
1994 $1,458 $1,785 $2,283 -$327 * -18.3% -$825 * -36.1%
1995 $1,427 $1,826 $2,353 -$399 * -21.8% -$926 * -39.4%
1996 $1,448 $1,824 $2,392 -$376 * -20.6% -$944 * -39.5%
1997 $1,544 $1,890 $2,423 -$347 * -18.3% -$879 * -36.3%
1998 $1,626 $1,912 $2,459 -$286 * -15.0% -$832 * -33.9%
1999 $1,652 $1,898 $2,481 -$246 * -12.9% -$829 * -33.4%
2000 $1,704 $1,983 $2,298 -$279 * -14.1% -$594 * -25.9%
N 43 136 728
For-Profit
1993 $8,826 $8,212 $8,975 $614 * 7.5% -$149 * -1.7%
1994 $8,605 $8,269 $9,228 $337 * 4.1% -$622 * -6.7%
1995 $9,730 $8,701 $9,697 $1,029 * 11.8% $34 0.3%
1996 $9,502 $8,835 $9,829 $667 * 7.6% -$327 * -3.3%
1997 $10,530 $9,456 $9,945 $1,074 * 11.4% $585 * 5.9%
1998 $10,778 $9,441 $10,258 $1,338 * 14.2% $521 * 5.1%
1999 $10,536 $9,901 $10,575 $635 * 6.4% -$39 -0.4%
2000 $11,807 $9,691 $12,052 $2,116 * 21.8% -$245 * -2.0%
N 65 98 875
_______________________________________________________________________
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates significance at the p < .05 level.
Data are weighted by FTE of undergraduates. Control groups exclude institutions from
states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period, and
institutions that were Florida competitors with more than 5% of first-year, full-time
undergraduate enrollment from Florida in any year (n=113 competitors in U.S. control
group). Means are compared using independent-samples t-tests procedures.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS: 1993-2000
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for institutions in Florida than both institutions in the United States and the Southeast.
Tuition and fees were consistently between 25.8% and 36.9% lower for institutions in
Florida than for institutions in the Southeast, and between 32.5% and 43.3% lower for
institutions in Florida than in the U.S. control group. Some of these large differences may
be attributed to Florida’s historic commitment to low tuition in the public sector, a
commitment enforced through legislative authority. Tuition and fees in the public four-
year sector actually declined in constant dollars in the first four years, whereas tuition and
fees in the Southeast and U.S. control groups increased.
Table 4.1 also shows average tuition and fees for private four-year institutions in
Florida compared with the Southeast control group and the U.S. control group. In contrast
to the public four-year sector, average tuition and fee levels in the private four-year sector
were 4.9% to 9.2% higher in Florida compared with the Southeast control group.
However, tuition and fees in the private four-year sector were 11.3% to 15.0% lower in
Florida than in the United States.
Public two-year colleges in Florida have consistently lower tuition and fee levels
relative to both the Southeast and U.S. control groups. Table 4.1 shows that public two-
year institutions in Florida had tuition and fee levels that were 25.9% to 39.5% lower
than the United States and 12.9% to 21.8% lower than the Southeast control group. These
results again reflect Florida’s commitment to low tuition in the public sector.
A comparison of the for-profit sector tuition and fee levels is also shown in Table
4.1. For this sector, average tuition and fees in Florida’s for-profit institutions were 4.1%
to 21.8% higher than for the Southeast control group. Differences in tuition and fees for
for-profit institutions in Florida and in the U.S. control group varied between 1993 and
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2000, with levels that were 2.0% to 6.7% lower in Florida than in the United States in
1993, 1994, 1996, and 2000, 5.1% to 5.9% higher in 1997 and 1998, and not different in
1995 and 1999. Some of the inconsistency from year to year may be explained by the
definition of tuition and fees used for this study in the for-profit sector. Because for-profit
institutions frequently price tuition and fees by program rather than semester, some of the
variation may reflect changes in which programs are largest at the institutions. 
 In summary, tuition and fee levels were lower on average for both public four-
year and public two-year institutions in Florida than in both the Southeast and U.S.
control groups. Private four-year tuition and fee rates were higher on average in Florida
than in the Southeast but lower on average in Florida than in the United States.
Differences in tuition and fees between Florida and the U.S. comparison groups in the
for-profit sector varied in the 1990s. Tuition and fees were consistently higher at Florida
for-profit institutions than Southeast for-profit institutions.
Room and Board
Room and board charges during the study period, 1993-2000, were significantly
higher in the public four-year sector in Florida than in the Southeast control group and in
the U.S. control group. Table 4.2 shows that room and board rates were consistently
between 5.6% and 9.6% higher for public four-year institutions in Florida than for public
four-year institutions in the Southeast control group and between 1.3% and 6.8% higher
in Florida than in the U.S. control group.
Average room and board charges in the private four-year sector were higher in
Florida than in the Southeast control group, but lower than in the U.S. control group.
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Table 4.2 shows that room and board rates in the private four-year sector were 5.2% to
11.3% higher in Florida than in the Southeast control group. But room and board rates in
the private four-year sector were 3.8% to 7.9% lower in Florida than in the U.S. control
group. No analysis was conducted for the public two-year and for-profit sectors because
these sectors typically do not offer room and board.
Table 4.2
Average Room and Board in 2006 Dollars for Institutions in Florida Compared with
Institutions in Southeast and U.S. Control Groups by Sector and by Year: 1993 to 2000
________________________________________________________________________
Southeast U.S. Florida Florida
Control Control minus % minus %
Florida Group Group Southeast Difference U.S. Difference
________________________________________________________________________
Public Four-Year
1993 $5,454 $5,043 $5,105 $411 * 8.1% $349 * 6.8%
1994 $5,477 $4,997 $5,162 $480 * 9.6% $315 * 6.1%
1995 $5,480 $5,019 $5,231 $461 * 9.2% $249 * 4.8%
1996 $5,393 $5,065 $5,253 $327 * 6.5% $140 * 2.7%
1997 $5,524 $5,143 $5,358 $381 * 7.4% $166 * 3.1%
1998 $5,801 $5,373 $5,538 $428 * 8.0% $263 * 4.7%
1999 $5,739 $5,432 $5,664 $307 * 5.6% $75 * 1.3%
2000 $6,122 $5,657 $5,771 $465 * 8.2% $351 * 6.1%
N 7 64 320
Private Four-Year
1993 $6,171 $5,772 $6,676 $398 * 6.9% -$505 * -7.6%
1994 $6,210 $5,901 $6,746 $309 * 5.2% -$536 * -7.9%
1995 $6,327 $5,968 $6,872 $359 * 6.0% -$546 * -7.9%
1996 $6,470 $6,055 $6,937 $414 * 6.8% -$467 * -6.7%
1997 $6,561 $6,134 $7,026 $427 * 7.0% -$464 * -6.6%
1998 $6,709 $6,213 $7,162 $496 * 8.0% -$453 * -6.3%
1999 $6,978 $6,272 $7,257 $706 * 11.3% -$279 * -3.8%
2000 $6,977 $6,438 $7,361 $539 * 8.4% -$383 * -5.2%
N 29 66 686
________________________________________________________________________
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates significance at the p < .05 level.
Data are weighted by FTE of undergraduates. Control groups exclude institutions from states that
introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period, and institutions that were Florida
competitors with more than 5% of first-year, full-time undergraduate enrollment from Florida in any year
(n=113 competitors in U.S. control group). Means are compared using independent-samples t-tests
procedures.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS: 1993-2000
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Institutional Grants
No analysis was conducted for the public two-year and for-profit sectors because
these sectors do not extensively offer institutional grants. Also, no analysis was
conducted for the public four-year sector as a result of the small sample size after cases
were selected with available and accurate data. Analysis of the reported data showed
extreme outliers in the grant aid amounts that could not be verified, leaving only two of
the public four-year institutions in the Florida sample, an insufficient sample size for
analysis.
Average institutional grant expenditures per FTE for every year during the study
period with the exception of 1995 were lower in Florida than in the Southeast and U.S.
control groups for private four-year institutions. Table 4.3 shows that, in the private four-
year sector, average institutional grant expenditures per FTE were between 9.3% and
28.3% lower in Florida than in the Southeast control group for every year except 1995
(which was 20.4% higher). Similarly, institutional grant expenditures per FTE were
between 12.7% and 20.9% lower in Florida than in the U.S. control group for every year
except 1995 (which was 4.6% higher).
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Table 4.3
Average Institutional Grants per FTE in 2006 Dollars for Institutions in Florida
Compared with Institutions in Southeast and U.S. Control Groups by Sector and by Year:
1993 to 2000
________________________________________________________________________
Southeast U.S. Florida Florida
Control Control minus % minus %
Florida Group Group Southeast Difference U.S. Difference
________________________________________________________________________
Private Four-Year
1993 $3,046 $3,558 $3,818 -$512 * -14.4% -$772 * -20.2%
1994 $3,305 $3,784 $4,080 -$480 * -12.7% -$776 * -19.0%
1995 $4,559 $3,786 $4,356 $773 * 20.4% $202 * 4.6%
1996 $3,848 $4,695 $4,866 -$846 * -18.0% -$1,017 * -20.9%
1997 $4,175 $5,822 $5,148 -$1,647 * -28.3% -$972 * -18.9%
1998 $4,815 $5,393 $5,377 -$578 * -10.7% -$562 * -10.5%
1999 $4,540 $5,416 $5,547 -$876 * -16.2% -$1,007 * -18.2%
2000 $5,126 $5,652 $5,871 -$526 * -9.3% -$744 * -12.7%
N 12 31 468
________________________________________________________________________
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates significance at the p < .05 level.
Data are weighted by FTE of undergraduates. Control groups exclude institutions from
states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period, and
institutions that were Florida competitors with more than 5% of first-year, full-time
undergraduate enrollment from Florida in any year (n=113 competitors in U.S. control
group). Means are compared using independent-samples t-tests procedures.
The sample of institutions in this analysis further excludes institutions with greater than
50% variation in grants per FTE over any two-year period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS: 1993-2000
Research Question Two: Annual Price Change in Florida Compared with Control Group
States
The second research question examines how the year-over-year changes in tuition
and fees, room and board charges, and grant aid expenditures at Florida colleges and
universities compare with changes at institutions in other states after the introduction of
Bright Futures. The annual change in tuition and fees is analyzed for each of the four
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sectors: public four-year, public two-year, private four-year, and for-profit. Room and
board charges are analyzed for four-year institutions only. Institutional grant aid
expenditures per FTE are analyzed for private four-year institutions only. The annual
percentage changes for tuition and fees, room and board, and institutional grants per FTE
by sector are presented in separate tables. These rates of change are compared before and
after the introduction of Bright Futures for the two control groups. The analyses exclude
states that introduced a merit-based aid program before or during the study period.
Competitor institutions, defined as institutions with more than 5% of first-year full-time
enrollees from Florida for any year, are also excluded from all analyses. Independent-
sample t-tests measure differences in the year-over-year percentage change in the prices
and expenditures of the Florida institutions and each of the two comparison groups.
Results are presented in the next three sections for each dependent variable: tuition and
fees, room and board, and institutional grants. In Tables 4.4 to 4.6 the results are
summarized.
Tuition and Fees
The annual percentage change in tuition and fees for institutions in Florida
compared with institutions in the Southeast and U.S. control groups are summarized in
Table 4.4. Differences in the annual change in tuition and fees between institutions in
Florida and institutions in the control groups are evident only in the public sectors. In
both the private four-year sector and the for-profit sector, the year-to-year changes in
tuition and fees were comparable for institutions in Florida and the Southeast control
group, as well as between institutions in Florida and institutions in the U.S. control group.
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Table 4.4
Annual Percentage Changes in Average Tuition and Fees for Institutions in Florida Compared
with Institutions in Southeast and U.S. Control Groups by Sector and by Year: 1993 to 2000
______________________________________________________________________________
Public Four-Year Private Four-Year
___________________________ _____________________________
Florida Southeast U.S. Florida Southeast U.S.
______________________________________________________________________________
Year
1993 - - - - - -
1994 -3.9% 2.1% * 3.0% * 3.0% 4.7% 3.1%
1995 -2.7% 3.6% * 5.1% * 3.1% 3.6% 3.2%
1996 -0.5% 1.9% 3.0% 3.4% 2.2% 3.0%
1997 4.5% 2.9% * 3.2% 2.2% 4.4% 3.2%
1998 4.4% 3.6% 2.4% 2.4% 3.1% 3.6%
1999 9.7% 1.2% * 2.6% * 6.2% 3.2% 3.0%
2000 1.9% 1.7% 1.2% 4.8% 2.6% 2.0%
N 9 75 425 36 79 804
______________________________________________________________________________
Public Two-Year For Profit
___________________________ _____________________________
Florida Southeast U.S. Florida Southeast U.S.
______________________________________________________________________________
Year
1993 - - - - - -
1994 -3.4% 0.1% * 4.8% * -0.6% 11.9% 4.7%
1995 -1.6% 2.4% * 3.8% * 16.1% 1.4% 3.0%
1996 6.6% -0.8% * 2.2% 10.6% 8.5% 6.2%
1997 15.8% 0.4% * 1.1% * 6.5% 3.7% 6.2%
1998 16.7% 2.9% * 2.3% * 2.8% 3.6% 4.6%
1999 11.5% 8.9% 2.3% * 3.5% 6.3% 5.2%
2000 -0.7% 5.5% * 0.2% 11.9% 4.6% 8.5%
N 43 136 728 65 98 875
______________________________________________________________________________
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates significance at the p < .05 level.
Data are weighted by FTE of undergraduates. Control groups exclude institutions from states that
introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period, and institutions that were
Florida competitors with more than 5% of first-year, full-time undergraduate enrollment from
Florida in any year (n=113 competitors in U.S. control group). Means are compared using
independent-samples t-tests procedures.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS: 1993-2000
136
However, in the public four-year sector, the annual change in tuition and fees was
different for institutions in Florida compared with institutions in the Southeast in 1994,
1995, 1997, and 1999 and between institutions in Florida and the U.S. control group in
1994, 1995 and 1999. Similarly, in the public two-year sector, the annual change in
tuition and fees was different in Florida compared with the Southeast every year except
1999 and between Florida and the U.S. control group every year except 1996 and 2000.
The differences in annual tuition and fee changes in the public sectors varied
before and after introduction of the Florida Bright Futures program in 1997. In the public
four-year sector, tuition and fees decreased annually in Florida between 1993 and 1996,
but increased annually in both the Southeast and the U.S. control groups over the same
time period. After the introduction of Bright Futures in 1997, tuition and fees increased
annually at a higher rate in Florida than in the Southeast control group in 1997 (4.5% vs.
2.9%) and 1999 (9.7% vs. 1.2%) and at a higher rate in Florida than in the U.S. control
group in 1999 (9.7% vs. 2.6%).
Institutions in the public two-year sector had annual tuition and fee changes that
varied in some of the years both before and after the introduction of the Florida Bright
Futures program. In the public two-year institutions, tuition and fees decreased annually
in Florida from 1993 to 1995 but increased in both the Southeast and the U.S. control
groups in the same time period. Between 1995 and 1996, public two-year institutions in
Florida increased tuition and fees by 6.6%, whereas the Southeast institutions decreased
by 0.8%. After the introduction of Bright Futures in 1997, tuition and fees increased
annually at a higher rate in Florida than in the Southeast control group in 1997 (15.8% vs.
0.4%) and in 1998 (16.7% vs. 2.9%). In 2000, public two-year institutions in Florida
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decreased tuition and fees by 0.7%, whereas the Southeast institutions increased tuition
and fees by 5.5%. Tuition and fees increased annually at a higher rate in Florida than in
the U.S. control group from 1996 through 1999 by margins of 14.7 percentage points
(1997), 14.4 percentage points (1998), and 9.1 percentage points (1999).
In summary, these descriptive analyses reveal differences in the annual change in
tuition and fees between Florida and the control groups and, difference in the direction of
the changes before and after the implementation of Bright Futures. In the public four-year
and public two-year sectors, tuition and fees generally decreased in Florida, whereas they
increased in the control groups before the introduction of Bright Futures. After the
introduction of Bright Futures, tuition and fees generally increased by a larger percentage
in Florida than in the control groups. For Research Question Three, the analyses explore
how much of this change is attributable to the introduction of Bright Futures.
Room and Board
Annual changes in room and board charges between Florida and the two control
groups are comparable in both the four-year public and four-year private sectors. In Table
4.5 the year-over-year changes in room and board between Florida and the Southeast and
the U.S. control groups are compared for each year from 1993 to 2000. No statistically
significant differences were found. In the public four-year sector, annual changes ranged
from a decrease of 4.0% to an increase of 16.8% in Florida. In the private four-year
sector, annual changes ranged from a decrease of 0.8% to an increase of 5.3% in Florida.
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The absence of statistically significant differences suggests that room and board
did not change in Florida after the introduction of the Florida Bright Futures program in
either the public four-year or the private four-year sector.
Table 4.5
Annual Percentage Changes in Average Room and Board for Institutions in Florida
Compared with Institutions in Southeast and U.S. Control Groups by Sector and by Year:
1993 to 2000
________________________________________________________________________
Public Four-Year Private Four-Year
_______________________ _________________________
Florida Southeast U.S. Florida Southeast U.S.
________________________________________________________________________
Year
1993 - - - - - -
1994 -0.1% -1.0% 0.9% -0.8% 1.4% 1.7%
1995 -0.6% 1.0% 1.8% 1.2% 0.5% 1.5%
1996 -0.1% 0.5% 0.5% 2.0% 1.1% 1.3%
1997 1.9% 1.3% 2.0% 0.5% 1.4% 1.5%
1998 6.9% 3.4% 2.6% 2.9% 1.4% 1.6%
1999 -4.0% 2.4% 2.0% 5.3% 2.4% 2.1%
2000 16.8% 4.7% 2.4% 0.8% 1.9% 1.4%
N 7 64 320 29 66 686
________________________________________________________________________
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates significance at the p < .05 level.
Data are weighted by FTE of undergraduates. Control groups exclude institutions from
states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period, and
institutions that were Florida competitors with more than 5% of first-year, full-time
undergraduate enrollment from Florida in any year (n=113 competitors in U.S. control
group). Means are compared using independent-samples t-tests procedures.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS: 1993-2000
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Institutional Grants
The year-over-year change in institution grant expenditures per FTE between
Florida and the control groups is generally comparable in the private four-year sector. In
Table 4.6 annual changes in institution grant expenditures per FTE in Florida are
compared with institutions in the Southeast and the U.S. control groups from 1993 to
2000. The absence of statistically significant differences suggests that grants per FTE did
not change in the private four-year sector after the introduction of the Florida Bright
Futures program.
Table 4.6
Annual Percentage Changes in Institutional Grants for Institutions in Florida Compared







1993 . . .
1994 12.5% 6.9% 6.8%
1995 8.3% 13.5% 7.3%
1996 8.6% 11.9% 12.3%
1997 17.7% 11.9% 6.2% *
1998 8.8% 5.5% 6.0%
1999 -0.2% 3.2% 4.0%
2000 2.1% 4.3% 5.3%
N 12 31 468
________________________________________
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates significance at the p < .05 level.
Data are weighted by FTE of undergraduates. Control groups exclude institutions from states that
introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period, and institutions that were Florida
competitors with more than 5% of first-year, full-time undergraduate enrollment from Florida in any year
(n=113 competitors in U.S. control group). Means are compared using independent-samples t-tests
procedures.
The sample of institutions in this analysis further excludes institutions with greater than 50% variation in
grants per FTE over any two-year period.
Source: from analyses of IPEDS: 1993-2000
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Research Question Three: Price Response to Bright Futures with Control Variables
The third research question uses OLS regression and a differences-within-
differences approach with controls for state and institutional characteristics. The analyses
measure price in three ways: tuition and fees, room and board, and institutional grants per
FTE. The purpose of three separate regression models, as outlined in Table 4.7, is to
measure the effect of Bright Futures on the three dependent variables in three different
ways: price after the introduction of Bright Futures, controlling for state and institutional
characteristics; price for institutions with high and low concentrations of Bright Futures
recipients; and price for each year of study after the introduction of Bright Futures to
identify whether price varies more or less in each year after 1997. The results are
summarized below and are organized according to dependent variables: tuition and fees,
room and board, and institutional grants per FTE. The detailed regression results are in
Appendix B.
All analyses in this section exclude institutions in the for-profit sector because
fewer than 1% of all students in this sector received Bright Futures awards. Institutions in
the for-profit sector were found to have on average only 12 award recipients annually.
Therefore, an analysis of the effect of Bright Futures on these institutions is not possible.
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Table 4.7
Description of Regression Models for each Sector and Dependent Variable
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Model I--STATE & INSTITUTION CONTROLS Model II--SCHOLARSHIP CONCENTRATION Model III--TIMING
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
State-level variables: State-level variables: State-level variables:
State unemployment (continuous) State unemployment (continuous) State unemployment (continuous)
Log of state per-capita income (continuous) Log of state per-capita income (continuous) Log of state per-capita income (continuous)
State educational attainment level (continuous) State educational attainment level (continuous) State educational attainment level (continuous)
State postsecondary capacity (continuous) State postsecondary capacity (continuous) State postsecondary capacity (continuous)
Institution-level variables: Institution-level variables: Institution-level variables:
Barron's rating (dummy coded, 1, 0, six categories) Barron's rating (dummy coded, 1, 0, six categories) Barron's rating
(dummy coded, 1, 0, six categories) (dummy coded, 1, 0, six categories) (dummy coded, 1, 0, six categories)
Endowment size per FTE (continuous) Endowment size per FTE (continuous) Endowment size per FTE (continuous)
Appropriations per FTE (continuous) Appropriations per FTE (continuous) Appropriations per FTE (continuous)
Carnegie classification Carnegie classification Carnegie classification
(dummy coded, 1, 0, ten categories) (dummy coded, 1, 0, ten categories) (dummy coded, 1, 0, ten categories)
Fixed-effects Fixed-effects Fixed-effects
Years (1993 - 2000) Years (1993 - 2000) Years (1993 - 2000)
Bright Futures variables: Bright Futures variables: Bright Futures variables:
Florida (dummy coded, 1, 0) Florida (dummy coded, 1, 0) Florida (dummy coded, 1, 0)
Florida x After (interaction for Florida and After) High Futures Florida x 1997
High Futures x After Florida x 1998
Low Futures Florida x 1999
Low Futures x After Florida x 2000
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________




Public four-year institutions. In Table 4.8 the regression results are summarized
for public four-year institutions after controlling for state and institutional characteristics
as well as year fixed-effects (Models 1 through 3). Model 1 shows that the coefficients
for both Florida and the interaction between Florida and After are statistically significant
in the analyses of public four-year institutions after controlling for other variables.
Table 4.8
Response to Bright Futures by Florida Public Four-Year Colleges Relative to the Southeast Control Group
______________________________________________________________________________________
Tuition and Fees Room and Board
_____________________________ ____________________________
Concen- Concen-
After BF tration Year After BF tration Year
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
______________________________________________________________________________________
Independent Variables
Florida -0.442 * -0.441 * -0.043 -0.044
Florida x after 0.128 * 0.075 *
High BF Concentration -0.442 * 0.010
Low BF Concentration -0.442 * -0.119 *
High BF Concentration x after 0.122 0.095 *
Low BF Concentration x after 0.132 * 0.058
Florida x 1997 0.050 0.055
Florida x 1998 0.051 0.079
Florida x 1999 0.248 * 0.059
Florida x 2000 0.178 * 0.108 *
R-squared 0.732 0.732 0.734 0.609 0.618 0.609
N of observations 666 666 666 572 572 572
______________________________________________________________________________________
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates significance at the p < .05 level.
All models include fixed-effects for years and controls for state characteristics such as state per capita
income, state unemployment rate, state postsecondary capacity, and the percent of the population with a
bachelor's degree. Controls for institutional characteristics include appropriations per FTE, endowment per
FTE, Carnegie classification, and Barron’s selectivity rating.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced a merit-
based aid program before or during the study period.
Analysis of institutional grants excluded to due to small sample size.
See Appendix B1 and B2 for more detailed regression results.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS: 1993-2000
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The results in Model 1 indicate that tuition and fees were 44.2% lower in Florida than in
the Southeast before Bright Futures was introduced, but only 31.4% lower than the
Southeast control group of public four-year institutions after the introduction of Bright
Futures.
In Model 2, when the Florida institutions are divided into two groups based on
high and low concentrations of scholarship recipients, the results indicate that tuition and
fees at public four-year institutions in Florida with high concentrations of recipients was
44.2% lower than at the public four-year institutions in the Southeast after controlling for
other variables both before and after Bright Futures. However, tuition and fees at public
four-year institutions in Florida with low concentrations of recipients were 44.2% lower
than the Southeast institutions before Bright Futures was implemented, but only 31.0%
lower after Bright Futures was implemented.
Model 3 tests whether the difference in tuition and fees between Florida
institutions and the Southeast institutions varied by each year after the introduction of
Bright Futures. Again Table 4.8 shows that tuition and fees were 44.1% lower at Florida
institutions before the introduction of Bright Futures. But, the gap in tuition and fees
between Florida and Southeast institutions was smaller in 1999 and 2000 than in other
years. Tuition and fees were 19.3% lower in Florida than in the Southeast in 1999 and
26.3% lower in Florida than in the Southeast in 2000. These results indicate that in 1999
and 2000 tuition and fees increased in public four-year institutions in Florida relative to
the public four-year institutions in the Southeast control group.
To test the robustness of the results I ran the same regression analyses with the
U.S. control group and found that public four-year institutions in Florida had lower
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tuition and fees relative to the U.S. control group throughout the study period
(approximately 47% lower) and that the gap in tuition and fees between Florida and the
U.S. control group did not change with the introduction of Bright Futures. Detailed
results are in Appendix C1.
Private four-year institutions. In Table 4.9 the regression results are summarized
comparing Florida with the Southeast control group for private four-year institutions after
controlling for state and institutional characteristics as well as year fixed-effects. Table
4.9 shows few statistically significant predictors of tuition and fees (Models 1 through 3)
for the private four-year sector. Model 1 shows that tuition and fees were no different at
private four-year institutions in Florida compared with the Southeast control group after
controlling for other variables and that this relationship was comparable before and after
the Bright Futures program was introduced. Model 2 shows that Florida institutions with
high concentrations of Bright Futures recipients had tuition and fees 36.0% higher than
institutions in the Southeast both before and after the introduction of Bright Futures.
Model 3 indicates that tuition and fees were comparable at private four-year institutions
in Florida compared with private four-year institutions in the Southeast regardless of
year.
To test the robustness of the results, I ran the same regression analyses with the
U.S. control group. The results show that, with one exception, tuition and fees in private
four-year institutions were comparable in Florida and the U.S. control group throughout
the study period after controlling for other variables. The one exception is that private
four-year institutions in Florida with low concentrations of scholarship recipients had
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Table 4.9
Response to Bright Futures by Florida Private Four-Year Colleges Relative to the Southeast Control Group
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Tuition and Fees Room and Board Institutional Grants per FTE
____________________________ ____________________________ _____________________________
Concen- Concen- Concen-
After BF tration Year After BF tration Year After BF tration Year
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Independent Variables
Florida 0.119 0.126 0.115 0.115 -0.993 -1.220
Florida x after -0.024 0.015 -0.003
High BF Concentration 0.360 * 0.287 * -0.821
Low BF Concentration -0.013 -0.335 * -0.830
High BF Concentration x after -0.126 0.055 0.238
Low BF Concentration x after 0.038 -0.016 -0.227
Florida x 1997 -0.031 0.037 0.059
Florida x 1998 -0.074 -0.001 -0.020
Florida x 1999 0.031 0.012 -0.101
Florida x 2000 -0.037 0.018 -0.208
R-squared 0.952 0.959 0.953 0.927 0.969 0.927 0.944 0.949 0.945
N of observations 150 150 150 125 125 125 69 69 69
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Note: An asterick (*) indicates significance at the p< .05 level.
All models include fixed effects for years and controls for state characteristics such as state per capita income, state unemployment rate, state postsecondary
capacity, and the percent of the population with a bachelor's degree. Controls for institutional characteristics include appropriations per FTE, endowment per
FTE, Carnegie classification, and Barron’s selectivity rating.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced a merit-based aid program before or during the study period.
See Appendices B3 - B5 for more detailed regression results.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS: 1993-2000
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24.6% lower tuition and fees than those in the U.S. control group throughout the study
period. The analyses also show that the introduction of Bright Futures did not result in
statistically significant differences in tuition and fees between private four-year
institutions in Florida and U.S. private four-year institutions. Detailed results are in
Appendix C3.
Public two-year institutions. In Table 4.10 the regression results are summarized
for public two-year institutions in Florida compared with the Southeast, controlling for
state and institutional characteristics as well as year fixed-effects. Model 1 shows that
tuition and fees in Florida were 64.4% lower in public two-year institutions in Florida
compared with public two-year institutions in the Southeast before the introduction of
Bright Futures. But, Model 1 also indicates that, after the introduction of Bright Futures,
the gap in tuition and fees between public two-year institutions in Florida and in the
Southeast was smaller (64.4% before vs. 5.6% after).
Model 2 shows that tuition and fees were lower at public two-year institutions in
Florida with high concentrations of Bright Futures recipients (58.4% lower) before the
introduction of Bright Futures, and 70.5% lower at public two-year institutions in Florida
with low concentrations of Bright Futures recipients before the introduction of Bright
Futures. But, the gap in tuition and fees was smaller after the introduction of Bright
Futures than before. After the introduction of Bright Futures, tuition and fees were 11.5%
lower at Florida institutions with high concentrations of Bright Futures recipients after
the introduction of Bright Futures compared with 58.4% lower before Bright Futures was
implemented. At Florida institutions with low concentrations of recipients,
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Table 4.10






After BF tration Year
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
________________________________________________
Independent Variables
Florida -0.644 * -0.649 *
Florida x after 0.588 *
High BF Concentration -0.584 *
Low BF Concentration -0.705 *
High BF Concentration x after 0.469 *
Low BF Concentration x after 0.708 *
Florida x 1997 0.435 *
Florida x 1998 0.525 *
Florida x 1999 0.758 *
Florida x 2000 0.711 *
R-squared 0.609 0.783 0.784
N of observations 1,442 1,442 1,442
_________________________________________________
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates significance at the p < .05 level.
All models include fixed-effects for years and controls for state characteristics such as
state per capita income, state unemployment rate, state postsecondary capacity, and the
percent of the population with a bachelor's degree. Controls for institutional
characteristics include appropriations per FTE, endowment per FTE, Carnegie
classification, and Barron’s selectivity rating.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that
introduced a merit-based aid program before or during the study period.
Analysis of institutional grants and room and board not performed because they are not
typically offered.
See Appendix B6 for more detailed regression results.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS: 1993-2000
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tuition and fees were on par with the Southeast after Bright Futures was implemented but
70.5% lower before Bright Futures was implemented.
Model 3 shows that tuition and fees were 64.9% lower at public two-year
institutions in Florida than public two-year institutions in the Southeast control group
before the introduction of Bright Futures. But, the relationship was different in the years
after the introduction of Bright Futures. After controlling for other variables, tuition and
fees were 21.4% lower in Florida than in the Southeast in 1997, 12.4% lower in 1998,
10.9% higher in 1999, and 6.2% higher in 2000.
To test the robustness of the results I ran the same regression analyses with the
U.S. control group and found that tuition and fees in public two-year institutions in
Florida were 35.1% lower than public two-year institutions in the U.S. control group
throughout the study period, controlling for other variables. Institutions with both high
and low concentrations of Bright Futures recipients had lower tuition and fees in Florida
than in the U.S. control group (21.9% and 48.3%, respectively). After the introduction of
Bright Futures, the gap in tuition and fees between public two-year institutions in Florida
with low concentrations of Bright Futures recipients and those in the U.S. control group
closed to 23.4% lower in Florida than those in the U.S. control group Detailed results are
presented in Appendix 6.
Room and Board
Public four-year institutions. In Table 4.8 the regression results are summarized
for room and board rates in public four-year institutions, controlling for state and
institutional characteristics, as well as for year fixed-effects (Models 4 through 6). Model
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4 indicates that there is no statistically significant difference in room and board rates in
public four-year institutions in Florida than in public four-year institutions in the
Southeast control group before the introduction of Bright Futures. However, Model 4 also
indicates that room and board rates were 7.5% higher in Florida than in the Southeast
after the introduction of Bright Futures, controlling for other variables.
In Model 5 the Florida institutions are grouped based on high and low
concentrations of scholarship recipients. Table 4.8 shows that room and board rates were
11.9% lower in public four-year institutions in Florida with low concentrations of Bright
Futures recipients than in institutions in the Southeast control group, controlling for other
variables before and after implementation of Bright Futures. Public four-year institutions
in Florida with high concentrations of Bright Futures recipients had room and board
charges that were not different from public four-year institutions in the Southeast control
group before implementation of Bright Futures. But these institutions had room and
board charges that were 9.5% higher than in institutions in the Southeast control group
after implementation of Bright Futures.
Model 6 tests variations in the effects of Bright Futures based on each year after
the program’s introduction. Table 4.8 indicates that room and board rates were 10.8%
higher in public four-year institutions in Florida than in public four-year institutions in
the Southeast in the year 2000, controlling for state and institutional characteristics and
year fixed-effects.
To test the robustness of the results, I ran the same regression analyses with the
U.S. control group and found that, with one exception, public four-year institutions in
Florida had comparable room and board rates relative to public four-year institutions in
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the U.S. control group throughout the study period, including before and after the
introduction of Bright Futures. Public four-year institutions in Florida with low
concentrations of scholarship recipients had 10.5% lower room and board rates than
public four-year institutions in the U.S. control group throughout the study period.
Detailed results are in Appendix C2.
Private four-year institutions. In Table 4.9 the regression results are summarized
for room and board rates in private four-year institutions in Florida compared with the
Southeast, controlling for state and institutional characteristics as well as year fixed-
effects (Models 4 through 6). Model 4 shows that room and board rates in four-year
private institutions in Florida are comparable with private four-year institutions in the
Southeast, with no measurable difference before or after Bright Futures was
implemented. Model 5 shows that room and board rates were 28.7% higher at private
four-year institutions in Florida with high concentrations of Bright Futures recipients and
33.5% lower at private four-year institutions in Florida with low concentrations of Bright
Futures recipients than at private four-year institutions in the Southeast control group.
But these relationships were the same before and after the Bright Futures program was
implemented. Model 6 indicates that room and board rates were comparable at private
four-year institutions in Florida compared with private-four-year institutions in the
Southeast even in the years after Bright Futures was implemented.
To test the robustness of the results, I ran the same regression analyses with the
U.S. control group. The results show that room and board rates were comparable at
private four-year institutions in Florida and the U.S. control group throughout the study
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period, controlling for other variables, and that the introduction of Bright Futures did not
result in statistically significant differences in room and board between private four-year
institutions in Florida and private four-year institutions in the U.S. control group. Private
four-year institutions in Florida with high concentrations of scholarship recipients had
23.0% higher room and board rates than private four-year institutions in the U.S. control
group throughout the study period. Detailed results are in Appendix C4.
Institutional Grants
Private four-year institutions. In Table 4.9 the regression results are summarized
for institutional grants per FTE in private four-year institutions in Florida compared with
the Southeast, controlling for state and institutional characteristics as well as year fixed-
effects (Models 7 through 9). Model 7 shows no difference in institutional grants per FTE
in private four-year institutions in Florida compared with private four-year institutions in
the Southeast before or after the introduction of Bright Futures. Model 8 shows no
difference in institutional grants per FTE in private four-year institutions in Florida
compared with in the Southeast control group regardless of the institutional concentration
of scholarship recipients. These relationships are comparable before and after Bright
Futures implementation. Model 9 shows no difference in institutional grants per FTE for
private four-year institutions in Florida and in the Southeast and no variation in this
relationship in the years after the introduction of Bright Futures. The lack of differences
for institutional grants per FTE in this sector may be the result of small sample sizes. The
analysis includes only 69 institutions.
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To test the robustness of the results, I ran the same regression analyses with the
U.S. control group. The analyses show that institutional grants per FTE were comparable
at private four-year institutions in Florida and the U.S. control group throughout the study
period, controlling for other variables. The introduction of Bright Futures was not
associated with statistically significant differences in institutional grants between private
four-year institutions in Florida and private four-year institutions in the U.S. control
group. Private four-year institutions in Florida with low concentrations of Bright Futures
scholarship recipients received 69.2% fewer institutional grants per FTE than private
four-year institutions in the U.S. control group throughout the study period. Detailed
results are in Appendix C5.
Summary
Tuition and fees were lower on average for both public four-year and public two-
year institutions in Florida than in both the Southeast and U.S. control groups. Private
four-year tuition and fee rates were higher on average in Florida than in the Southeast but
lower on average in Florida than in the United States. Differences in tuition and fees
between Florida and the U.S. comparison groups in the for-profit sector varied in the
1990s. Tuition and fees were consistently higher at Florida for-profit institutions than at
Southeast for-profit institutions.
Descriptive analyses revealed differences in the annual change in tuition and fees
between Florida and the control groups and differences in the direction of the changes
before and after the implementation of Bright Futures. In the public four-year and public
two-year sectors, tuition and fees generally decreased in Florida, whereas they increased
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in the control groups before the introduction of Bright Futures. After the introduction of
Bright Futures, tuition and fees generally increased by a larger percentage in Florida than
in the control groups.
After controlling for other variables, tuition and fees were lower in public four-
year institutions in Florida relative to the Southeast (-44.2%) before Bright Futures. After
Bright Futures, tuition and fees in this sector were only 31.4% lower in Florida than in
the Southeast and the annual increase in tuition and fees in public four-year institutions in
Florida was most pronounced in 1999 and 2000. The regression analyses also show that
room and board rates in public four-year institutions were comparable in Florida and the
Southeast before Bright Futures was introduced, controlling for other price predictors.
However, room and board rates were 3.2% higher in Florida than in the Southeast after
Bright Futures was introduced. This increase was most pronounced in institutions with
high concentrations of scholarship recipients.
The regression analyses in the public two-year sector show that, even controlling
for state and institutional variables, Florida had 64.4% lower prices than public two-year
institutions in the Southeast before Bright Futures but only 5.6% lower after Bright
Futures. The regression results also show that, in each year that the Bright Futures
program was in effect, tuition and fees in public two-year institutions in Florida were
higher than in the Southeast control group.
The regression analyses in the private four-year sector show no difference in
tuition and fees in Florida relative to the Southeast, before or after the introduction of
Bright Futures. Similarly, in the private four-year sector, room and board rates were
comparable in Florida and the Southeast, controlling for state and institutional
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characteristics, both before and after the introduction of Bright Futures. Regression
analyses also indicate that there were no differences in institutional grants per FTE
between private four-year institutions in Florida relative to the Southeast, controlling for
state and institutional characteristics before or after the introduction of Bright Futures.
The final chapter of this study draws conclusions about state merit-based financial
aid in Florida based on the findings. Implications of the findings for policymakers are
identified along with recommendations for further research.
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CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CHAPTER 5
Introduction
This study extended two bodies of research, one that analyzes institutional price
response to student financial aid and a second that examines the effect of state merit-
based aid programs on institutions, by examining changes in tuition and fees, room and
board charges and institutional aid expenditures following the introduction of the Bright
Futures merit-based aid program in Florida. Applying an economic theoretical framework
to postsecondary education pricing, this study explored how institutions respond to the
introduction of a new aid subsidy and how this response varies for different types of
postsecondary institutions. Using descriptive and ordinary least squares regression
analyses that include year fixed-effects and other controls, this study used institution-
level data for the 1993-1994 to 2000-2001 academic years from the Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) and the Florida Bright Futures program
to explore the following research questions for four sectors of postsecondary education
(public four-year, public two-year, private four-year, and for-profit institutions):
1. How do tuition and fee charges, room and board charges, and grant aid
expenditures at Florida colleges and universities compare with those at
institutions in other states?
2. How do annual changes in tuition and fee charges, room and board charges, and
grant aid expenditures at Florida colleges and universities compare with annual
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changes at institutions in other states after the introduction of the Bright Futures
merit-based aid program?
3. Relative to a comparison group of institutions in other states, how do tuition and
fee charges, room and board charges, and grant aid expenditures at Florida
colleges and universities react to the introduction of the state merit-based aid
program, controlling for institutional and state economic characteristics?
The first section of this chapter summarizes the findings of this study for each
sector. The second section summarizes the results and highlights key conclusions. The
final section of the chapter presents the implications of the study and suggests directions
for future policy and research.
Summary of Findings by Sector
The research findings are summarized by sector. More specifically, the results are
summarized across research questions and across dependent variables for each of four
institutional sectors: public four-year, public two-year, private four-year, and for-profit
institutions.
Prices in Institutions in the Public Four-Year Sector
Analyses of prices in the public four-year sector show that, on average, tuition
and fees from 1993 to 2000 were lower in Florida than in the Southeast and U.S control
groups, but room and board rates were higher in Florida than in the Southeast and U.S.
control groups. The descriptive analyses indicate that the average tuition and fees in the
public four-year sector were 25.8% to 36.9% lower in Florida relative to the Southeast
control group, and even lower in Florida relative to the United States (32.5% to 43.3%
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lower). This finding is consistent with Florida’s historic commitment to a low tuition
policy in the public sector. In contrast, average room and board rates in the public four-
year sector were higher in Florida relative to both the Southeast control groups (5.6% to
9.6%) and the U.S. control group (1.3% to 6.8%). Higher average room and board rates
suggest that, although public four-year institutions in Florida kept tuition and fee charges
low, these institutions may have compensated by gaining additional revenues through
higher room and board charges.
Further descriptive analyses show that annual percentage changes in the price of
public four-year institutions varied after the introduction of Bright Futures. From 1993 to
1996, public four-year institutions in Florida decreased tuition and fees in constant
dollars, while institutions in the Southeast and United States increased theirs. After the
1997 introduction of Bright Futures, tuition and fees increased annually at a higher rate in
public four-year institutions in Florida relative to the Southeast in 1997 (4.5% vs. 2.9%)
and in 1999 (9.7% vs. 1.2%), as well as relative to the United States in 1999 (9.7% vs.
2.6%). Annual percentage changes in room and board rates were comparable in Florida
and the control groups throughout the study years. These results suggest that, although
Florida kept tuition and fees low compared to the Southeast before Bright Futures, in two
of the four years after the introduction of Bright Futures, tuition and fees in Florida in the
public four-year sector increased at a faster rate.
The regression analyses measure the extent to which the differences identified in
the descriptive analyses are still present, controlling for state and institutional
characteristics that might explain the observed variation in prices. The results confirm
that, after controlling for other variables, tuition and fees were still lower in public four-
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year institutions in Florida relative to the Southeast (-44.2%) before Bright Futures. After
Bright Futures, tuition and fees in this sector were only 31.4% lower in Florida than in
the Southeast. These results suggest that the introduction of Bright Futures was
associated with an increase in tuition and fees in the public four-year sector in Florida.
Furthermore, the regression results indicate that the change in tuition and fees was most
pronounced in institutions with low concentrations of Bright Futures recipients. This
finding suggests that perhaps other factors besides Bright Futures drove the price change
in Florida relative to the Southeast. If the flow of Bright Futures dollars caused the price
change, the change in prices should be present in institutions with the highest
concentration of scholarship recipients. The regression results also showed that the
annual increase in tuition and fees in public four-year institutions in Florida was most
pronounced in 1999 and 2000. This result suggests that, as the numbers of scholarship
recipients grew, the gap in tuition and fees in public four-year institutions in Florida
diminished relative to the Southeast. This finding also suggests that the increase in price
associated with Bright Futures was delayed, occurring three years after the program
began.
The regression analyses also show that room and board rates in public four-year
institutions were comparable in Florida and the Southeast before Bright Futures was
introduced, controlling for other price predictors. However, room and board rates were
3.2% higher in Florida than in the Southeast after Bright Futures was introduced. This
increase was most pronounced in institutions with high concentrations of scholarship
recipients. These results suggest that the introduction of Bright Futures was associated
with an increase in room and board charges at public four-year institutions in Florida.
159
Furthermore, the regression results indicate that the difference in room and board rates
was most pronounced in 2000 when room and board rates in public four-year institutions
were 6.4% higher in Florida than other Southeast institutions.
The results of the regression analyses comparing Florida with the United States
suggest that Bright Futures was unrelated to price changes in the public four-year sector.
The only difference in price between Florida and four-year public institutions in the
Unites States was in room and board rates in institutions with low concentrations of
scholarship recipients before Bright Futures (Florida had 10.5% lower room and board
rates relative to the rest of the United States). If low scholarship concentration is a proxy
for academic quality of the student body, this finding simply suggests that lower room
and board rates were present in public four-year institutions of lower academic quality in
Florida than in other institutions in the United States.
Prices in Institutions in the Public Two-Year Sector
Descriptive analyses of public two-year institutions show that tuition and fees
were lower in Florida than in the Southeast (by 12.9% to 21.8%) and the United States
(by 25.9% to 39.5%) from 1993 to 2000. Descriptive analyses also show that, before
Bright Futures was introduced, tuition and fees annually decreased from 1993 to 1995 in
public two-year institutions in Florida but increased in both the Southeast and U.S.
control groups. However, in the years after Bright Futures was introduced public two-
year institutions in Florida annually increased tuition and fees at a higher rate than both
the Southeast (in 1997 and 1998) and the United States (in 1996 to 1999). The descriptive
analyses indicate that, like public four-year institutions, public two-year institutions in
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Florida have historically kept a low tuition policy. The annual increases in tuition and
fees after Bright Futures indicates that this sector increased prices at a faster rate than the
Southeast and the U.S. control groups did.
The regression analyses confirm that, even controlling for state and institutional
variables, public two-year institutions in Florida had 64.4% lower prices than public two-
year institutions in the Southeast before Bright Futures but only 5.6% lower after Bright
Futures. This finding suggests that increases in price in public two-year institutions in
Florida was associated with the introduction of Bright Futures. The increase in tuition
was present in institutions with both high and low concentrations of scholarship
recipients but most pronounced in those with low concentrations. The regression results
also show that, in each year that the Bright Futures program was in effect, tuition and fees
increased at a faster rate than in the Southeast control group. Tuition and fees were 21.4%
lower in Florida relative to the Southeast in 1997, 12.4% lower in 1998, 10.9% lower in
1999, and just 6.2% lower in 2000, suggesting that tuition and fees at public two-year
institutions in Florida annually grew to be on a par with the control group. No significant
differences were found in this sector’s tuition and fees relative to the United States before
or after Bright Futures.
Prices in Institutions in the Private Four-Year Sector
Descriptive analyses of the private four-year sector show that prices were higher
in Florida than in the Southeast (4.9% to 9.2% higher tuition and fees and 5.2% to 11.3%
higher room and board rates) but lower in Florida than in the United States (11.3% to
15.0% lower tuition and fees and 3.8% to 7.9% lower room and board rates). However,
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annual percentage changes in both tuition and fees and room and board rates were
comparable for institutions in Florida and institutions in both the Southeast and the U.S.
control groups between 1993 and 2000.
A descriptive analysis examining institutional grants per full-time equivalent
enrollment (FTE) in the private four-year sector shows that the level of grants was lower
in Florida than in the Southeast (9.3% to 28.3% lower) and the United States (12.7% to
20.9% lower), with the exception of one year, 1995. However, annual percentage changes
in grants per FTE were comparable in Florida and in private four-year institutions in both
the Southeast and the United States. Thus the results of the descriptive analyses suggest
that, on average, private four-year institutions in Florida charged higher prices but offered
lower grant aid relative to the Southeast both before and after implementation of Bright
Futures. And Florida had lower prices and lower grant aid relative to the U.S. control
group in the private four-year sector.
Controlling for state and institutional characteristics, the regression analyses show
no difference in tuition and fees in private four-year institutions in Florida relative to the
Southeast, before or after the introduction of Bright Futures. Similarly, Florida
institutions with both high and low concentrations of scholarship recipients had
comparable tuition and fees as institutions in the Southeast before and after the
introduction of Bright Futures. These results suggest that, in the private four-year sector,
Bright Futures had no effect on tuition and fees, even though the private sector had more
flexibility than the public sector in adjusting prices at the time Bright Futures was
introduced.
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Although no increase in tuition and fees was indicated after Bright Futures, the
regression results did show that private four-year institutions in Florida with high
concentrations of scholarship recipients had tuition and fees that were 36.0% higher than
institutions in the Southeast. This finding suggests that there may be a selection effect in
which scholarship recipients attend higher-priced institutions. If scholarship recipients are
better students academically, and if price is a proxy for academic quality (Zhang, 2004),
the results indicate that higher-achieving students attend higher-priced/quality schools.
Similar to the pattern for tuition and fees in the private four-year sector, room and
board rates were comparable in Florida and the Southeast, controlling for state and
institutional characteristics, both before and after the introduction of Bright Futures.
However, before Bright Futures was introduced, private four-year institutions with high
concentrations of recipients had room and board rates that were 28.7% higher than in the
Southeast, whereas institutions with low concentrations had room and board rates that
were 33.5% lower than in the Southeast. If we assume that scholarship concentration is
associated with the academic quality of students enrolled the institutions, these findings
may indicate that higher-quality institutions charged higher prices and lower-quality
institutions charged lower prices.
The regression analyses also indicate that there were no differences in
institutional grants per FTE between private four-year institutions in Florida relative to
the Southeast, controlling for state and institutional characteristics before or after the
introduction of Bright Futures. The results of the regression analyses that compared
Florida with the United States revealed no differences in price (tuition and fees and room
and board) or institutional grants per FTE in the private four-year sector before or after
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the introduction of Bright Futures. Private four-year institutions in Florida with high
concentrations of scholarship recipients had room and board rates that were 23.0% higher
than the private four-year institutions in the U.S. control group. But this result may again
simply indicate that the concentration variable is a proxy for academic quality of
students, and, in the private four-year sector, higher-quality institutions average higher
room and board rates.
Prices in Institutions in the For-Profit Sector
Only descriptive analyses were conducted for for-profit institutions because of the
low participation rates of this sector in the Bright Futures program. Furthermore, the
price differences in the descriptive analysis must be interpreted with caution because of
the rapid change in this sector. To maintain the sample size, the tuition and fees variable
for this sector is defined differently from the other three sectors. Tuition and fees are
defined as the price of full-time full-year attendance in the largest program offering. The
largest program may vary from year to year for the institution. Regardless, the results
indicate that tuition and fees were higher at for-profit institutions in Florida than in the
Southeast each year (from 4.1% higher to 21.8% higher). The annual percentage change
in tuition and fees varied not only across the years but also between institutions in Florida
and the Southeast and U.S. for-profit institutions.
Conclusions
This study’s findings contribute to two bodies of research, one that analyzes
institutional price response to student financial aid and a second that examines the effect
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of state merit-based aid programs on institutions. The results inform research on price
response by testing price differences in a treatment group compared with a control group.
This quasi-natural experimental design is a more precise way of testing price response
than the research designs used in previous price response studies (Acosta, 2001; Li, 1999;
McPherson & Schapiro, 1991, 1993). The results inform research on merit-based aid
programs by extending the analysis of price response to the subsidy in a previously
unstudied state, Florida. Based on the findings of this study, two main conclusions may
be drawn. First, the introduction of Bright Futures was associated with an increase in
price in public-sector institutions. Second, the introduction of Bright Futures was not
associated with changes in prices in the private four-year sector.
With regard to the public sector change in price: After the introduction of Bright
Futures, in the public four-year institutions the gap in tuition and fee charges between
Florida and the Southeast decreased by 12.8%, and the change was most pronounced in
the last two years of the study (a 24.8% smaller gap in 1999 and a 17.8% smaller gap in
2000). Room and board rates were also 7.5% higher after the introduction of Bright
Futures in the public four-year sector, with the greatest increases in room and board rates
at public four-year institutions in Florida with high concentrations of scholarship
recipients. Similarly, in the public two-year sector, tuition and fees in Florida were far
below those in the Southeast before the introduction of Bright Futures (64.4% lower) but
only 5.6% lower in Florida than in the Southeast after the introduction of Bright Futures,
controlling for other variables. The regression analyses show that public two-year tuition
and fees in Florida moved from 21.4% lower in Florida than the Southeast in 1997, to
12.4% lower in Florida than in the Southeast in 1998, to 10.9% higher in Florida than in
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the Southeast in 1999, and 6.2% higher in Florida than the Southeast in 2000. Also,
public two-year institutions with both high and low concentrations of Bright Futures
recipients increased their prices after Bright Futures was introduced.
Although the findings show that tuition and fees increased at public four-year
institutions in Florida relative to institutions in the Southeast after the introduction of
Bright Futures, some caution is warranted. Specifically, this conclusion is uncertain
because the analyses show no significant difference in price for Florida public four-year
institutions with high concentrations of scholarship recipients compared with Southeast
institutions. Similarly, in the public two-year sector, although the price increase relative
to the Southeast was evident in institutions with both low and high concentrations of
recipients, it was most pronounced in the institutions with low concentrations of
scholarship recipients.
These findings may indicate that other explanations that are not controlled for in
the model account for the differences in price response related to recipient concentration.
Some possible explanations identified in the economic theoretical literature on price-
setting (Blais & Dion, 1991; Clotfelter, 1996; McPherson & Schapiro, 1993; Winston,
1999) suggest that institutions may become more selective as an alternative to raising
their prices. The trade-off between price and selectivity in response to student demand is
dependent upon the goals and objectives of the institutions and its orientation toward
academic quality (Clotfelter, 1996; Winston, 1999). Particularly in highly selective
institutions in which the number of seats is stagnant, institutions may be more likely to
seek students with higher academic qualifications to raise the prestige of their institution
through commonly used college rankings (Clotfelter, 1996). Theorists (Rothschild &
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White, 1995) also suggest that increasing the academic quality of students is a desirable
choice because better academically prepared students add to what the institution can offer
in terms of peer quality of the student body.
In Florida, tuition and fees are set by state policymakers in the public sector, but
institutions have discretion to become more selective in response to a growing applicant
pool and institutions have discretion to set room and board rates. If Bright Futures
resulted in an increase of student applicants at Florida’s public institutions, then
institutions may have responded by choosing better academically qualified students.
Public four-year institutions in Florida with high concentrations of Bright Futures
students are by definition academically more selective institutions. Thus these institutions
would have been more likely to respond to the increasing flow of scholarship recipients
by being even more academically selective rather than by increasing their price. This
study does not control for changes in student-level academic achievement during the
study period, but only institution-level measures of selectivity, wealth, and mission, such
as Barron’s rating, endowment, and Carnegie classification.
Another explanation for the increase in price in the public sector may be that
Florida had such extremely low tuition rates among U.S. states, policymakers may have
simply been motivated to close the tuition and fee gap between it and surrounding states.
The notion of lagging tuition rates being equated with lagging quality is a view that
recently drove Florida House legislators to increase tuition and fees (by 40% by 2010) to
improve the perceived quality of the Florida public system of higher education
(Tallahassee Bureau, May 3, 2007). If Bright Futures recipients selected higher-quality
higher-priced institutions while avoiding lower-priced lower-quality institutions, the
167
increase in price in the institutions with a low-concentration of Bright Futures recipients
may truly correlate with a direct policy change in price and not with the increase in
Bright Futures scholarship revenue to those institutions. Institutional and state
policymakers typically use peer institutions as benchmarks to make decisions about price
(Clotfelter, 1996; Mumper, 2001), therefore the surrounding postsecondary market may
have pressured the low relative position of Florida’s public sector prices upward if
policymakers and students had the impression that Florida institutions were under-price.
With regard to the private four-year sector, the analyses show that these Florida
institutions did not change their prices after Bright Futures was introduced. However,
private four-year institutions in Florida may have responded to Bright Futures by
increasing the academic quality of the students that they enroll rather than by raising
prices. Or the share of the price covered by the Bright Futures scholarship was so small
that it had no significant effect on the institutions in Florida. The regression results show
that private four-year institutions with high concentrations of scholarship recipients had
tuition and fees that were 36.0% higher than those in the Southeast before Bright Futures.
This finding suggests that there may have been a selection effect in which scholarship
recipients concentrated mostly at higher-priced institutions. If scholarship recipients are
better students academically, and if price is a proxy for academic quality, then the results
may indicate that high achieving students attended higher-priced higher-quality schools.
Therefore, the results suggest that the academic quality of students changed during the
study period, but this change is not captured by the variables included in this study’s
model of pricing behavior.
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With the exception of Long (2002, 2003), the results of this study can not be
directly compared with previous price response research because prior studies analyzed
national samples and examined federal aid subsidies. The results of this study share some
similarities with Long’s (2002, 2003) analyses for Georgia. Long showed that both public
four-year and private four-year institutions responded to HOPE by raising tuition and fee
rates. In contrast, this study shows that public four-year and public two-year institutions,
but not private four-year institutions, changed tuition and fees in response to Bright
Futures. Long’s study indicated that the increases were more pronounced in institutions
with many HOPE recipients in both the private and the public four-year sectors, but this
study found that tuition and fee increases were present only in low-concentration
institutions. Both this study’s findings and the Long analysis for Georgia found that room
and board charges increased after the merit-based aid subsidy was introduced in the
public four-year college sector, and increases were present in institutions with the largest
concentration of scholarship recipients. Although Long’s analysis showed that
institutional grant aid decreased in private four-year institutions in Georgia after HOPE
was introduced, this analysis suggests that, in private four-year institutions in Florida,
institutional grants were unrelated to the introduction of Bright Futures.
In summary, the findings in this study suggest that the price increase in Florida
was associated with the introduction of Bright Futures in public two- and four-year
institutions, but no change in price occurred in private four-year institutions. However,
conclusions about causality are limited because these changes may have resulted from
other forces that coincided with the introduction of Bright Futures but that were not
controlled in the analyses. The quasi-natural experimental method requires that only one
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treatment factor be introduced and measured during the study period. Prices at Florida
institutions trended far below the national average in the first half of the study period. If
institutions raised their prices in the second half of this study period because of forces
related to the low position of Florida institutions relative to other institutions in the same
market (and unrelated to the introduction of Bright Futures), the results of the study
falsely indicate that Bright Futures was the cause of the tuition and fee increases. Despite
this limitation, the current study shows a significant price increase in public sector
institutions in Florida relative to the Southeast after Bright Futures was introduced, even
controlling for other explanations of this relationship. In the next section implications of
this study’s findings and conclusions for policy are described, and directions for future
research are suggested.
Implications
The implications and considerations of the findings for policymakers are
described. Recommendations for state policymakers are offered along with possible
directions for future research on the subject of price response and merit-based aid.
Recommendations for Policy
The results indicate that the introduction of the Bright Futures program in Florida
was associated with an increase in price at public four-year and public two-year
institutions in Florida, but not in private four-year institutions. Several recommendations
for policy may be drawn from the findings.
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First, Florida’s policymakers may need to target more aid dollars toward low-
income students to address the price increase associated with Bright Futures. In Florida,
institutions are authorized to set room and board rates, but state policymakers are
responsible for setting tuition and fees (Finney, 1997). This study, however, does not
address why policymakers increased tuition and fees in response to Bright Futures. One
potential explanation is that those responsible for setting prices thought that an increase
in tuition and fees after the introduction of Bright Futures would be more palatable to
institutional leaders and college students in the state, because the new scholarship would
help to subsidize the price. Regardless of the reason for the change in price, if the
introduction of a new subsidy results in price increase, the scholarship program’s
effectiveness at reducing net costs for students is diminished. Students who do not
receive the scholarship and students who lose their scholarship because they cannot
renew then face higher prices and are adversely affected by this price increase.
Prior studies on enrollment response indicated that low-income students are more
sensitive to price increases than higher-income students and less likely to enroll as a
result of financial constraints (Heller, 1997). Therefore, policymakers should target
higher education finance policy in such a way that the price effects of merit-based aid are
mitigated for low-income populations, because these groups qualify for merit-based aid at
lower rates than their higher-income peers (Heller, 2002). For example, states might
adjust their appropriations formulas for public institutions to financially reward
institutions for enrolling lower-income students. Such a policy would offset some of the
effects of the merit-based aid on enrollment. If Florida is intentionally moving from being
a low-price/low-aid state toward being a high-price/high-aid state, policymakers in
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Florida need to consider the adverse effects on the enrollment of low-income students in
a high-price/high-aid model, and consider ways to mitigate these effects as they continue
the Bright Futures program by adding need as a factor in Bright Futures award formulas
and supplementing Bright Futures with additional state need-based financial aid
programs.
Second, because no price response was evident in the private four-year sector,
Florida’s policymakers could use merit-based aid as a strategy to achieve increases in
other outcomes: student academic quality, in-state retention, and affordability. In the
private four-year sector only, these goals could be pursued without decreasing
affordability for non-recipients in the sector. However, in this study there was no attempt
to ascertain whether these other goals were in fact achieved with merit-based aid during
the study period or whether other potentially adverse effects of merit-based aid did or did
not occur, such as decreasing enrollment rates for disadvantaged groups.
Third, policymakers in all states should monitor the effect of state financial aid
programs on prices in each sector in order to determine what portion of the state financial
aid program is captured by students and what portion is captured by institutions.
Although in this study focus was on Florida, policymakers in other states might conclude
that state merit-based aid programs result in price increases in the public sectors, and
therefore they may not be an appropriate financial aid tool for improving college
affordability. If states do use merit-based financial aid programs, policymakers should
also monitor and control the full set of state financial aid programs, state appropriations,
tuition and fees and room and board charges in the public sectors in such a way as to
minimize the potentially adverse affects of large aid programs on prices. By jointly
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managing tuition and fee policy, state appropriations, and state financial aid in the public
sectors, state policymakers can allocate the financial benefit of state financial aid toward
students rather than toward institutions by ensuring that increases in state financial aid are
not offset by decreases in appropriations or increases in prices.
Recommendations for Future Research
The results contribute to two bodies of research, one that analyzes merit aid and
the other that measures price response. However, only a small set of potentially relevant
responses to a merit-based aid program in just one state were examined. More analysis is
needed to provide policymakers with useful information for developing effective
financial aid programs. The results of this study suggest at least four directions for future
research.
First, future analyses of institutional response to such subsidies as state merit-
based aid programs should include measurements of student academic quality that vary
over the time of the study (e.g., average college entrance scores or GPA levels of
incoming first-year students). Measurements of changes in student academic quality were
not included in this study because IPEDS did not consistently collect student academic
performance measurements for 1993 - 2000. Therefore, the extent to which institutions
responded to the Bright Futures subsidy by increasing quality rather than increasing price
was not examined. Other researchers (Cornwell, Lee, & Mustard, 2005) found that the
academic quality of students increased at four-year institutions in response to the
introduction of the Georgia HOPE scholarship. Their study also indicated that, at the
most competitive four-year institutions, application rates increased, whereas acceptance
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rates declined, after the introduction of HOPE. Therefore, future studies of merit-based
aid should include yearly measurements of student quality and selectivity as independent
variables in order to control for institutions’ choices to increase student quality instead of
prices.
Second, in future research on the effect of merit-based financial aid in Florida,
other institutional characteristics besides price that may change in response to Bright
Futures should be considered. One of the first studies of institutional responses to the
introduction of merit aid (Cornwell & Mustard, 2006) examined changes in the racial and
economic diversity of institutions after the introduction of Georgia HOPE as well as
changes in the academic diversity of students. Cornwell and Mustard found that Georgia
institutions became more homogenous after the introduction of merit-based aid. Future
research on Bright Futures should examine institutional changes other than price to
understand the full effect of Bright Futures on institutions in Florida. The same
differences-within-differences methodology could be employed, but enrollment rates for
different racial, socio-economic and academic achievement groups should be used as
dependent variables.
Third, further research on price response to a newly introduced subsidy like a
state merit-based aid program should consider variations in responses of states with low
tuition and fee levels compared to states with high tuition and fee levels. Florida’s low
prices compared to both the southeastern region and the rest of the U.S. states may have
introduced other market forces into the tuition setting decisions that are not controlled for
in this study. While the southeastern region functioned as a similar control group for this
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study because the prices in the region were closer to Florida on average than the U.S.,
prices in the Florida public sector were still comparatively low.
Last, further research on price response to Bright Futures in Florida should
qualitatively explore the decision-making process surrounding price-setting behaviors.
Although the setting of room and board rates and grant aid expenditures were controlled
by the institutions, the decision to change tuition and fees in the public sectors between
1993 and 2000 was primarily the responsibility of the Florida Board of Regents. A case
study of the Florida Board of Regents and Florida State Legislature would ascertain the
factors that led policymakers to authorize increases in price while simultaneously
introducing a merit-based aid program that was broadly available in the state. For
example, raising tuition and fees while also introducing Bright Futures canceled out some
of the price-savings of the merit-based aid for students in the public sectors who received
the scholarships and increased prices for nonrecipients. However, introduction of the
generous merit-based aid program may have made political constituents less averse to the
tuition and fees increases. Mumper’s (2001) qualitative study of how policymakers
formulate decisions about college prices in 11 states between 1995 and 1999 found that
such decisions were rooted in the individual perspectives of policymakers on what factors
drive college costs and prices. He identified state governments, public institutions
themselves, the competing state financial priorities of prisons and Medicaid, and the cost
of increasing institutional quality as the perceived drivers of cost and prices. A qualitative
study of the postsecondary policymaking process in Florida during the study period
would shed light on the forces that shaped price increases in the public sector after the
introduction of the Florida Bright Futures program.
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Final Comments
The literature on merit-based aid described earlier (Farrell, 2004a, 2004b; Heller
& Rasmussen, 2001, 2002; Heller & Rogers, 2003; Ness & Noland, 2004) showed that
merit-based aid programs do little to close the gaps in college participation within a state.
Yet, these programs continue to be highly popular among state policymakers and their
constituents (Dynarski, 2004). Policymakers in Florida are now struggling to financially
sustain the Bright Futures program because of the growing number of recipients, the
larger outlays per recipient triggered because the award formula is based on tuition rates
that are increasing, and the stagnant rate of lottery sales in the state (Borg & Stranahan,
2000). Policymakers are considering substantial new fees at public institutions that would
not be covered by Bright Futures in order to increase institutional revenues. Such fees
would erode the financial benefit that the merit-based aid provides for its recipients.
Although merit-based aid remains popular, some states are more creatively
targeting aid programs earlier in the education pipeline to expand college opportunities.
Recently, Wisconsin policymakers launched a statewide college access program called
the Wisconsin Covenant, focused on expanding opportunities for all eighth graders in the
state who commit to being good citizens and achieving B grades (CNN.com, April 30,
2007). Although the grade requirement is a characteristic of a merit-based aid program,
the timing of the aid offer increases the motivational effect of the aid on student
preparation for all eligible students. The governor’s proposed budget includes $10 million
annually in financial aid to guarantee each eligible student a way to pay for college in-
state through a combination of work-study, loans, and scholarships. This kind of
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commitment to students encourages students to prepare for what is possible in their future
(Bugler et al., 1999; Henry & Rubenstein, 2002).
Despite the popularity of state merit-based aid among some policymakers and
their constituents, the findings from this study suggest that supporters of merit-based aid
programs should be cautious in asserting that these programs improve college
affordability. While there may be several different explanations for the price changes
observed in Florida in this study, merit-based aid was associated with an increase in price
in public sector institutions. Bright Futures directly improved the price for recipients, but
at the expense of nonrecipients who faced higher prices. Therefore, policymakers should
consider the appropriateness of utilizing merit-based financial aid for addressing public
policy goals of college affordability and equality in college opportunity.
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Appendix A. List of Florida Institutions Included in the Analytic Sample
______________________________________________________________________________________
Public 4 Year
FLORIDA AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL UNIVERSITY
FLORIDA ATLANTIC UNIVERSITY-BOCA RATON
FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
THE UNIVERSITY OF WEST FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA








EMBRY RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY
FLAGLER COLLEGE
FLORIDA CHRISTIAN COLLEGE INC
FLORIDA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY-MELBOURNE
FLORIDA MEMORIAL COLLEGE
FLORIDA SOUTHERN COLLEGE





NORTHWOOD UNIVERSITY-FLORIDA EDUCATION CENTER
NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
PALM BEACH ATLANTIC COLLEGE-WEST PALM BEACH
RINGLING SCHOOL OF ART AND DESIGN
ROLLINS COLLEGE
SAINT JOHN VIANNEY COLLEGE SEMINARY
SAINT LEO UNIVERSITY
SAINT THOMAS UNIVERSITY
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE ASSEMBLIES OF GOD
STETSON UNIVERSITY
THE BAPTIST COLLEGE OF FLORIDA
TRINITY BAPTIST COLLEGE







Source: Analyses of IPEDS: 1993-2000
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BREVARD COMMUNITY COLLEGE-COCOA CAMPUS
BROWARD COMMUNITY COLLEGE
CENTRAL FLORIDA COMMUNITY COLLEGE
CHARLOTTE VOCATIONAL TECHNICAL CENTER
CHIPOLA JUNIOR COLLEGE
D G ERWIN TECHNICAL CENTER
DAYTONA BEACH COMMUNITY COLLEGE
EDISON COMMUNITY COLLEGE
FLORIDA COMMUNITY COLLEGE AT JACKSONVILLE
FLORIDA KEYS COMMUNITY COLLEGE
GEORGE STONE AREA VOCATIONAL TECHNICAL CENTER
GEORGE T BAKER AVIATION SCHOOL
GULF COAST COMMUNITY COLLEGE
HILLSBOROUGH COMMUNITY COLLEGE
INDIAN RIVER COMMUNITY COLLEGE






NORTH FLORIDA COMMUNITY COLLEGE
OKALOOSA-WALTON COMMUNITY COLLEGE
PALM BEACH COMMUNITY COLLEGE
PASCO-HERNANDO COMMUNITY COLLEGE
PENSACOLA JUNIOR COLLEGE
PINELLAS TECHNICAL EDUCATION CENTER-CLEARWATER
POLK COMMUNITY COLLEGE
RADFORD M LOCKLIN TECHNICAL CENTER
SAINT JOHNS RIVER COMMUNITY COLLEGE
SAINT PETERSBURG JUNIOR COLLEGE
SANTA FE COMMUNITY COLLEGE
SARASOTA COUNTY TECHNICAL INSTITUTE
SEMINOLE COMMUNITY COLLEGE
SHERIDAN TECHNICAL CENTER





WILLIAM T MCFATTER TECHNICAL CENTER
WINTER PARK TECH
______________________________________________________________________________
Source: Analyses of IPEDS: 1993-2000
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List of Florida Institutions Included in the Analytic Sample
________________________________________________________________________
For Profit
ADVANCED-BASIC HAIR DESIGN TRAINING CENTER
AMERICAN MOTORCYCLE INSTITUTE
ART INSTITUTE OF FORT LAUDERDALE
ATI HEALTH EDUCATION CENTER
ATLANTIC COAST INSTITUTE
BRADENTON BEAUTY AND BARBER ACADEMY
CAREER TRAINING INSTITUTE
CLINTON TECHNICAL INSTITUTE-MOTORCYCLE/MARINE MECH
COOPER CAREER INSTITUTE
DARLYNE MCGEES ACADEMY OF COSMETOLOGY
EDUCATION AMERICA-TAMPA TECHNICAL INSTITUTE
EURO HAIR DESIGN INSTITUTE
FASHION FOCUS HAIR ACADEMY
FLIGHT SAFETY INTERNATIONAL
FLORIDA CAREER INSTITUTE INC
FLORIDA COMPUTER AND BUSINESS SCHOOL INC
FLORIDA INSTITUTE OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE MEDICINE
FLORIDA INSTITUTE OF ULTRASOUND INC
FLORIDA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY-BRANDON
FLORIDA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY-FT LAUDERDALE
FLORIDA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY-LAKELAND
FLORIDA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY-NORTH ORLANDO
FLORIDA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY-PINELLAS





FLORIDA TECHNICAL COLLEGE OF JACKSONVILLE INC
FORT PIERCE BEAUTY ACADEMY
HERITAGE INSTITUTE
HUMANITIES CTR INST OF ALLIED HLTH SCH OF MASSAGE
INSTITUTE OF CAREER EDUCATION
INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF DESIGN AND TECHNOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF HAIR DESIGN
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF BEAUTY
LA BARON HAIRDRESSING ACADEMY
LA BELLE BEAUTY ACADEMY
LA BELLE BEAUTY SCHOOL
LORAINES ACADEMY INC
______________________________________________________________________________
Source: Analyses of IPEDS: 1993-2000
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MARGATE SCHOOL OF BEAUTY INC
MEDICAL CAREER CENTER
NEW ENGLAND INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY-PALM BEACH
NORMANDY BEAUTY SCHOOL OF JACKSONVILLE








NATIONAL SCHOOL OF TECHNOLOGY INC
AVANTI HAIR TECH
CONCORDE CAREER INSTITUTE
SUNSTATE ACADEMY OF HAIR DESIGN
______________________________________________________________________________
Source: Analyses of IPEDS: 1993-2000
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Bright Futures variables
Florida -0.442 0.039 -0.373 0.000 -0.441 -0.373 0.039 0.000
Florida x after 0.128 0.050 0.079 0.011
High BF Concentration -0.442 -0.257 0.056 0.000
Low BF Concentration -0.442 -0.286 0.050 0.000
High BF Concentration x after 0.122 0.051 0.072 0.089
Low BF Concentration x after 0.132 0.061 0.065 0.042
Florida x 1997 0.050 0.016 0.077 0.513
Florida x 1998 0.051 0.016 0.077 0.511
Florida x 1999 0.248 0.078 0.079 0.002
Florida x 2000 0.178 0.056 0.078 0.022
State characteristics
Postsecondary capacity -1.119 8.173 -0.004 0.891 -1.108 -0.004 8.187 0.892 0.067 0.000 8.213 0.993
State annual average unemployment rate 9.644 1.140 0.382 0.000 9.646 0.382 1.142 0.000 9.862 0.390 1.141 0.000
Percentage of state residents 25 and older with BA 3.775 0.486 0.601 0.000 3.772 0.600 0.488 0.000 3.938 0.627 0.491 0.000
Log per capita income constant (2006) dollars 0.472 0.209 0.176 0.024 0.472 0.177 0.209 0.024 0.422 0.158 0.210 0.045
Institution characteristics
Barron's Less Competitive Institutions -0.121 0.038 -0.123 0.001 -0.121 -0.123 0.038 0.001 -0.120 -0.122 0.038 0.001
Barron's Competitive Institutions 0.005 0.036 0.007 0.880 0.005 0.007 0.037 0.881 0.007 0.009 0.036 0.852
Barron's Very Competitive Institutions 0.080 0.043 0.088 0.060 0.081 0.088 0.043 0.062 0.080 0.088 0.042 0.059
Barron's Highly Competitive Institutions 0.012 0.057 0.008 0.827 0.014 0.009 0.060 0.814 0.014 0.009 0.057 0.808
Barron's Most Competitive Institutions 0.141 0.061 0.072 0.021 0.141 0.072 0.061 0.021 0.142 0.072 0.061 0.020
Barron's Non-Competitive or Unclassified (ref.)
Carnegie Research I 0.227 0.035 0.208 0.000 0.227 0.208 0.035 0.000 0.226 0.207 0.035 0.000
Carnegie Research II 0.335 0.059 0.140 0.000 0.333 0.139 0.063 0.000 0.335 0.139 0.059 0.000
Carnegie Doctoral I 0.189 0.037 0.121 0.000 0.190 0.121 0.037 0.000 0.189 0.121 0.037 0.000
Carnegie Doctoral II 0.146 0.030 0.117 0.000 0.146 0.117 0.031 0.000 0.147 0.118 0.030 0.000
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive I -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive II 0.135 0.045 0.069 0.003 0.136 0.069 0.045 0.003 0.134 0.068 0.045 0.003
Carnegie Baccalaureate Liberal Arts 0.280 0.042 0.163 0.000 0.280 0.163 0.042 0.000 0.279 0.163 0.042 0.000
Carnegie Baccalaureate II -0.015 0.029 -0.014 0.605 -0.015 -0.014 0.029 0.605 -0.016 -0.015 0.029 0.574
Carnegie Associates Colleges -0.642 0.075 -0.190 0.000 -0.642 -0.190 0.075 0.000 -0.644 -0.191 0.075 0.000
Carnegie Professional or Special Emphasis 0.386 0.081 0.115 0.000 0.387 0.115 0.081 0.000 0.383 0.113 0.081 0.000
Carnegie Unclassified (ref.)
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
Model 3
TUITION AND FEES - PUBLIC FOUR-YEAR
Model 1 Model 2
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Log of state appropriations per FTE constant (2006) dollars -0.113 0.016 -0.188 0.000 -0.113 -0.189 0.017 0.000 -0.112 -0.187 0.016 0.000
Log endowment per FTE constant (2006) dollars -0.003 0.003 -0.030 0.280 -0.003 -0.030 0.003 0.282 -0.003 -0.030 0.003 0.284
Year fixed effects
Year is 1994 0.072 0.032 0.065 0.025 0.072 0.065 0.032 0.025 0.074 0.067 0.032 0.020
Year is 1995 0.093 0.033 0.084 0.004 0.093 0.084 0.033 0.004 0.095 0.086 0.032 0.004
Year is 1996 0.079 0.034 0.071 0.019 0.079 0.071 0.034 0.019 0.079 0.071 0.034 0.019
Year is 1997 0.092 0.035 0.083 0.008 0.092 0.084 0.035 0.008 0.101 0.092 0.035 0.004
Year is 1998 0.139 0.037 0.125 0.000 0.139 0.125 0.037 0.000 0.149 0.135 0.037 0.000
Year is 1999 0.131 0.038 0.117 0.001 0.131 0.118 0.038 0.001 0.119 0.107 0.038 0.002
Year is 2000 0.173 0.038 0.156 0.000 0.173 0.156 0.038 0.000 0.171 0.154 0.039 0.000
Year is 1993 (ref.)
R-squared 0.732 0.719 0.721
N of observations 668 668 668
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
TUITION AND FEES - PUBLIC FOUR-YEAR
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Bright Futures variables
Florida -0.043 -0.067 0.029 0.128 -0.044 -0.068 0.029 0.123
Florida x after 0.075 0.084 0.036 0.036
High BF Concentration 0.010 0.012 0.036 0.783
Low BF Concentration -0.119 -0.123 0.042 0.005
High BF Concentration x after 0.095 0.081 0.045 0.037
Low BF Concentration x after 0.058 0.043 0.052 0.267
Florida x 1997 0.055 0.031 0.055 0.321
Florida x 1998 0.079 0.045 0.055 0.157
Florida x 1999 0.059 0.034 0.057 0.299
Florida x 2000 0.108 0.062 0.056 0.054
State characteristics
Postsecondary capacity 2.838 0.020 5.864 0.629 1.021 0.007 5.829 0.861 2.430 0.017 5.918 0.682
State annual average unemployment rate 7.794 0.585 0.816 0.000 7.854 0.590 0.808 0.000 7.797 0.586 0.820 0.000
Percentage of state residents 25 and older with BA 2.032 0.606 0.334 0.000 2.160 0.644 0.333 0.000 2.023 0.604 0.338 0.000
Log per capita income constant (2006) dollars 0.477 0.329 0.143 0.001 0.438 0.302 0.142 0.002 0.479 0.330 0.144 0.001
Institution characteristics
Barron's Less Competitive Institutions -0.051 -0.102 0.037 0.170 -0.055 -0.109 0.037 0.139 -0.051 -0.102 0.037 0.174
Barron's Competitive Institutions -0.033 -0.084 0.036 0.370 -0.031 -0.079 0.036 0.396 -0.032 -0.084 0.036 0.374
Barron's Very Competitive Institutions -0.011 -0.023 0.040 0.792 -0.027 -0.058 0.040 0.503 -0.010 -0.022 0.040 0.798
Barron's Highly Competitive Institutions 0.051 0.068 0.048 0.291 0.008 0.010 0.050 0.878 0.052 0.069 0.049 0.284
Barron's Most Competitive Institutions 0.007 0.007 0.049 0.883 0.001 0.001 0.049 0.988 0.007 0.008 0.049 0.879
Barron's Non-Competitive or Unclassified (ref.)
Carnegie Research I 0.097 0.175 0.027 0.000 0.091 0.164 0.026 0.001 0.097 0.173 0.027 0.000
Carnegie Research II 0.073 0.062 0.038 0.053 0.144 0.123 0.042 0.001 0.073 0.062 0.038 0.053
Carnegie Doctoral I 0.090 0.117 0.024 0.000 0.085 0.111 0.024 0.000 0.090 0.117 0.024 0.000
Carnegie Doctoral II 0.077 0.118 0.020 0.000 0.086 0.132 0.020 0.000 0.077 0.118 0.020 0.000
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive I -- -- -- --
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive II 0.035 0.037 0.029 0.225 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.350 0.035 0.037 0.029 0.228
Carnegie Baccalaureate Liberal Arts 0.053 0.063 0.028 0.057 0.056 0.067 0.028 0.041 0.052 0.062 0.028 0.060
Carnegie Baccalaureate II -0.009 -0.016 0.020 0.657 -0.010 -0.018 0.020 0.605 -0.009 -0.017 0.020 0.642
Carnegie Associates Colleges -- -- -- --
Carnegie Professional or Special Emphasis -- -- -- --
Carnegie Unclassified (ref.)
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
ROOM AND BOARD - PUBLIC FOUR-YEAR
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Log of state appropriations per FTE constant (2006) dollars -0.055 -0.105 0.021 0.010 -0.039 -0.076 0.021 0.065 -0.054 -0.104 0.021 0.011
Log endowment per FTE constant (2006) dollars 0.002 0.033 0.002 0.359 0.002 0.031 0.002 0.396 0.002 0.034 0.002 0.350
Year fixed effects
Year is 1994 0.047 0.081 0.022 0.032 0.047 0.080 0.022 0.032 0.047 0.081 0.022 0.033
Year is 1995 0.050 0.085 0.022 0.026 0.049 0.084 0.022 0.027 0.050 0.085 0.022 0.027
Year is 1996 0.041 0.069 0.023 0.079 0.039 0.066 0.023 0.091 0.041 0.069 0.023 0.079
Year is 1997 0.049 0.084 0.024 0.041 0.047 0.081 0.024 0.048 0.051 0.088 0.024 0.036
Year is 1998 0.094 0.162 0.025 0.000 0.093 0.159 0.025 0.000 0.095 0.162 0.026 0.000
Year is 1999 0.100 0.171 0.026 0.000 0.097 0.166 0.026 0.000 0.102 0.174 0.027 0.000
Year is 2000 0.153 0.262 0.027 0.000 0.151 0.259 0.027 0.000 0.150 0.257 0.027 0.000
Year is 1993 (ref.)
R-squared 0.590 0.598 0.588
N of observations 573 573 573
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
ROOM AND BOARD - PUBLIC FOUR-YEAR
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Bright Futures variables
Florida 0.119 0.090 0.064 0.067 0.126 0.095 0.067 0.064
Florida x after -0.024 -0.015 0.068 0.722
High BF Concentration 0.360 0.199 0.083 0.000
Low BF Concentration -0.013 -0.007 0.071 0.859
High BF Concentration x after -0.126 -0.055 0.082 0.126
Low BF Concentration x after 0.038 0.017 0.081 0.636
Florida x 1997 -0.031 -0.008 0.100 0.756
Florida x 1998 -0.074 -0.019 0.097 0.447
Florida x 1999 0.031 0.011 0.092 0.734
Florida x 2000 -0.037 -0.013 0.102 0.721
State characteristics
Postsecondary capacity -5.217 -0.012 21.956 0.813 9.306 0.022 20.969 0.658 -0.504 -0.001 24.510 0.984
State annual average unemployment rate -12.142 -0.240 3.258 0.000 -13.622 -0.269 3.080 0.000 -12.222 -0.242 3.317 0.000
Percentage of state residents 25 and older with BA 0.978 0.111 0.728 0.182 0.937 0.107 0.684 0.173 1.134 0.129 0.769 0.143
Log per capita income constant (2006) dollars 0.816 0.201 0.383 0.035 1.250 0.308 0.374 0.001 0.794 0.196 0.388 0.043
Institution characteristics
Barron's Less Competitive Institutions 0.610 0.505 0.122 0.000 0.598 0.495 0.119 0.000 0.647 0.535 0.131 0.000
Barron's Competitive Institutions 0.825 0.897 0.121 0.000 0.715 0.778 0.121 0.000 0.864 0.940 0.131 0.000
Barron's Very Competitive Institutions 0.806 0.733 0.132 0.000 0.690 0.628 0.130 0.000 0.846 0.769 0.141 0.000
Barron's Highly Competitive Institutions 0.960 0.658 0.133 0.000 0.832 0.570 0.132 0.000 1.000 0.685 0.143 0.000
Barron's Most Competitive Institutions
Barron's Non-Competitive or Unclassified (ref.)
Carnegie Research I 1.491 1.022 0.124 0.000 1.293 0.886 0.130 0.000 1.091 0.747 0.141 0.000
Carnegie Research II 0.216 0.039 0.121 0.078 0.094 0.017 0.122 0.446 -0.220 -0.040 0.134 0.103
Carnegie Doctoral I 0.272 0.221 0.059 0.000 0.280 0.228 0.055 0.000 -0.170 -0.139 0.036 0.000
Carnegie Doctoral II 0.294 0.201 0.041 0.000 0.279 0.191 0.039 0.000 -0.147 -0.101 0.048 0.002
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive I 0.441 0.401 0.049 0.000 0.423 0.385 0.046 0.000 -0.441 -0.418 0.049 0.000
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive II 0.097 0.048 0.052 0.063 0.123 0.061 0.049 0.013 -0.345 -0.172 0.065 0.000
Carnegie Baccalaureate Liberal Arts 0.091 0.064 0.058 0.120 0.084 0.059 0.055 0.130 -0.351 -0.247 0.062 0.000
Carnegie Baccalaureate II
Carnegie Associates Colleges
Carnegie Professional or Special Emphasis
Carnegie Unclassified (ref.)
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
TUITION AND FEES - PRIVATE FOUR-YEAR
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Log of state appropriations per FTE constant (2006) dollars -0.044 -0.059 0.020 0.030 -0.056 -0.076 0.019 0.004 -0.042 -0.057 0.020 0.043
Log endowment per FTE constant (2006) dollars 0.070 0.381 0.009 0.000 0.079 0.430 0.009 0.000 0.069 0.377 0.009 0.000
Year fixed effects
Year is 1994 -0.065 -0.047 0.044 0.142 -0.074 -0.053 0.041 0.075 -0.063 -0.046 0.044 0.154
Year is 1995 -0.060 -0.043 0.048 0.221 -0.077 -0.055 0.046 0.095 -0.060 -0.044 0.049 0.220
Year is 1996 -0.124 -0.089 0.057 0.032 -0.143 -0.103 0.054 0.009 -0.131 -0.094 0.059 0.028
Year is 1997 -0.103 -0.074 0.061 0.095 -0.134 -0.097 0.058 0.023 -0.110 -0.079 0.064 0.088
Year is 1998 -0.151 -0.111 0.079 0.060 -0.213 -0.157 0.076 0.006 -0.154 -0.113 0.083 0.066
Year is 1999 -0.247 -0.190 0.097 0.012 -0.329 -0.254 0.093 0.001 -0.266 -0.205 0.103 0.011
Year is 2000 -0.251 -0.189 0.100 0.013 -0.330 -0.249 0.096 0.001 -0.256 -0.193 0.101 0.013
Year is 1993 (ref.)
R-squared 0.942 0.949 0.941
N of observations 150 150 150
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
TUITION AND FEES - PRIVATE FOUR-YEAR
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Bright Futures variables
Florida 0.115 0.135 0.071 0.111 0.115 0.134 0.073 0.121
Florida x after 0.015 0.014 0.061 0.802 0.037 0.015 0.088 0.674
High BF Concentration 0.287 0.253 0.054 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.085 0.990
Low BF Concentration -0.335 -0.282 0.062 0.000 0.012 0.007 0.086 0.890
High BF Concentration x after 0.055 0.038 0.051 0.286 0.018 0.009 0.094 0.851






Postsecondary capacity 27.539 0.099 20.125 0.174 27.791 0.099 13.195 0.038 26.892 0.096 21.714 0.219
State annual average unemployment rate 5.492 0.163 3.491 0.119 8.969 0.266 2.313 0.000 5.546 0.165 3.573 0.124
Percentage of state residents 25 and older with BA 0.551 0.094 0.679 0.419 -0.131 -0.022 0.449 0.770 0.546 0.093 0.708 0.443
Log per capita income constant (2006) dollars 1.685 0.632 0.344 0.000 2.898 1.088 0.249 0.000 1.680 0.630 0.350 0.000
Institution characteristics
Barron's Less Competitive Institutions -0.047 -0.052 0.113 0.679 -0.205 -0.229 0.078 0.010 -0.050 -0.056 0.120 0.676
Barron's Competitive Institutions 0.569 0.880 0.113 0.000 0.215 0.333 0.081 0.009 0.566 0.875 0.122 0.000
Barron's Very Competitive Institutions 0.518 0.736 0.134 0.000 0.276 0.392 0.091 0.003 0.514 0.731 0.144 0.001
Barron's Highly Competitive Institutions 0.591 0.643 0.134 0.000 0.291 0.317 0.092 0.002 0.588 0.639 0.143 0.000
Barron's Most Competitive Institutions
Barron's Non-Competitive or Unclassified (ref.)
Carnegie Research I 0.823 0.895 0.140 0.000 0.502 0.547 0.096 0.000 0.702 0.764 0.168 0.000
Carnegie Research II
Carnegie Doctoral I 0.507 0.147 0.115 0.000 0.368 0.107 0.077 0.000 0.389 0.113 0.131 0.004
Carnegie Doctoral II
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive I 0.116 0.149 0.037 0.002 0.110 0.141 0.024 0.000
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive II 0.202 0.220 0.042 0.000 0.169 0.184 0.028 0.000 0.085 0.093 0.052 0.102
Carnegie Baccalaureate Liberal Arts -0.117 -0.166 0.038 0.003
Carnegie Baccalaureate II 0.535 0.727 0.064 0.000 0.707 0.960 0.045 0.000 0.419 0.568 0.076 0.000
Carnegie Associates Colleges 0.132 0.105 0.061 0.034 0.375 0.299 0.045 0.000 0.015 0.012 0.071 0.832
Carnegie Professional or Special Emphasis
Carnegie Unclassified (ref.)
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
ROOM AND BOARD - PRIVATE FOUR-YEAR
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Log of state appropriations per FTE constant (2006) dollars 0.076 0.141 0.027 0.006 0.117 0.216 0.018 0.000 0.077 0.141 0.028 0.007
Log endowment per FTE constant (2006) dollars 0.111 0.330 0.026 0.000 0.034 0.100 0.018 0.066 0.112 0.331 0.026 0.000
Year fixed effects
Year is 1994 0.047 0.049 0.043 0.277 0.062 0.065 0.028 0.030 0.047 0.050 0.043 0.283
Year is 1995 0.044 0.047 0.048 0.358 0.057 0.060 0.031 0.075 0.045 0.047 0.049 0.361
Year is 1996 0.014 0.015 0.056 0.798 0.041 0.044 0.037 0.263 0.015 0.016 0.057 0.791
Year is 1997 -0.008 -0.008 0.061 0.899 0.002 0.002 0.040 0.967 -0.009 -0.010 0.063 0.881
Year is 1998 -0.037 -0.041 0.078 0.635 -0.085 -0.093 0.052 0.100 -0.033 -0.036 0.082 0.684
Year is 1999 -0.109 -0.124 0.094 0.253 -0.132 -0.151 0.062 0.036 -0.106 -0.121 0.099 0.287
Year is 2000 -0.163 -0.177 0.096 0.093 -0.239 -0.260 0.063 0.000 -0.161 -0.175 0.098 0.103
Year is 1993 (ref.)
R-squared 0.909 0.961 0.906
N of observations 125 125 125
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
ROOM AND BOARD - PRIVATE FOUR-YEAR
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Bright Futures variables
Florida -0.993 -0.573 0.577 0.092 -1.220 -0.704 0.660 0.071
Florida x after -0.003 -0.001 0.202 0.990
High BF Concentration -0.821 -0.368 1.444 0.572
Low BF Concentration -0.830 -0.351 0.600 0.174
High BF Concentration x after 0.238 0.078 0.235 0.316
Low BF Concentration x after -0.227 -0.065 0.257 0.383
Florida x 1997 0.059 0.014 0.306 0.848
Florida x 1998 -0.020 -0.003 0.320 0.952
Florida x 1999 -0.101 -0.024 0.258 0.699
Florida x 2000 -0.208 -0.049 0.574 0.719
State characteristics
Postsecondary capacity 10.049 0.007 107.566 0.926 44.602 0.031 130.990 0.735 62.443 0.043 248.300 0.803
State annual average unemployment rate 12.566 0.178 13.695 0.364 18.770 0.266 19.354 0.337 16.222 0.230 15.225 0.292
Percentage of state residents 25 and older with BA -0.076 -0.005 2.431 0.975 -0.117 -0.008 2.382 0.961 -0.592 -0.038 2.657 0.825
Log per capita income constant (2006) dollars 3.369 0.402 4.321 0.439 6.383 0.761 9.478 0.504 1.989 0.237 4.799 0.681
Institution characteristics
Barron's Less Competitive Institutions -5.240 -2.347 0.943 0.000 -5.614 -2.515 1.028 0.000 -5.011 -2.245 1.026 0.000
Barron's Competitive Institutions -2.044 -1.423 0.405 0.000 -2.214 -1.541 0.429 0.000 -1.955 -1.361 0.434 0.000
Barron's Very Competitive Institutions
Barron's Highly Competitive Institutions
Barron's Most Competitive Institutions
Barron's Non-Competitive or Unclassified (ref.)




Carnegie Masters Comprehensive I -0.418 -0.187 0.150 0.008 -1.054 -0.472 0.215 0.000 -0.406 -0.182 0.154 0.012
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive II -0.612 -0.361 0.189 0.002
Carnegie Baccalaureate Liberal Arts 0.763 0.441 0.144 0.000 0.199 0.115 0.108 0.071
Carnegie Baccalaureate II 1.702 0.982 0.609 0.008 1.514 0.874 1.018 0.144 0.736 0.425 0.153 0.000
Carnegie Associates Colleges 1.557 0.899 0.661 0.023
Carnegie Professional or Special Emphasis
Carnegie Unclassified (ref.)
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
INSTITUTIONAL GRANTS - PRIVATE FOUR-YEAR
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Log of state appropriations per FTE constant (2006) dollars 0.609 0.280 0.154 0.000 0.641 0.295 0.150 0.000 0.627 0.289 0.160 0.000
Log endowment per FTE constant (2006) dollars -1.059 -1.482 0.246 0.000 -1.168 -1.634 0.263 0.000 -1.004 -1.404 0.265 0.000
Year fixed effects
Year is 1994 0.061 0.029 0.150 0.688 0.089 0.042 0.156 0.572 0.118 0.056 0.193 0.544
Year is 1995 0.077 0.033 0.198 0.698 0.092 0.039 0.195 0.640 0.151 0.064 0.227 0.510
Year is 1996 0.025 0.012 0.276 0.928 0.023 0.011 0.269 0.933 0.138 0.065 0.322 0.670
Year is 1997 0.103 0.046 0.363 0.777 0.050 0.022 0.402 0.902 0.237 0.106 0.423 0.579
Year is 1998 0.011 0.005 0.520 0.984 -0.160 -0.076 0.686 0.816 0.235 0.111 0.600 0.697
Year is 1999 -0.105 -0.049 0.675 0.877 -0.303 -0.143 0.891 0.735 0.192 0.090 0.787 0.808
Year is 2000 -0.211 -0.099 0.796 0.792 -0.505 -0.238 1.166 0.667 0.171 0.081 0.952 0.858
Year is 1993 (ref.)
R-squared 0.944 0.949 0.945
N of observations 69 69 125
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
INSTITUTIONAL GRANTS - PRIVATE FOUR-YEAR
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Bright Futures variables
Florida -0.644 -0.542 0.034 0.000 -0.649 -0.546 0.034 0.000
Florida x after 0.588 0.374 0.043 0.000
High BF Concentration -0.584 -0.373 0.042 0.000
Low BF Concentration -0.705 -0.451 0.044 0.000
High BF Concentration x after 0.469 0.218 0.055 0.000
Low BF Concentration x after 0.708 0.328 0.055 0.000
Florida x 1997 0.435 0.147 0.062 0.000
Florida x 1998 0.525 0.178 0.062 0.000
Florida x 1999 0.758 0.253 0.067 0.000
Florida x 2000 0.711 0.229 0.066 0.000
State characteristics
Postsecondary capacity 5.119 0.013 9.115 0.574 4.974 0.013 9.088 0.584 8.383 0.022 9.165 0.361
State annual average unemployment rate 46.349 1.022 1.502 0.000 46.366 1.023 1.497 0.000 47.366 1.045 1.509 0.000
Percentage of state residents 25 and older with BA 5.224 0.462 0.577 0.000 5.223 0.461 0.575 0.000 5.710 0.504 0.587 0.000
Log per capita income constant (2006) dollars 1.706 0.353 0.244 0.000 1.707 0.353 0.243 0.000 1.564 0.324 0.245 0.000
Institutional characteristics
Log of State and Local Appropby FTE -0.234 -0.303 0.014 0.000 -0.230 -0.298 0.015 0.000 -0.228 -0.296 0.014 0.000
Year fixed effects
Year is 1994 0.299 0.197 0.035 0.000 0.299 0.197 0.035 0.000 0.306 0.202 0.035 0.000
Year is 1995 0.393 0.258 0.037 0.000 0.392 0.258 0.037 0.000 0.399 0.263 0.036 0.000
Year is 1996 0.439 0.290 0.038 0.000 0.439 0.290 0.038 0.000 0.446 0.295 0.037 0.000
Year is 1997 0.413 0.271 0.040 0.000 0.412 0.270 0.040 0.000 0.457 0.300 0.042 0.000
Year is 1998 0.606 0.400 0.044 0.000 0.606 0.400 0.044 0.000 0.634 0.419 0.046 0.000
Year is 1999 0.697 0.458 0.046 0.000 0.697 0.458 0.046 0.000 0.673 0.442 0.047 0.000
Year is 2000 0.543 0.355 0.049 0.000 0.546 0.357 0.049 0.000 0.537 0.351 0.049 0.000
Year is 1993 (ref.)
R-squared 0.609 0.612 0.615
N of observations 1442 1442 1442
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
TUITION AND FEES - PUBLIC TWO-YEAR
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Bright Futures variables -0.465 -0.178 0.048 0.000
Florida -0.465 -0.178 0.048 0.000
Florida x after -0.007 -0.002 0.067 0.916
High BF Concentration -0.495 -0.128 0.072 0.000
Low BF Concentration -0.441 -0.127 0.064 0.000
High BF Concentration x after -0.012 -0.002 0.100 0.901
Low BF Concentration x after -0.003 -0.001 0.089 0.975
Florida x 1997 -0.046 -0.006 0.105 0.665
Florida x 1998 -0.021 -0.003 0.105 0.841
Florida x 1999 0.006 0.001 0.106 0.955
Florida x 2000 0.033 0.005 0.106 0.755
State characteristics
Postsecondary capacity 11.706 0.055 2.884 0.000 11.716 0.055 2.885 0.000 11.691 0.055 2.886 0.000
State annual average unemployment rate 0.695 0.024 0.499 0.164 0.697 0.025 0.499 0.163 0.701 0.025 0.499 0.160
Percentage of state residents 25 and older with BA -2.039 -0.254 0.176 0.000 -2.038 -0.254 0.176 0.000 -2.036 -0.254 0.176 0.000
Log per capita income constant (2006) dollars 1.829 0.694 0.061 0.000 1.828 0.694 0.061 0.000 1.828 0.694 0.061 0.000
Institution characteristics
Barron's Less Competitive Institutions 0.024 0.022 0.020 0.213 0.024 0.023 0.020 0.211 0.024 0.022 0.020 0.213
Barron's Competitive Institutions 0.076 0.102 0.016 0.000 0.076 0.101 0.016 0.000 0.076 0.102 0.016 0.000
Barron's Very Competitive Institutions 0.074 0.073 0.021 0.000 0.075 0.073 0.021 0.000 0.074 0.072 0.021 0.000
Barron's Highly Competitive Institutions 0.155 0.092 0.030 0.000 0.158 0.094 0.030 0.000 0.155 0.092 0.030 0.000
Barron's Most Competitive Institutions 0.234 0.052 0.061 0.000 0.233 0.052 0.061 0.000 0.233 0.052 0.061 0.000
Barron's Non-Competitive or Unclassified (ref.)
Carnegie Research I 0.288 0.229 0.021 0.000 0.192 0.153 0.024 0.000 0.288 0.229 0.021 0.000
Carnegie Research II 0.290 0.164 0.025 0.000 0.191 0.108 0.028 0.000 0.290 0.164 0.025 0.000
Carnegie Doctoral I 0.123 0.070 0.024 0.000 0.026 0.015 0.026 0.320 0.123 0.070 0.024 0.000
Carnegie Doctoral II 0.245 0.160 0.021 0.000 0.148 0.096 0.024 0.000 0.245 0.160 0.021 0.000
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive I -- -- -- -- -0.097 -0.127 0.015 0.000 -- -- -- --
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive II 0.234 0.122 0.026 0.000 0.137 0.071 0.027 0.000 0.234 0.122 0.026 0.000
Carnegie Baccalaureate Liberal Arts 0.400 0.162 0.033 0.000 0.303 0.123 0.035 0.000 0.400 0.162 0.033 0.000
Carnegie Baccalaureate II 0.097 0.097 0.015 0.000 -- -- -- -- 0.097 0.097 0.015 0.000
Carnegie Associates Colleges 0.148 0.080 0.026 0.000 0.052 0.028 0.027 0.053 0.148 0.080 0.026 0.000
Carnegie Professional or Special Emphasis 0.404 0.256 0.027 0.000 0.308 0.195 0.029 0.000 0.404 0.256 0.027 0.000
Carnegie Unclassified (ref.)
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
Model 3
TUITION AND FEES - PUBLIC FOUR-YEAR
Model 1 Model 2
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Log of state appropriations per FTE constant (2006) dollars -0.148 -0.266 0.010 0.000 -0.149 -0.267 0.010 0.000 -0.148 -0.266 0.010 0.000
Log endowment per FTE constant (2006) dollars -0.004 -0.030 0.002 0.052 -0.003 -0.029 0.002 0.053 -0.004 -0.030 0.002 0.052
Year fixed effects
Year is 1994 0.018 0.016 0.020 0.350 0.018 0.016 0.020 0.350 0.018 0.016 0.020 0.350
Year is 1995 0.067 0.059 0.020 0.001 0.067 0.059 0.020 0.001 0.067 0.059 0.020 0.001
Year is 1996 0.070 0.062 0.020 0.001 0.071 0.062 0.020 0.001 0.071 0.062 0.020 0.001
Year is 1997 0.067 0.059 0.021 0.002 0.067 0.060 0.021 0.002 0.068 0.060 0.021 0.001
Year is 1998 0.033 0.029 0.023 0.142 0.033 0.030 0.023 0.141 0.034 0.030 0.023 0.139
Year is 1999 0.061 0.054 0.023 0.009 0.061 0.054 0.023 0.009 0.061 0.054 0.023 0.009
Year is 2000 0.018 0.016 0.024 0.465 0.018 0.016 0.024 0.460 0.017 0.015 0.024 0.484
Year is 1993 (ref.)
R-squared 0.445 0.445 0.445
N of observations 3418 3418 3418
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
TUITION AND FEES - PUBLIC FOUR-YEAR
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Bright Futures variables
Florida -0.043 -0.026 0.029 0.138 -0.043 -0.026 0.029 0.138
Florida x after 0.056 0.024 0.040 0.165
High BF Concentration 0.006 0.003 0.038 0.885
Low BF Concentration -0.105 -0.042 0.044 0.016
High BF Concentration x after 0.072 0.024 0.053 0.173
Low BF Concentration x after 0.034 0.010 0.061 0.574
Florida x 1997 0.020 0.004 0.064 0.748
Florida x 1998 0.066 0.014 0.064 0.301
Florida x 1999 0.021 0.005 0.064 0.739
Florida x 2000 0.116 0.025 0.064 0.068
State characteristics
Postsecondary capacity 0.456 0.003 1.698 0.788 0.427 0.003 1.695 0.801 0.408 0.003 1.699 0.810
State annual average unemployment rate 8.090 0.449 0.304 0.000 8.085 0.449 0.304 0.000 8.091 0.449 0.304 0.000
Percentage of state residents 25 and older with BA 0.539 0.106 0.113 0.000 0.538 0.106 0.113 0.000 0.538 0.106 0.113 0.000
Log per capita income constant (2006) dollars 0.936 0.570 0.039 0.000 0.938 0.572 0.039 0.000 0.936 0.570 0.039 0.000
Institution characteristics
Barron's Less Competitive Institutions 0.003 0.005 0.014 0.815 0.003 0.004 0.014 0.840 0.003 0.005 0.014 0.816
Barron's Competitive Institutions 0.020 0.042 0.012 0.091 0.021 0.043 0.012 0.084 0.020 0.042 0.012 0.091
Barron's Very Competitive Institutions 0.035 0.057 0.014 0.013 0.033 0.054 0.014 0.020 0.035 0.057 0.014 0.013
Barron's Highly Competitive Institutions 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.358 0.011 0.011 0.018 0.562 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.359
Barron's Most Competitive Institutions 0.069 0.028 0.034 0.041 0.069 0.028 0.034 0.041 0.069 0.028 0.034 0.041
Barron's Non-Competitive or Unclassified (ref.)
Carnegie Research I 0.209 0.287 0.012 0.000 0.208 0.286 0.012 0.000 0.209 0.287 0.012 0.000
Carnegie Research II 0.172 0.173 0.014 0.000 0.177 0.178 0.014 0.000 0.172 0.173 0.014 0.000
Carnegie Doctoral I 0.095 0.092 0.013 0.000 0.095 0.092 0.013 0.000 0.095 0.092 0.013 0.000
Carnegie Doctoral II 0.164 0.175 0.012 0.000 0.165 0.177 0.012 0.000 0.164 0.175 0.012 0.000
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive I -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive II 0.144 0.122 0.015 0.000 0.144 0.122 0.015 0.000 0.144 0.122 0.015 0.000
Carnegie Baccalaureate Liberal Arts 0.101 0.069 0.019 0.000 0.102 0.070 0.019 0.000 0.101 0.069 0.019 0.000
Carnegie Baccalaureate II 0.068 0.101 0.009 0.000 0.068 0.101 0.009 0.000 0.068 0.101 0.009 0.000
Carnegie Associates Colleges 0.075 0.035 0.027 0.006 0.074 0.034 0.027 0.006 0.075 0.035 0.027 0.006
Carnegie Professional or Special Emphasis 0.147 0.100 0.019 0.000 0.146 0.100 0.019 0.000 0.147 0.101 0.019 0.000
Carnegie Unclassified (ref.)
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
ROOM AND BOARD - PUBLIC FOUR-YEAR
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
195
Appendix C2 (Continued)












ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Log of state appropriations per FTE constant (2006) dollars -0.031 -0.059 0.008 0.000 -0.030 -0.056 0.008 0.000 -0.031 -0.059 0.008 0.000
Log endowment per FTE constant (2006) dollars 0.004 0.045 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.046 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.045 0.001 0.001
Year fixed effects
Year is 1994 0.057 0.079 0.012 0.000 0.057 0.079 0.012 0.000 0.057 0.079 0.012 0.000
Year is 1995 0.090 0.125 0.012 0.000 0.090 0.124 0.012 0.000 0.090 0.125 0.012 0.000
Year is 1996 0.085 0.118 0.012 0.000 0.085 0.118 0.012 0.000 0.085 0.118 0.012 0.000
Year is 1997 0.111 0.153 0.013 0.000 0.110 0.153 0.013 0.000 0.111 0.154 0.013 0.000
Year is 1998 0.126 0.174 0.014 0.000 0.125 0.173 0.014 0.000 0.125 0.173 0.014 0.000
Year is 1999 0.139 0.192 0.014 0.000 0.138 0.192 0.014 0.000 0.140 0.193 0.014 0.000
Year is 2000 0.152 0.210 0.015 0.000 0.152 0.209 0.015 0.000 0.151 0.208 0.015 0.000
Year is 1993 (ref.)
R-squared 0.618 0.619 0.618
N of observations 2595 2595 2595
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
ROOM AND BOARD - PUBLIC FOUR-YEAR
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Bright Futures variables
Florida -0.099 -0.034 0.079 0.206
Florida x after -0.033 -0.009 0.099 0.740 -0.098 -0.034 0.079 0.210
High BF Concentration 0.053 0.013 0.110 0.634
Low BF Concentration -0.246 -0.060 0.109 0.025
High BF Concentration x after -0.016 -0.003 0.138 0.909
Low BF Concentration x after -0.051 -0.010 0.138 0.710
Florida x 1997 0.057 0.006 0.170 0.735
Florida x 1998 0.026 0.003 0.170 0.879
Florida x 1999 -0.140 -0.022 0.133 0.293
Florida x 2000 -0.003 0.000 0.133 0.984
State characteristics
Postsecondary capacity -4.801 -0.031 3.654 0.189 -4.505 -0.029 3.643 0.216 -4.927 -0.032 3.658 0.178
State annual average unemployment rate -3.340 -0.112 1.131 0.003 -3.341 -0.112 1.127 0.003 -3.365 -0.112 1.132 0.003
Percentage of state residents 25 and older with BA -1.227 -0.108 0.346 0.000 -1.207 -0.107 0.345 0.000 -1.234 -0.109 0.346 0.000
Log per capita income constant (2006) dollars 1.540 0.437 0.126 0.000 1.536 0.436 0.126 0.000 1.543 0.438 0.126 0.000
Institution characteristics
Barron's Less Competitive Institutions -0.242 -0.189 0.033 0.000 -0.231 -0.181 0.033 0.000 -0.244 -0.191 0.033 0.000
Barron's Competitive Institutions -0.024 -0.032 0.026 0.350 -0.025 -0.033 0.026 0.335 -0.025 -0.034 0.026 0.328
Barron's Very Competitive Institutions 0.040 0.048 0.029 0.161 0.041 0.048 0.029 0.158 0.039 0.046 0.029 0.175
Barron's Highly Competitive Institutions 0.216 0.174 0.035 0.000 0.216 0.174 0.035 0.000 0.215 0.173 0.035 0.000
Barron's Most Competitive Institutions 0.229 0.166 0.045 0.000 0.222 0.161 0.045 0.000 0.227 0.165 0.045 0.000
Barron's Non-Competitive or Unclassified (ref.)
Carnegie Research I 0.403 0.281 0.042 0.000 0.391 0.272 0.042 0.000 0.402 0.280 0.042 0.000
Carnegie Research II 0.237 0.073 0.061 0.000 0.234 0.072 0.061 0.000 0.236 0.073 0.061 0.000
Carnegie Doctoral I 0.247 0.149 0.032 0.000 0.242 0.145 0.032 0.000 0.246 0.148 0.032 0.000
Carnegie Doctoral II 0.131 0.064 0.038 0.001 0.129 0.063 0.038 0.001 0.130 0.063 0.038 0.001
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive I 0.177 0.204 0.019 0.000 0.174 0.200 0.019 0.000 0.177 0.203 0.019 0.000
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive II 0.130 0.074 0.032 0.000 0.128 0.073 0.032 0.000 0.129 0.074 0.032 0.000
Carnegie Baccalaureate Liberal Arts 0.342 0.350 0.024 0.000 0.340 0.348 0.024 0.000 0.342 0.349 0.024 0.000
Carnegie Baccalaureate II
Carnegie Associates Colleges 0.245 0.092 0.050 0.000 0.243 0.091 0.049 0.000 0.244 0.091 0.050 0.000
Carnegie Professional or Special Emphasis -0.008 -0.008 0.024 0.731 -0.010 -0.010 0.024 0.679 -0.009 -0.009 0.024 0.701
Carnegie Unclassified (ref.)
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
TUITION AND FEES - PRIVATE FOUR-YEAR
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
197
Appendix C3 (Continued)












ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Log of state appropriations per FTE constant (2006) dollars -0.009 -0.028 0.007 0.195 -0.009 -0.028 0.007 0.182 -0.009 -0.029 0.007 0.177
Log endowment per FTE constant (2006) dollars 0.029 0.200 0.003 0.000 0.029 0.202 0.003 0.000 0.029 0.201 0.003 0.000
Year fixed effects
Year is 1994 -0.011 -0.010 0.026 0.680 -0.011 -0.010 0.026 0.679 -0.011 -0.010 0.026 0.675
Year is 1995 -0.010 -0.009 0.028 0.723 -0.010 -0.009 0.028 0.723 -0.010 -0.009 0.028 0.715
Year is 1996 -0.027 -0.024 0.030 0.370 -0.027 -0.024 0.030 0.367 -0.027 -0.025 0.030 0.363
Year is 1997 -0.041 -0.037 0.031 0.194 -0.041 -0.037 0.031 0.193 -0.042 -0.038 0.031 0.178
Year is 1998 -0.074 -0.067 0.038 0.055 -0.074 -0.067 0.038 0.054 -0.075 -0.068 0.038 0.051
Year is 1999 -0.085 -0.078 0.042 0.043 -0.085 -0.078 0.042 0.043 -0.083 -0.076 0.042 0.049
Year is 2000 -0.116 -0.105 0.048 0.016 -0.116 -0.105 0.048 0.015 -0.117 -0.106 0.048 0.015
Year is 1993 (ref.)
R-squared 0.666 0.668 0.666
N of observations 1264 1264 1264
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
TUITION AND FEES - PRIVATE FOUR-YEAR
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Bright Futures variables
Florida 0.043 0.026 0.064 0.502 0.044 0.026 0.064 0.497
Florida x after -0.050 -0.023 0.080 0.532
High BF Concentration 0.230 0.101 0.088 0.009
Low BF Concentration -0.142 -0.059 0.088 0.105
High BF Concentration x after 0.003 0.001 0.109 0.981
Low BF Concentration x after -0.155 -0.048 0.113 0.173
Florida x 1997 -0.017 -0.003 0.136 0.899
Florida x 1998 -0.032 -0.006 0.136 0.816
Florida x 1999 -0.120 -0.033 0.107 0.262
Florida x 2000 0.006 0.001 0.118 0.959
State characteristics
Postsecondary capacity 10.825 0.086 4.862 0.026 12.878 0.103 4.800 0.007 10.462 0.083 4.880 0.032
State annual average unemployment rate 0.498 0.027 1.141 0.663 0.255 0.014 1.124 0.820 0.472 0.025 1.142 0.680
Percentage of state residents 25 and older with BA 1.311 0.178 0.361 0.000 1.326 0.180 0.355 0.000 1.305 0.178 0.361 0.000
Log per capita income constant (2006) dollars 0.787 0.353 0.129 0.000 0.794 0.356 0.127 0.000 0.790 0.355 0.129 0.000
Institution characteristics
Barron's Less Competitive Institutions -0.230 -0.266 0.036 0.000 -0.212 -0.245 0.036 0.000 -0.233 -0.269 0.036 0.000
Barron's Competitive Institutions -0.092 -0.195 0.030 0.002 -0.100 -0.214 0.029 0.001 -0.093 -0.199 0.030 0.002
Barron's Very Competitive Institutions -0.014 -0.028 0.033 0.667 -0.021 -0.042 0.032 0.514 -0.015 -0.031 0.033 0.637
Barron's Highly Competitive Institutions 0.087 0.125 0.036 0.015 0.081 0.116 0.035 0.021 0.086 0.123 0.036 0.017
Barron's Most Competitive Institutions 0.054 0.070 0.042 0.196 0.037 0.048 0.041 0.370 0.052 0.068 0.042 0.211
Barron's Non-Competitive or Unclassified (ref.)
Carnegie Research I 0.121 0.151 0.034 0.000 0.109 0.136 0.034 0.001 0.121 0.150 0.034 0.000
Carnegie Research II 0.079 0.044 0.048 0.103 0.079 0.044 0.048 0.099 0.079 0.044 0.048 0.105
Carnegie Doctoral I 0.052 0.053 0.026 0.050 0.049 0.050 0.026 0.061 0.051 0.051 0.027 0.057
Carnegie Doctoral II -0.014 -0.011 0.033 0.665 -0.011 -0.009 0.033 0.735 -0.015 -0.012 0.033 0.650
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive I
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive II 0.049 0.051 0.027 0.065 0.053 0.055 0.026 0.043 0.049 0.051 0.027 0.065
Carnegie Baccalaureate Liberal Arts -0.035 -0.063 0.019 0.071 -0.034 -0.060 0.019 0.077 -0.035 -0.064 0.019 0.067
Carnegie Baccalaureate II -0.044 -0.079 0.017 0.010 -0.036 -0.065 0.017 0.032 -0.043 -0.078 0.017 0.011
Carnegie Associates Colleges -0.194 -0.129 0.045 0.000 -0.199 -0.132 0.044 0.000 -0.195 -0.129 0.045 0.000
Carnegie Professional or Special Emphasis -0.068 -0.071 0.032 0.033 -0.070 -0.074 0.031 0.024 -0.068 -0.072 0.032 0.032
Carnegie Unclassified (ref.)
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
ROOM AND BOARD - PRIVATE FOUR-YEAR
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Log of state appropriations per FTE constant (2006) dollars -0.001 -0.004 0.007 0.914 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.945 -0.002 -0.007 0.007 0.834
Log endowment per FTE constant (2006) dollars -0.009 -0.073 0.004 0.022 -0.008 -0.068 0.004 0.031 -0.008 -0.072 0.004 0.024
Year fixed effects
Year is 1994 0.006 0.009 0.024 0.790 0.004 0.006 0.023 0.858 0.006 0.009 0.024 0.797
Year is 1995 0.003 0.004 0.026 0.922 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.991 0.002 0.003 0.026 0.935
Year is 1996 -0.004 -0.006 0.028 0.888 -0.007 -0.010 0.027 0.792 -0.004 -0.006 0.028 0.872
Year is 1997 -0.018 -0.027 0.029 0.537 -0.021 -0.032 0.029 0.458 -0.019 -0.028 0.029 0.514
Year is 1998 -0.045 -0.067 0.037 0.223 -0.051 -0.075 0.037 0.162 -0.046 -0.068 0.037 0.214
Year is 1999 -0.051 -0.075 0.041 0.217 -0.058 -0.085 0.041 0.156 -0.050 -0.073 0.041 0.230
Year is 2000 -0.081 -0.119 0.047 0.088 -0.092 -0.134 0.047 0.050 -0.083 -0.122 0.047 0.080
Year is 1993 (ref.)
R-squared 0.444 0.463 0.445
N of observations 1014 1014 1014
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
ROOM AND BOARD - PRIVATE FOUR-YEAR
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Bright Futures variables
Florida -0.323 -0.057 0.190 0.089 -0.250 -0.036 0.228 0.272
Florida x after -0.121 -0.016 0.249 0.627
High BF Concentration 0.207 0.021 0.320 0.518
Low BF Concentration -0.692 -0.068 0.315 0.028
High BF Concentration x after -0.281 -0.023 0.399 0.480
Low BF Concentration x after -0.676 -0.049 0.414 0.103
Florida x 1997 -0.059 -0.003 0.490 0.904
Florida x 1998 0.323 0.011 0.657 0.623
Florida x 1999 -0.560 -0.037 0.383 0.145
Florida x 2000 -0.658 -0.043 0.384 0.087
State characteristics
Postsecondary capacity 3.376 0.009 13.801 0.807 -64.575 -0.135 13.903 0.000 -66.756 -0.140 13.979 0.000
State annual average unemployment rate -1.946 -0.033 2.955 0.510 4.585 0.064 3.275 0.162 4.672 0.066 3.294 0.156
Percentage of state residents 25 and older with BA -1.424 -0.062 0.947 0.133 -1.267 -0.047 1.041 0.224 -1.378 -0.051 1.046 0.188
Log per capita income constant (2006) dollars 0.336 0.049 0.324 0.299 0.646 0.080 0.354 0.068 0.660 0.082 0.356 0.064
Institution characteristics
Barron's Less Competitive Institutions -0.775 -0.298 0.098 0.000 -0.631 -0.204 0.093 0.000 -0.666 -0.215 0.094 0.000
Barron's Competitive Institutions -0.210 -0.144 0.078 0.007 -0.156 -0.087 0.071 0.027 -0.153 -0.085 0.071 0.032
Barron's Very Competitive Institutions -0.103 -0.063 0.087 0.235 -0.023 -0.011 0.081 0.778 -0.024 -0.012 0.082 0.773
Barron's Highly Competitive Institutions -0.167 -0.074 0.098 0.088 -0.112 -0.038 0.100 0.264 -0.113 -0.038 0.101 0.261
Barron's Most Competitive Institutions -0.043 -0.016 0.117 0.714 0.010 0.003 0.121 0.935 0.028 0.009 0.121 0.818
Barron's Non-Competitive or Unclassified (ref.)
Carnegie Research I 0.382 0.141 0.101 0.000 0.343 0.099 0.114 0.003 0.380 0.110 0.114 0.001
Carnegie Research II 0.577 0.099 0.147 0.000 0.511 0.067 0.176 0.004 0.523 0.068 0.177 0.003
Carnegie Doctoral I 0.063 0.021 0.080 0.429 0.062 0.016 0.093 0.509 0.084 0.021 0.094 0.370
Carnegie Doctoral II 0.302 0.065 0.119 0.011 0.037 0.008 0.107 0.730 0.041 0.009 0.107 0.706
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive I 0.203 0.121 0.050 0.000 0.204 0.098 0.055 0.000 0.218 0.105 0.055 0.000
Carnegie Masters Comprehensive II 0.024 0.008 0.078 0.753 0.076 0.018 0.092 0.409 0.081 0.020 0.092 0.379
Carnegie Baccalaureate Liberal Arts 0.645 0.359 0.062 0.000 0.575 0.247 0.069 0.000 0.584 0.251 0.070 0.000
Carnegie Baccalaureate II
Carnegie Associates Colleges -0.435 -0.072 0.143 0.002 -0.286 -0.042 0.150 0.057 -0.276 -0.040 0.151 0.068
Carnegie Professional or Special Emphasis -0.421 -0.184 0.070 0.000 -0.419 -0.170 0.068 0.000 -0.413 -0.168 0.069 0.000
Carnegie Unclassified (ref.)
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
INSTITUTIONAL GRANTS - PRIVATE FOUR-YEAR
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Log of state appropriations per FTE constant (2006) dollars 0.015 0.024 0.020 0.450 -0.091 -0.122 0.020 0.000 -0.091 -0.122 0.020 0.000
Log endowment per FTE constant (2006) dollars 0.083 0.226 0.010 0.000 0.142 0.373 0.009 0.000 0.142 0.372 0.009 0.000
Year fixed effects
Year is 1994 0.070 0.032 0.067 0.298 0.129 0.049 0.075 0.085 0.130 0.050 0.075 0.085
Year is 1995 0.108 0.048 0.074 0.147 0.160 0.059 0.082 0.053 0.162 0.060 0.083 0.051
Year is 1996 0.245 0.112 0.077 0.002 0.318 0.116 0.087 0.000 0.319 0.116 0.087 0.000
Year is 1997 0.329 0.152 0.081 0.000 0.436 0.161 0.091 0.000 0.431 0.159 0.092 0.000
Year is 1998 0.409 0.190 0.100 0.000 0.521 0.196 0.110 0.000 0.522 0.197 0.110 0.000
Year is 1999 0.392 0.182 0.111 0.000 0.549 0.214 0.120 0.000 0.555 0.216 0.121 0.000
Year is 2000 0.465 0.217 0.127 0.000 0.683 0.268 0.136 0.000 0.692 0.271 0.137 0.000
Year is 1993 (ref.)
R-squared 0.514 0.518 0.513
N of observations 1047 1229 1229
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
INSTITUTIONAL GRANTS - PRIVATE FOUR-YEAR
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
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ized Beta S.E. Sig.
Bright Futures variables -0.383 -0.130 0.049 0.000
Florida -0.383 -0.130 0.049 0.000
Florida x after 0.122 0.030 0.069 0.077
High BF Concentration -0.203 -0.049 0.068 0.003
Low BF Concentration -0.559 -0.136 0.068 0.000
High BF Concentration x after -0.034 -0.006 0.096 0.726
Low BF Concentration x after 0.274 0.047 0.096 0.004
Florida x 1997 0.059 0.007 0.108 0.583
Florida x 1998 0.149 0.019 0.108 0.166
Florida x 1999 0.102 0.013 0.109 0.348
Florida x 2000 0.184 0.022 0.112 0.101
State characteristics
Postsecondary capacity 17.276 0.048 4.277 0.000 17.273 0.048 4.272 0.000 17.146 0.048 4.280 0.000
State annual average unemployment rate -18.681 -0.376 0.770 0.000 -18.680 -0.376 0.770 0.000 -18.672 -0.376 0.771 0.000
Percentage of state residents 25 and older with BA -3.977 -0.247 0.335 0.000 -3.978 -0.247 0.335 0.000 -3.977 -0.247 0.336 0.000
Log per capita income constant (2006) dollars 2.507 0.508 0.107 0.000 2.507 0.508 0.107 0.000 2.507 0.508 0.107 0.000
Year fixed effects
Year is 1994 -0.134 -0.067 0.032 0.000 -0.134 -0.067 0.032 0.000 -0.134 -0.067 0.032 0.000
Year is 1995 -0.197 -0.098 0.033 0.000 -0.197 -0.098 0.033 0.000 -0.197 -0.098 0.033 0.000
Year is 1996 -0.229 -0.114 0.033 0.000 -0.229 -0.114 0.033 0.000 -0.228 -0.114 0.033 0.000
Year is 1997 -0.345 -0.171 0.035 0.000 -0.345 -0.171 0.035 0.000 -0.341 -0.169 0.035 0.000
Year is 1998 -0.473 -0.235 0.037 0.000 -0.473 -0.235 0.037 0.000 -0.475 -0.236 0.038 0.000
Year is 1999 -0.494 -0.244 0.038 0.000 -0.494 -0.244 0.038 0.000 -0.493 -0.243 0.039 0.000
Year is 2000 -0.656 -0.322 0.040 0.000 -0.656 -0.322 0.040 0.000 -0.659 -0.323 0.040 0.000
Year is 1993 (ref.)
R-squared 0.161 0.163 0.161
N of observations 6192 6192 6192
Note: Reference group are noted in italics for each categorical independent variable.
Control group excludes Florida competitor institutions and institutions from states that introduced merit-based aid programs before or during the study period.
Source: Analyses of IPEDS 1993 - 2000
TUITION AND FEES - PUBLIC TWO-YEAR
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Appendix B1. Coefficients, Standard Errors, and Significance for Public Four-Year Institution Response to Bright Futures Relative to
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